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I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous decisionmaking in matters affecting the body and mind
is one of the most valued liberties in a civilized society.' This liberty
encompasses the right to self-determination in medical matters as evi-
denced by the protection long accorded this entitlement under the com-
mon law.' This legal right to choose whether to submit to proposed
medical treatment has, at times, been a source of controversy between
the medical and legal professions. The physician, socialized in the values
of health and care, may deem a particular treatment medically appro-
priate and necessary. The patient may, nonetheless, assert his legal right
to refuse the intervention after weighing its benefits and risks in light
1. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
Problems of Moral Philosophy 2336 (Paul W. Taylor ed., 2d ed. 1972); Charles Fried,
An Autonomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice 34-39, 138 (1970).
2. The tort of battery includes medical procedures performed on patients without
their consent. See generally I Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts
§§ 3.1-3.3, at 211-20 (1956).
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of personal values, preferences, and fears. Even if the patient's decision
appears unwise, foolish, or life-threatening, the law requires that it be
respected if competently made.3
Perhaps at no time is this medical/legal debate more pronounced
than when institutionalized mentally disabled individuals refuse prescribed
psychiatric treatment. The therapy which has generated the most con-
troversy is the administration of antipsychotic drugs.4 This treatment
has proven successful in controlling the symptoms of psychoses. By
reducing the duration and severity of psychotic episodes, antipsychotic
medication has allowed many patients, who otherwise would have faced
long periods of hospitalization, to lead productive lives in the com-
munity.' Since their introduction in the early 1950s, antipsychotic drugs
have become the most common mode of treatment for the institution-
alized mentally ill.6 The conflict surrounding their use derives from the
fact that each antipsychotic drug is capable of producing a wide variety
of serious side effects, some of which are permanently debilitating and
even fatal.7
Following the initial observations of the drugs' efficacy, institutional
psychiatrists eschewed the potential for hazardous side effects. 8 While
the prevalence of side effects began to rise, instances of abuse in the
prescribing of these drugs also began to surface. The over-crowded and
under-staffed conditions at most public institutions invited use of the
drugs for purposes other than treatment, including restraint, punishment,
and convenience. 9 Not surprisingly, patients began to refuse this med-
ication and sought to give force to their objections through the legal
system.
3. See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
4. For commentary exemplifying the heated and emotional character of this con-
troversy, see Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case:
"Involuntary Mind Control," the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot," 137 Am. J.
Psychiatry 720 (1980); Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal,
Involuntary Medication, and "Rotting with Your Rights On," 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 327
(1980); Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse
Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 461 (1977); Stephen Rachlin, One Right Too Many, 3
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 99 (1975); Harvey Schwed, Social Policy and the Rights
of the Mentally Ill: Time for Re-examination, 5 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 193 (1980).
5. Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity,"
"Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsy-
chotic Medication, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 77, 100 (1983).
6. Barry R. Furrow, Public Psychiatry and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Toward
an Effective Damage Remedy, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 21, 24 (1984); see infra note
171 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 70-167 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
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Traditionally, courts viewed the custody, care, and treatment of
involuntarily committed mental patients to be within the complete dis-
cretion of institutional authorities.' 0 The 1960s and 1970s, however,
witnessed a breakdown of this legal immunity as advocates for the
mentally disabled attacked virtually every component of state mental
health systems. Litigated issues included the criteria for involuntary
commitment, patient rights, institutional conditions, the interplay be-
tween the criminal process and the civil mental health systems, and the
adequacy of treatment."
In many instances, lawyers and mental health professionals formed
alliances to promote legislative and judicial reform of antiquated pro-
cedures, practices, and facilities. This interprofessional relationship began
to crumble in Rennie v. Klein, 2 when the New Jersey federal district
court announced that involuntarily committed mental patients have a
legal right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. A year later the Massachusetts
federal district court issued a similar holding in Rogers v. Okin. 3 These
two cases prompted further refusal litigation in both federal and state
courts.'
4
The growing recognition of the right to refuse posed a fundamental
challenge to a well established and widely used treatment and to deeply
ingrained notions of institutional professional discretion. Psychiatrists
vehemently opposed this emerging legal concept, maintaining that it
directly contradicts their professional duty to treat the institutionalized
mentally ill." The right to refuse antipsychotic drugs soon became the
most controversial and divisive issue between the medical and legal
professions.
Most courts which have addressed the issue have recognized a right
to refuse medication although they have differed on the right's legal
10. See generally Jessica Litman, Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Med-
ication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1720 (1982).
11. See generally Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
III, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190 (1974).
12. The district court issued two opinions in Rennie. The first opinion was based on
a motion for a preliminary injunction filed on behalf of John Rennie. 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978). The second opinion was generated by a class action filed on behalf of
patients of five New Jersey state mental hospitals based on John Rennie's amended
complaint. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded,
653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S.
Ct. 3506 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
13. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated and
remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
14. See, e.g., infra notes 289, 295 and accompanying text.
15. For a listing of psychiatric literature on the topic, see Alexander D. Brooks, The
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and Policy, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 339, 340
n.2 (1987).
[Vol. 53
ANTIPS YCHOTIC DRUGS
source. Some courts have drawn upon federal constitutional provisions,
while others have relied on state constitutional, statutory, or common
law.' 6 The courts have also disagreed over which governmental interests
are sufficient to override a patient's refusal. 17 Additionally, the proce-
dural safeguards employed, which ultimately shape, define, and protect
the substantive right, have varied dramatically. Some courts have adopted
a due process procedural model, requiring judicial intervention before
a patient's refusal can be overridden in non-emergency situations.' Other
courts have deferred to professional decisionmaking by authorizing in-
house or independent medical review systems. 19 A third approach dem-
onstrates an unqualified deference to institutional decisionmaking by
allowing forced medication upon the decision of a treating physician
exercising professional judgment. 0 .
After more than a decade of litigation, the United States Supreme
Court finally addressed the refusal issue in Washington v. Harper.2 In
Harper, the Court recognized that a mentally ill convicted prisoner retains
a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 However, the Court drastically
limited the scope of this right as well as the procedural protections
which must accompany it in the prison setting.
While Harper firmly establishes that the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the decision raises
many questions. The Court did not address whether other constitutional
protections, such as those afforded by the First Amendment, may also
encompass the right to refuse.2 3 Also, the Court's extensive limitations
on the scope of this right result from a rationale developed in a recent
line of prison cases. Whether this reasoning is transferable to the civil
institutional setting is an unanswered but critical issue. And perhaps the
most important question raised and left unanswered by Harper is whether
16. See infra notes 197-309 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 339-401 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 598-626 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 533-556 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 557-597 and accompanying text.
21. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The Court avoided the issue on two previous
occasions. See Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
22. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22, 1102 S. Ct. at 1036.
23. Id. at 258 n.32, 110 S. Ct. at 1050 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Generally, the
more important a constitutionally protected right is, the stronger the government's reason
must be for infringement. Thus, whether an individual's right to refuse is outweighed by
countervailing governmental interests may very well depend on the constitutional source
upon which the right is based. See infra note 311 and accompanying text. This analysis
no longer applies in the prison environment. See infra notes 816-818 and accompanying
text.
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the minimal procedural safeguards upheld by the Court would satisfy
due process requirements outside the prison context.
The professional discord surrounding the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs reflects the inherent tension between the law's respect for the
values of self-determination and bodily integrity and the medical profes-
sion's concern for the treatment and care of the mentally ill. Another
relevant consideration is the government's interest in orderly management
and security in public institutional settings. Within a very brief time,
we have experienced the recognition of a right to refuse, and have
witnessed periods of expansion and retraction of the right. This tu-
multuous evolution represents the legal system's desperate search for the
proper balance between respect for individuality and concern for pro-
tection.
This article traces the disordered development of the right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs and attempts to analyze the complex legal, medical,
and ethical issues involved. The article begins by describing the dual
nature of the medication in providing therapeutic benefits while posing
a substantial risk of hazardous side effects. After depicting the circum-
stances which led to the initial "right to refuse" litigation, the article
analyzes the various legal grounds on which courts have based the right
to refuse.
Even when based on a constitutional source, the right to refuse is
not absolute. The right must be balanced against the government's
reasons for infringement.2' The article examines this balancing process
by taking into account the private interests at stake, the level of intru-
siveness presented by antipsychotic drugs, and the government's objec-
tives behind forced treatment.
The two governmental interests which courts have recognized as
being sufficient, under appropriate circumstances, to justify forced med-
ication are next addressed. First, the government's police power interest
in preventing a mentally ill individual from harming himself or others
is explained. While some courts authorize forced drugging based on a
mere prediction of future violent behavior, other courts limit this police
power authority to emergency situations. Second, the government's par-
ens patriae interest in caring for those individuals who are unable to
care for themselves is examined. The article explains that a traditional
precondition to forced treatment based on the parens patriae authority
is a finding that the patient is incompetent to make his own treatment
decisions. The article examines the concept of competency and describes
recent medical research which documents that many drug refusals by
mentally ill individuals are the product of rational and considered de-
cisions. An emergency exception to the competency limitation on the
24. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
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parens patriae authority is also discussed. In addition, the article ad-
dresses whether the least restrictive alternative doctrine is applicable as
another restriction on the government's ability to compel treatment under
either the police power or the parens patriae authority.
Next, the issue of procedural due process is addressed. The article
describes the three models of procedural review referred to above and
the court opinions which adopt them .2 A detailed analysis of the ap-
propriateness of these review systems is undertaken. This inquiry is
guided by the considerations announced by the Supreme Court for
determining the procedures due in a particular situation,2 6 and the most
recent medical research and empirical data on the benefits and drawbacks
of procedural due process for medication refusals are investigated.
Finally, the article analyzes the substantive and procedural com-
ponents of. the Supreme Court's decision in Harper. Although this
decision is limited to a convicted prisoner's right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs, its interpretation could impact thousands of mentally ill and
retarded individuals confined in civil institutions. In addition, as one
commentator noted, the ramifications of Harper could extend to "even
larger numbers of individuals residing in the community who are released
from civil hospitals, diverted from the criminal justice system, or paroled
from prison, on the basis that they accept treatment as a condition of
their release." ' 27 The article, therefore, concludes by examining the po-
tential effects of the Harper decision on the right of an individual to
refuse antipsychotic drugs outside the prison environment. This exam-
ination includes an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Riggins v. Nevada' in which the Court addressed the right of a pretrial
detainee to refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs.
II. THE NATURE OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Antipsychotic drugs were introduced into the United States in 1954
and released for marketing the following year. 9 These medications, also
25. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
26. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
27. Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amend-
ment Perspective, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989).
28. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
29. Chlorpromazine, a phenothiazine derivative and one of the most widely used
antipsychotic drugs, was synthesized and developed in the early 1950s by French researchers.
It was initially used as part of a "cocktail" developed as a new anesthesia. The drug
was found to alter patients' mental awareness and sedate them without inducing uncon-
sciousness. Patients receiving chlorpromazine appeared quiet and unconcerned about their
external environment. Because of these findings, the drug was tested for the treatment
of schizophrenia in 1952 and found to ameliorate psychotic episodes. Robert Julien, A
Primer of Drug Action 149-50 (5th ed. 1988); Leo E. Hollister, Clinical Use of Psycho-
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referred to as neuroleptics or major tranquilizers, are only one category
of psychoactive or psychotropic drugs. Other classes of these mood and
behavior altering drugs include the sedative-hypnotic compounds such
as barbiturates and antianxiety agents, antidepressants and convulsants,
narcotic analgesics, and the psychedelics and hallucinogens.3 0
Each class of psychoactive drugs serves a different function, and
no class is effective in treating all mental disorders." In addition, each
class poses distinct toxic effects.3 2 This article focuses on antipsychotic
drugs because of their widespread use and the conflict generated between
the rationale for their administration and the justifications for refusal.
therapeutic Drugs 3-5 (1977). The development of psychotherapeutic drugs is marked by
the fact that most were designed for other uses, with their psychiatric benefits being
discovered rather fortuitously. Id. at 5.
30. Julien, supra note 29, at 37. Neuroleptic is defined as "denoting a neurophar-
macologic agent that has antipsychotic action affecting principally psychomotor activity."
Lawrence D. Gaughan & Lewis H. LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 L. & Psychol. Rev. 43, 46 (1978) (quoting
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1041 (25th ed. 1974)). The drugs' principal effect
is on muscular action resulting from the mental processes. Id. See generally Hollister,
supra note 29, at 7 (explaining the inappropriateness of such nomenclatures and suggesting
new labels based on the actual clinical uses of the drugs); Peter R. Breggin, Psychiatric
Drugs: Hazards to the Brain 82-85 (1983) (noting that the label "major tranquilizer" is
misleading in that antipsychotic drugs do not tranquilize but instead, commonly produce
uncomfortable, suppressing effects).
31. Breggin, supra note 30, at 146. There still exists no satisfactory definition outlining
the boundaries of the concept "mental illness" or "mental disorder." See Robert L.
Sadoff, Basic Facts About Mental Illness, in Legal Rights of Mentally Disabled Persons
163 (1979); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders xxii (3d ed. Rev. 1987) [hereinafter "DSM Ill-R"]. Mental disorders include
anxiety, a term usually referring to a state of tension or uneasiness which is not traceable
to any specific source; neurosis, an emotional disorder usually accompanied by anxiety
which interferes with a person's ability to cope with life; mania, the uncontrollable, excited
phase of a manic-depressive illness; depression, characterized by pessimism and hopelessness
which can result in impairment of function and often occurs cyclically with mania; and
psychosis, a rather generic label which refers to major mental disorders characterized by
an inability to recognize reality and often accompanied by delusions, hallucinations, and
illusions. Julien, supra note 29, at 146-47. There are two major categories of psychoses:
(1) those resulting from organic brain disorders such as injury to the brain or brain
disease, and (2) those not attributable to physical or organic conditions. The latter category
is composed of three groups: the schizophrenias, characterized by disorders of thought;
the major affective disorders, characterized by disturbances of mood; and the paranoid
states, characterized by delusions. See generally DSM III-R, at 97-203; Robert Julien, A
Primer of Drug Action 122 (2d ed. 1978).
Anxiety and neurosis are commonly treated with the sedative-hypnotic compounds.
These drugs are not useful in the treatment of psychoses and manic-depressive illness, as
they can induce depression or deep sleep in patients afflicted with these conditions. The
antidepressants are likewise of little benefit to psychotic patients but are useful in treating
some forms of depression. Julien, supra note 29, at 148.
32. Julien, supra note 29, at 31.
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The largest class of antipsychotic drugs and the most commonly
prescribed are the phenothiazines. One of the first derivatives of the
phenothiazines was chlorpromazine, often known by its trade name
Thorazine. Most other antipsychotic drugs are derivatives of the phe-
nothiazine class of compounds.3" Trade names of other antipsychotic
drugs include Trilafon (brand of perphenazine), Stelazine (brand of
trifluoroperazine), Prolixin (brand of fluphenazine), Navane (brand of
thiothixene) and Haldol (brand of Haloperidol).3 4 The various types of
antipsychotic drugs share similar clinical properties although their tox-
icities may differ.35
There appears to be no widely accepted theory on the biochemical
manner in which antipsychotic drugs work.3 6 Although they differ in
chemical structure, the pharmacological action of each drug appears
similar." Because these drugs are most effective in controlling the symp-
toms of schizophrenia and the major affective disorders, many phar-
macologists believe these psychoses have a chemical origin. It is
hypothesized that psychotic episodes are caused by either a chemical
over-sensitivity or imbalance in the part of the brain that regulates
emotion and motivation. This condition causes undirected, overly-stim-
ulated neural activity resulting in schizophrenic symptomology. Since
this theory views the source of schizophrenia as chemically based, an-
tipsychotic drugs are considered the preferred treatment for alleviating
its symptoms.3 Not all pharmacologists accept this theory. Alternative
33. Id. at 155. More than 20 derivatives of phenothiazine are available for use. Julien,
supra note 31, at 127.
34. Breggin, supra note 30, at 8-10; see generally Hollister, supra note 29, at 14-20
(presenting a detailed explanation of the chemical and pharmacological differences between
the various antipsychotic drugs).
35. Breggin, supra note 30, at 8-10. For a study which compares the differences in
the onset of relief between different antipsychotic drugs, see F. S. Abuzzahab & R. L.
Zimmerman, Psychopharmacological Correlates of Post-Psychotic Depression: A Double
Blind Investigation of Haloperidol v. Thiothixene in Outpatient Schizophrenia, 43 J.
Clinical Psychiatry 105 (1982).
36. Singh & Smith, Kinetics and Dynamics of Response to Haloperidol in Acute
Schizophrenia: A Longitudinal Study of the Therapeutic Process, 14 Comparative Psy-
chiatry 363 (1979); Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 47.
37. Hollister, supra note 29, at 22.
38. Stephen Beyer, Comment, Medicine and Madness: The Forcible Administration
of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 497, 498. This view has been labeled the
dopamine theory of schizophrenia. It is hypothesized that a psychotic episode is accom-
panied by an increased level of dopamine, a biogenic amine, in the limbic system. An
alternative hypothesis is that it is not an increased level of dopamine which causes
schizophrenic symptoms but instead, an increased sensitivity of the dopamine receptors.
In either case, the effects of dopamine are apparently blunted by antipsychotic medication
which, in turn, reduces psychotic symptoms. Id. at 498 and n.6. The dopamine theory
is supported by the fact that drugs which stimulate dopamine receptors induce schizo-
phrenic-like symptoms. Julien, supra note 29, at 153.
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theories are that schizophrenia is an inherited disease or is caused by
environmental factors .39 The list of theories is growing and a consensus
does not appear imminent.4 It is estimated that up to one percent of
the general population suffers from schizophrenia. This condition is
responsible for approximately two-thirds of mental hospital admissions
and over one-quarter of all hospital admissions. 4'
The term schizophrenia means "splitting of the mind" and consists
of an apparently related collection of mental syndromes involving an
imbalance between emotional reactions and the thought content asso-
ciated with the emotions. 42 Schizophrenia may develop quickly, in which
case it is referred to as "acute." Chronic schizophrenia, on the other
hand, develops slowly over a longer period of time.4 Diagnostic symp-
toms include unrealistic thinking, severe anxiety, suspiciousness, con-
fusion, withdrawal, auditory and other hallucinations, delusions, blunted
affect, over-activity, apprehension of impending doom, and generalized
motor inhibition." Antipsychotic drugs were found to ameliorate many
of these symptoms, and their effectiveness established drug therapy as
the primary treatment for schizophrenia. 45
A. The Benefits of Antipsychotic Drugs
Before the introduction of antipsychotic drugs, there was no broadly
applicable effective treatment for psychotic patients. Patients suffering
from severe psychoses were usually hospitalized on a long-term or per-
39. See Hollister, supra note 29, at 13; Julien, supra note 29, at 152. The inheritance
theory, although not verified, is supported by studies which indicate that although the
incidence of schizophrenia in the general population is approximately 1%, among children
with one parent suffering from the condition, the incidence increases to 7%-16%. Where
both parents suffer from schizophrenia, the rate among children increases to 40%-68%.
Id. at 152.*
40. Walter A. Brown & Lawrence R. Herz, Response to Neuroleptic Drugs as a
Device for Classifying Schizophrenia, 15 Schizophrenia Bull. 123, 126 (1989) (admitting
the psychiatric profession's "complete ignorance" about schizophrenia's pathophysiology);
Breggin, supra note 30, at 66.
41. Julien, supra note 29, at 147. During any one year, 500,000 to one million
individuals will require treatment for schizophrenia. Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J.
Sadock, Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 1II 301 (3d ed. 1980).
42. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 48; Julien, supra note 29, at 146.
43. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 363, 377 (1980).
44. National Inst. of Mental Health-Psychopharmacology Service Center Collabo-
rative Study Group, Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 Archives Gen.
Psychiatry 246, 249 (1964).
45. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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manent basis.4 In 1955, the year antipsychotic drugs were released for
marketing in the United States, there were over 558,000 patients in state
mental hospitals. By 1970, however, this number had dropped to less
than 340,000 despite a dramatic increase in admissions. By 1980, the
number of patients in state mental hospitals had dropped to just over
137,000. 47 This decrease in the average length of hospitalization has been
attributed to the effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in reducing the
severity and duration of psychotic episodes and lengthening the interval
between relapses."
The above figures demonstrate that antipsychotic drugs have revo-
lutionized the treatment of psychoses. They were found to reduce hal-
lucinations, delusions, agitation, disorganized mentation, and other
psychotic symptoms. 49 Not only has this reduction in psychotic symptoms
enabled many patients to leave the hospital for productive lives in the
community, it is claimed that it also has reduced incidents of violence
and disruption among those who remain in the hospital. This, in turn,
has resulted in more humane treatment by hospital staff who now need
to depend less on physical restraint and seclusion. 0
46. Julien, supra note 29, at 149; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100. For
an explanation of other treatment modalities for the mentally ill, see Plotkin, supra note
4, at 461. Psychotherapy is one such treatment. Psychotherapy is grounded upon the
doctor-patient alliance in which emotional and mental problems are dealt with through a
conversational process over a long period of time. Id. at 481 n.130. Because schizophrenia
is believed by many to be related, in part, to environmental factors, it is generally held
that its most effective treatment is drug therapy combined with a psychotherapeutic
program. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 41, at 334; James C. Beck et al., An Empirical
Investigation of Psychotherapy with Schizophrenic Patients, 7 Schizophrenic Bull. 241
(1981); Hollister, supra note 29, at 55. However, some studies indicate that psychotherapy
provides little value in the treatment of schizophrenia and its effects provide no greater
results than drug therapy alone. Donald R. Gorham & Alex D. Pokorny, Effects of a
Phenothiazine and/or Group Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics, 25 Diseases of the Nerv-
ous System 77 (1964); Lester Grinspoon et al., Long-term Treatment of Chronic Schiz-
ophrenia, 4 Int'l J. Psychiatry 116 (1967). In addition, the value of psychotherapy as a
viable treatment modality is limited in state hospitals due to a shortage of psychiatric
staff. Plotkin, supra note 4, at 481 n.130; Eugene Z. DuBose, Jr., Of the Parens Patriae
Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient
Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 1149, 1167-68 (1976).
47. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100; Julien, supra note 29, at 149.
Between 1955 and 1965, the annual admission rate to state psychiatric hospitals nearly
doubled. Id. at 149-50.
48. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100. The typical hospital stay was reduced
from 44 days in 1971 to 26 days by 1975 and is now even shorter. Alexander D. Brooks,
Law -and Antipsychotic Medications, 4 Behavioral Sciences & L. 247, 248-49 (1986).
49. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100.
50. Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medi-
cations, 8 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 179, 182-83 (1981). However, it is also
maintained that the use of physical restraints in state hospitals has declined due to the
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It is indisputable that antipsychotic drugs provide great benefit to
many psychotic patients. However, claims of their overall effectiveness
are not without controversy. The drugs do not cure psychoses, they
merely suppress some of the symptoms while often leaving others un-
touched. 5' These medications are only effective while in the patient's
bloodstream and relapse frequently occurs once treatment is terminated.5 2
The drugs seem to be more effective in treating the symptoms of acute
schizophrenia rather than the long-term chronic cases.5 3 Studies indicating
the apparent benefits of antipsychotic medications are now being ques-
tioned on an increasing basis.5 4 Empirical studies claiming that drug
therapy is responsible for reducing the average length of hospital stays
have been disputed by studies suggesting that other factors, such as legal
reforms and the policy of deinstitutionalization, are responsible for this
decrease. 5 Furthermore, the studies attributing decreased hospital stays
to drug treatment rarely measure the scope of improved ability to cope
inappropriate use of drugs as a means of control and restraint. Sheldon Gelman, Mental
Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 Geo. L.J. 1725, 1750-51 (1984).
See also Davis v. Hubbard,.506 F. Supp. 915, 926 and n.7 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding
the prevalent use of psychotropic drugs for staff convenience and the punishment of
patients).
51. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 101; Gelman, supra note 50, at 1749;
Hollister, supra note 29, at 13-14. See also John M. Davis & Jonathan 0. Cole, Anti-
psychotic Drugs, in 5 Am. Handbook of Psychiatry 441, 445 (Daniel X. Freedman &
Jarl E. Dyrud eds., 2d ed. 1975) (noting that there are a substantial number of cases in
which the drugs fail to provide any symptomatic control).
52. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30,
at 48.
53. Brooks, supra note 50, at 183; Litman, supra note 10, at 1725.
54. Many of the studies which indicate that antipsychotic drugs are effective in
controlling psychotic symptoms have been criticized on the basis of their methodology.
The studies are intended to be double-blind, that is, neither the patients nor the investigators
know whether a drug or a placebo is administered. However, due to the neurotoxic effects
of these drugs, it is likely that both the investigator and patient are aware when a drug
is administered. Furthermore, the studies have been criticized on the grounds of bias in
choosing which symptoms are analyzed and which are ignored and in the selection of
study participants. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 55; Breggin, supra note 30, at
59-60. See also Beyer, supra note 38, at 539 and n.184 (noting criticisms of the inter-
pretations of even reliable statistical data); Mary C. Durham & John Q. La Fond, A
Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treat-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 303, 346-47 (1988) (pointing out that because
medication studies are usually performed in controlled environments with carefully designed
procedures, it is unlikely that they replicate the actual practices in public psychiatric
hospitals).
55. See Brooks, supra note 50, at 182 n.15 (citing commentary indicating that de-
institutionalization is more the product of policy, not pharmacology); Breggin, supra note
30, at 61-65 (referring to studies documenting the role of factors other than drugs in
reducing the length of hospital stays).
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with life outside the mental institution.16 While some studies show that
re-hospitalization rates for medicated patients are less than for non-
medicated patients, there are other studies which indicate that medicated
patients function no better than non-medicated patients in the com-
munity.57 In fact, there is scientific evidence that drug therapy fosters
hospital dependency and thus serves to increase the likelihood of re-
hospitalization."5
A substantial number of patients receive no benefit from antipsy-
chotic medication and some actually deteriorate while being administered
the drugs.5 9 These results are true even for acute schizophrenics despite
the claimed efficacy of the drugs in these cases. 60 Relapse while on
medication is not uncommon. 6' A number of studies indicate that many
schizophrenics actually improve after medication is terminated. 62 One
56. Gelman, supra note 50, at 1741-42; Dubose, supra note 46, at 1191-92.
57. See DuBose, supra note 46, at 1196-97; Beyer, supra note 38, at 541-42.
58. DuBose, supra note 46, at 1196-97; Beyer, supra note 38, at 541-42 and n.194.
See also J. Sanbourne Bockoven & Harry C. Solomon, Comparison of Two Five-Year
Follow-up Studies: 1947 to 1952 and 1967 to 1972, 132 Am. J. Psychiatry 796 (1975)
(suggesting that drugs may prolong the social dependencies of some discharged patients);
Breggin, supra note 30, at 58-59. Other studies have indicated that drug therapy has no
affect on post-hospitalization functioning in the community. See Brooks, supra note 50,
at 183.
59. Ross J. Baldessarini & Frances R. Frankenburg, Clozapine: A Novel Antipsychotic
Agent, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 746, 746 (1991) (twenty percent of schizophrenic patients
receive no benefit from antipsychotic drugs); Brown & Herz, supra note 40, at 123
(approximately twenty percent of schizophrenic patients are clearly resistant to even high
doses of antipsychotic drugs); T. Kolakowska et al., Schizophrenia with Good and Poor
Outcome, 146 British J. Psychiatry 229 (1985) (nearly forty-one percent of schizophrenic
patients studied received no benefit from drug treatment); Robert Prien et al., High Dose
Trifluoperazine Therapy in Chronic Schizophrenia, 126 Am. J. Psychiatry 305 (1969)
(approximately ten percent of chronic schizophrenic inpatients deteriorate on medication).
60. Beyer, supra note 38, at 540 and n.191.
61. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Replying to Letter "Ethics of Drug Discontinuation
Studies in Schizophrenia," 46 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 387 (1989) (approximately thirty
percent relapse rate despite continued drug compliance); Tobias & MacDonald, Withdrawal
of Maintenance Drugs with Long-Term Hospitalized Mental Patients: A Critical Review,
81 Psychology Rev. 107 (1974) (approximately forty percent of schizophrenic inpatients
relapse within two years of discharge despite continued medication).
62. Janos Karucz & John Fallon, Dose Reduction and Discontinuation of Antipsy-
chotic Medication, 31 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 117, 118-19 (1980) (authors estimate
that if the results of medication termination on one hospital ward could be matched
hospital-wide, approximately twenty percent of medicated patients could improve enough
to leave the hospital if drug therapy is discontinued); Prien et al., supra note 59, at 305
(fourteen percent of patients studied improved after their medication was replaced by
placebo); Stephen R. Marder et al., Predicting Drug Free Improvement in Schizophrenic
Psychosis, 36 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 1080, 1080 (1979) (eight of twenty-two schizophrenic
patients studied showed substantial improvement during drug-free period); D. Shumway
et al., "80 Percent Neuroleptic Reduction in Chronic Psychotics," presented at the 140th
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study indicated that fifty percent of chronic schizophrenic outpatients
receive no benefit from continued drug therapy. 63 Researchers studying
chronic schizophrenic inpatients concluded that withdrawal of low-dosage
maintenance drugs fail to have deleterious effects when replaced with
positive social-environmental programs." And for those patients who do
improve on medication, the scope of improvement is subject to contro-
versy. 6
Complicating the matter is the fact that the diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia is an imprecise science. It has been estimated that misdiagnosis
of schizophrenia may be as high as forty percent. This statistic suggests
that antipsychotic drugs are inappropriately prescribed in a number of
cases."6 In fact, the drugs themselves may mask psychotic symptoms
which in turn interferes with continuing diagnosis. 67 Even when there is
an accurate diagnosis, there is not yet a scientifically sound method to
determine the most appropriate antipsychotic drug to prescribe. 68 Once
a drug is selected, its proper dosage can only be determined on a trial
and error basis. As one group of researchers stated, "Drugs are chosen
by custom and rumored repute, and dosage is commonly adjusted upward
until the patient either responds or develops toxic symptoms.
'
"69
Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 1987, cited in
Brown & Herz, supra note 40, at 127-28 (study showing that nearly fifty percent of
patients either improve or remain unchanged after antipsychotic drugs are withdrawn or
dosage is reduced); John M. Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry IV 1481, 1487 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 1985) (study
showing that twenty-five percent of psychotic patients improve significantly without med-
ication).
63. George Gardos & Jonathan Cole, Maintenance Antipsychotic Therapy: Is the
Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 32, 34 (1976).
64. Gordon L. Paul et al., Maintenance Psychotropic Drugs in the Presence of Active
Treatment Programs, 27 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 106, 113 (1972). See also Phillip R.A.
May et al., Predicting Outcome of Antipsychotic Drug Treatment From Early Response,
137 Am. J. Psychiatry 1088, 1088 (1980) (substantial number of schizophrenic patients
do not deteriorate after discontinuation of drug treatment); Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas
H. McGlashan, Sustained Remission in Drug Free Patients, 144 Am. J. Psychiatry 1306,
1308-09 (1987) (finding a sustained good outcome over a prolonged postdischarge period
for a definite proportion of schizophrenic patients after drug withdrawal).
65. See Paul et al., supra note 64, at 106; Breggin, supra note 30, at 56-59. For a
detailed critique of the methodology and results of various psychiatric studies concerning
the effects of antipsychotic drugs, see DuBose, supra note 46.
66. Donald J. Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients'
Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. Legal Medicine 107, 115 (1985); Litman, supra
note 10, at 1724.
67. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 55.
68. Louis S. Goodman & Alfred Gilman, The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics
172-74 (5th ed. 1975); Hollister, supra note 29, at 30-32; Theodore Van Putten & Phillip
R.A. May, Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacotherapy: The
Consumer Has a Point, 35 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 477 (1978).
69. Plotkin, supra note 4, at 475 quoting Phillip R.A. May et al., Predicting Individual
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From this brief discussion, it should be clear that although antip-
sychotic drugs benefit many patients, there is a good deal of controversy
concerning the presence of benefit in a substantial number of cases and
the extent of benefit in others. Psychopharmacology is still in an early
stage of development and the accompanying uncertainties must be a
factor in weighing the benefits of its use against the potential costs to
the patient.
B. The Cost Side of the Equation: Side Effects of Antipsychotic
Drugs
The benefits that result from use of antipsychotic drugs must be
balanced against their temporary and permanent side effects. Although
the toxicity of each medication may differ, all antipsychotic drugs are
capable of producing a wide variety of side effects. 70 Adverse patient
reactions to the drugs were noticed shortly after their introduction into
this country. However, in the general euphoria caused by their observed
benefits, the side effects were downplayed and often ignored. 7' It is only
now that the drugs' serious side effects are receiving widespread rec-
ognition.
Side effects are prevalent even when the drugs are responsibly and
carefully administered. 72 A complete listing of side effects is beyond the
scope of this article, but the most common fall into the following general
categories:
1. Non-neurological Side Effects
At the onset of drug therapy, patients often experience drowsiness
and fatigue. The extent and duration of this sedation vary according
to the physiology of the patient, ranging from merely bothersome to
severely limiting. These effects generally dissipate as the patient becomes
more accustomed to the drug. 73
Various anticholinergic disturbances of the autonomic nervous system
may occur. Patients often experience dry mouth and throat, stuffy nose,
urinary retention, constipation and in rare cases, a type of paralysis of
Responses to Drug Treatment in Schizophrenia: A Test Dose Model, 162 J. Nervous &
Mental Disease 177, 178 (1976).
70. Timothy Howell & Ronald J. Diamond, The Use of Psychotropic Drugs in Elderly
Patients with Chronic Mental Illness, 29 New Directions for Mental Health Services 47,
51 (1986); Hollister, supra note 29, at 46-47; Breggin, supra note 30, at 70; Beyer, supra
note 38, at 512-13.
71. Brooks, supra note 50, at 183; Breggin, supra note 30, at 49; see infra notes
168-180 and accompanying text.
72. Brooks, supra note 50, at 183.
73. Kemna, supra note 66, at lll; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 51.
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the intestine (paralytic ileus).7 4 Patients may also suffer orthostatic or
postural hypotension, a faintness or dizziness upon standing up due to
a decrease in blood pressure. 7 Blurred vision often results from the
drugs' effects on the nervous system. 76 More seriously, eyesight can be
impaired by opaque deposits on the lens and cornea of the eye (ocu-
locutaneous pigmentation) or an accumulation of pigment on the retina
of the eye (retinitis pigmentosa). 77 In rare cases, high doses of thioridazine
may cause blindness. 7
Antipsychotic medication may cause sexual dysfunctions including
reduced libido and impotence. 79 Males may suffer an inability to ejaculate
or, more painful, a reversal of ejaculation into the bladder.80 The drugs
may also induce priapism, a sustained and painful erection occurring
without sexual stimulation. The erection does not subside after orgasm
and often requires emergency surgery."' Various endocrine and hormonal
disorders are not uncommon. Patients often have an increased appetite
resulting in substantial weight gain.12 Females may experience sponta-
neous lactation and irregularities in the menstrual cycle. In some cases,
menstruation may be completely blocked resulting in infertility. Breast
enlargement in males may occur. 3 Skin disorders have also been reported,
ranging from hypersensitivity and rashes to an often irreversible dis-
coloration of pigmentation." The drugs may also interfere with body
temperature regulation."
Antipsychotic drugs may cause a variety of blood disorders called
dyscrasias. Dyscrasias result from allergic or toxic effects of antipsychotic
drugs on the hematologic system. The most serious blood dyscrasia
induced by the drugs is agranulocytosis, a decrease in certain white
blood cells which destroy bacteria. This condition renders the patient
74. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 51-52; Breggin, supra note 30, at 71.
75. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 51-52; Julien, supra note 29, at 157; Kemna,
supra note 66, at 111-12.
76. Julien, supra note 29, at 157; Kemna, supra note 66, at 111.
77. Kemna, supra note 66, at 111; DuBose, supra note 46, at 1204.
78. Julien, supra note 29, at 159-60; Beyer, supra note 38, at 535-36 n.177; Breggin,
supra note30, at 71; Hollister, supra note 29, at 53.
79. Hollister, supra note 29, at 52; Beyer, supra note 38, at 535.
80. Julien, supra note 29, at 158; Breggin, supra note 30, at 71.
81. Donald G. Gold, Jr. & Joseph D. Justino, "Bicycle Kickstand" Phenomenon:
Prolonged Erections Associated with Antipsychotic Agents, 81 S. Med. J. 792, 793 (1988).
82. Hollister, supra note 29, at 52. In some cases, phenothiazines may suppress the
appetite resulting in weight loss. Julien, supra note 29, at 158.
83. Julien, supra note 29, at 158; Beyer, supra note 38, at 535.
84. Julien, supra note 29, at 159-60; Hollister, supra note 29, at 51; DuBose, supra
note 46, at 1204.
85. Julien, supra note 29, at 158; Beyer, supra note 38, at 535.
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highly susceptible to life-threatening infections."s This potentially fatal
disorder may be reversible if detected within one or two weeks of its
onset.8 7 Agranulocytosis is of special concern in the use of clozapine,
an antipsychotic drug recently approved by the Federal Drug Admin-
istration for distribution in the United States. It is estimated that up
to two percent of patients receiving clozapine will be afflicted with
agranulocytosis8 s Other serious physiological side effects of antipsychotic
drugs include cholestatic jaundice, liver dysfunction, and cardiovascular
irregularities.8 9
86. DuBose, supra note 46, at 1205-06; Beyer, supra note 38, at 537-38 and n.180;
Hollister, supra note 29, at 50-51.
87. Rathe, Two Drugs Offer Great Hope for Refractory Patients, Psychiatric Times,
July 1989, at 1, col. 3.
88. Id. A weekly blood monitoring system has been developed for patients receiving
clozapine in order to facilitate the early detections of agranulocytosis. Other common side
effects of the drug include sedation and fatigue (thirty-nine percent prevalence rate),
hypersalivation (thirty-one percent prevalence rate), tachycardia (twenty-five percent prev-
alence rate), hypotension (eleven percent prevalence rate), weight gain (thirty-four percent
prevalence rate), fever (five percent prevalence rate), and electrocardiographic changes
(two percent prevalence rate). In addition, clozapine poses a substantial risk of grand mal
seizure (one percent-two percent prevalence rate at doses below 300 mg./day; three percent-
four percent prevalence rate at doses below 600 mg./day; five percent-ten percent prevalence
rate at doses of 600-900 mg./day). Id.; Promotional Literature, distributed by Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (Nov. 1989); Baldessarini & Frankenburg, supra note 59, at 751.
A recent report stated that "[o]ther less frequent or less serious side effects include dry
mouth, tremor, stiffness, mild akathisia, headache, confusion, sweating, urinary or sexual
dysfunction, constipation, cataplexy, hypertension, low temperature, altered liver chemistry,
eosinophilia, leukocytosis, and thrombocytopenia." Id. Recent reports also associate clo-
zapine with the potentially fatal neuroleptic malignant syndrome. Del P. Miller et al., A
Case of Clozapine-Induced Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 52 J. Clinical Psychiatry 99
(1991); Eve S. Anderson & Pauline S. Powers, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome Associated
with Clozapine Use, 52 J. Clinical Psychiatry 102 (1991); Krishna DasGupta & Asja
Young, Clozapine-Induced Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 52 J. Clinical Psychiatry 105
(1991). Unlike other antipsychotic drugs, however, the risk of severe extrapyramidal side
effects associated with clozapine appears low at this early point in time. The drug is
being recommended for patients who have failed to respond to trials of at least three
other antipsychotic drugs or those individuals suffering severe extrapyramidal symptoms
which preclude the use of other antipsychotic agents. Rathe, supra note 87, at 1, col. 3.
89. Liver damage has been linked to treatment with the phenothiazines. The frequency
of liver damage has been reduced to the extent that it has all but disappeared. Hollister,
supra note 29, at 50; Breggin, supra note 30, at 71. More common is the onset of
jaundice, probably due to hypersensitivity or an allergic reaction to the drugs. Termination
of drug therapy will alleviate this condition. Id. at 71; Julien, supra note 29, at 159-60.
There is evidence which links antipsychotic drugs to various cardiovascular compli-
cations including re-polarization changes, conduction abnormalities, and various arrhyth-
mias. Claire M. Lathers & Leslie J. Lipka, Cardiac Arrhythmia, Sudden Death, and
Psychoactive Agents, 27 J. Clinical Psychopharmacology 1 (1987); Breggin, supra note
30, at 71; Ernesto B. Baello, Jr. & David J. Skorton, Effects of Psychotropic Drugs on
the Cardiovascular System, 73 J. Iowa Med. Soc'y 370, 372 (1983). Evidence also exists
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2. Neurological Side Effects
a. Extrapyramidal Side Effects
All antipsychotic medications are neurotoxic and capable of pro-
ducing a wide variety of neurologic disorders. 90 Most of these disorders
involve abnormal body motions caused by the drugs' effect on the
extrapyramidal system of the brain. The extrapyramidal system is a
nonvoluntary nervous system which controls the coordination of muscular
movements. 9'
One category of extrapyramidal side effects is parkinsonism. As its
name implies, this impairment mimics the more serious Parkinson's
disease. 92 Its symptoms include a mask-like face, tremors of the limbs,
muscle rigidity, spasms, drooling, a stooped and shuffling gait, and a
general slowing of motor responses. 93 The prevalence of parkinsonism
is disputed with estimates of the rate of infliction ranging anywhere
from five percent to ninety percent of all patients treated with antip-
sychotic drugs. 94 At least one psychiatrist believes that upon close ob-
servation, subtle parkinsonism can be detected in virtually all patients
treated with effective doses of the drugs. 95 This impairment is usually
controllable by a reduction in drug dosage or through the use of anti-
parkinsonian or anticholinergic medication.9 Parkinsonism eventually
that antipsychotic drugs may have the potential to induce fatal cardiac tachyarrhythmias.
Lathers & Lipka, supra, at 1; Beyer, supra note 38, at 536-37 and n.179; Hollister, supra
note 29, at 52-53. In addition, there is some evidence, although inconclusive, which
associates the effects of antipsychotic drugs to a number of other sudden patient deaths.
Breggin, supra note 30, at 71-73; Beyer, supra note 38, at 538-39 and nn.181-83.
90. Breggin, supra note 30, at 73-74.
91. DuBose, supra note 46, at 1203 and n.147; Kemna, supra note 66, at 112. The
risk of extrapyramidal side effects associated with the use of clozapine appears low in
comparison to other antipsychotic drugs. See supra note 88.
92. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 107; Gelman, supra note 50, at 1745.
93. Kemna, supra note 66, at 112; Beyer, supra note 38, at 530-31.
94. See studies cited in Breggin, supra note 30, at 87-88. One recent study indicated
a forty-two percent nonrecognition rate of parkinsonism by clinical psychiatrists. Peter J.
Weiden et al., Clinical Nonrecognition of Neuroleptic-Induced Movement Disorders: A
Cautionary Study, 144 Am. J. Psychiatry 1148, 1150 (1987).
95. Breggin, supra note 30, at 87-88.
96. Kemna, supra note 66, at 112; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 108.
However, a study of parkinsonism in children and adolescents found that the symptoms
of the disorder remained constant despite the use of anti-parkinsonian agents and worsened
upon the lowering of antipsychotic drug dosage. Mary A. Richardson et al., Neuroleptic
Use, Parkinsonian Symptoms, Tardive Dyskinesia, and Associated Factors in Child and
Adolescent Psychiatric Patients, 148 Am. J. Psychiatry 1322, 1326 (1991). The study also
revealed that the symptoms of parkinsonism often go unrecognized by staff clinicians
although the children "were well aware of these symptoms in themselves and their peers,
describing them as 'zombie-like' and implicating them as a reason for outpatient treatment
noncompliance." Id.
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disappears upon termination of drug therapy, although symptoms may
linger for months. 97
A subcategory of parkinsonism is akinesia, characterized by a de-
crease in spontaneous mobility and speech along with a general feeling
of listlessness and apathy.9 Even mild akinesia is socially debilitating.
This impairment is especially distressful for patients with any intellectual
interests, as reading and talking become virtually impossible. 99 Akinesia
is difficult to diagnose and is often mistaken for depression or the
negative effects of psychosis. The burden of detection is on the physician
as the patient "often denies any difficulty and is seemingly locked in
a peaceful, apathetic remoteness."'100 The emotional apathy induced by
akinesia often leads to a feeling of emptiness and depression.°'0 Studies
suggest that approximately thirty to thirty-five percent of individuals on
maintenance medication develop akinesia.10 2 Anti-parkinsonian drugs as-
sist in controlling akinesia but cannot be relied upon to completely
alleviate the impairment.'0 3
A particularly agonizing drug induced extrapyramidal side effect is
akathisia. This impairment is characterized by a painful irritability and
a persistent desire to move.'04 Symptoms can include a constant tapping
of feet, alteration of posture and shifting of legs, fidgeting, pacing, and
an inability to feel comfortable in any position. In a severe case, the
patient reaches a point of extreme agitation and panic, being unable to
remain motionless for more than a few minutes.' 5 This severe anxiety
is sometimes mistaken for the patient's original psychiatric disorder and,
97. See Breggin, supra note 30, at 88-89 (citing studies which indicate that remnants
of parkinsonism symptomology may linger for months and even years after cessation of
drug therapy); Richardson et al., supra note 96, at 1326 (citing studies which reveal that
symptoms of parkinsonism may persist up to eighteen months after discontinuation of
drug therapy).
98. Gelman. supra note 50, at 1744; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 107.
99. Brooks, supra note 50, at 184; Theodore Van Putten & Stephen R. Marder,
Behavioral Toxicity of Antipsychotic Drugs, 48 J. Clinical Psychiatry 13, 15-16 (1987).
100. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 16. One patient described the effects
of akinesia as follows: "I ceased to have any moods. I ceased to care about anything.
Nothing moved me-not even the death of my parents. I forgot what it felt like to be
happy or unhappy. Was it good or bad? It was neither. It was nothing." Id. at 15. One
recent study indicated a forty percent nonrecognition or misdiagnosis rate by clinical
psychiatrists. Weiden et al., supra note 94, at 1150.
101. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 16-17; Brooks, supra note 50, at 184.
102. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 16.
103. Id.
104. Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse to Take Their
Drugs?, 31 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 67, 68-69 (1974); Breggin, supra note 30, at 75.
105. Van Putten, supra note 104, at 68-69. Gelman, supra note 50, at 1743-44.
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on occasion, may actually exacerbate the underlying psychosis.?° Patients
often find akathisia intolerable, being more difficult to endure than the
symptoms of the underlying psychosis. 07 As one patient stated:
[The akathisia] is like an inner shakiness . . . an inner agitation.
It makes me feel more vulnerable. It's like an unprotected
feeling. The inner antsiness reaches a point where it's like I'm
standing raw in front of the world like a little child ... like
I'm standing naked in front of everybody. 08
An increasing body of recent medical research has connected severe
akathisia to both suicidal and homicidal behavior. ' 9
As with any of the extrapyramidal side effects, the methods for
detecting akathisia are in a primitive state." 0 There have been few
systematic attempts to measure the prevalence of akathisia. One early
study found that forty-five percent of the patients observed experienced
akathisia at one time or another."' A more recent study, however,
indicates a much higher prevalence rate. After only one five milligram
dose of haloperidol, sixty-four percent of the test group experienced
akathisia, with twenty-two percent suffering a severe case. At the end
of one week of treatment with a daily ten milligram dose, seventy-six
percent of the patients experienced the impairment. Sixty-three percent
of another test group experienced akathisia after four weeks of treatment
with a -fixed dose of thiothixene." 2
Some researchers believe that this syndrome can be improved by
treatment with anti-parkinsonian medications." 3 However, these addi-
106. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 14; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note
5, at 108. A mistaken diagnosis of akithisia may result in a higher dosage of antipsychotic
medication (the causative agent) administered to the patient. Theodore Van Putten, The
Many Faces of Akathisia, 16 Comprehensive Psychiatry 43, 43 (1975). This result is
disturbing in light of a recent study indicating a thirty-five percent clinical misdiagnosis
rate. In addition, the study revealed a sixty-five percent nonrecognition rate by clinical
psychiatrists. It was found that patients with unrecognized akathisia received higher doses
of antipsychotic drugs than those patients with diagnosed akathisia. Weiden et al., supra
note 94, at 1150-51.
107. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 14.
108. Quoted in Theodore Van Putten et al., Subjective Response to Antipsychotic
Drugs, 38 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 187, 189-90 (1981).
109. John N. Herrera et al., High Potency Neuroleptics and Violence in Schizophrenics,
176 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 558 (1988); Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at
14 (stating that cited case literature "reads convincingly: it is reasonable to conclude that
akathisia, in the extreme case, can drive people to suicide or to homicide."); Gelman,
supra note 50, at 1744-45 and n.97; Beyer, supra note 38, at 538-39 and nn.181-83.
110. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 13.
111. Van Putten, supra note 104, at 45.
112. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 99, at 14-15.
113. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 108.
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tional drugs tend to increase the anticholinergic side effects of antip-
sychotic medications." 4 Other psychiatrists believe that anti-parkinsonian
agents are not effective in alleviating akathisia and that dosage reduction
or complete withdrawal of antipsychotic medication is the only effective
measure."'
The dystonias are another type of extrapyramidal impairment. Dys-
tonic reactions often involve acute and very painful spasms of muscle
groups including those in the neck, face, eyes, pelvis, trunk, and the
extremities. These debilitating and grotesque spasms frequently affect
young patients and are extremely frightening." '6 Dystonias can generally
be alleviated by continuous treatment with anti-parkinsonian medica-
tions. '17
. A somewhat similar impairment, only recently associated with an-
tipsychotic drugs, is Meige's Syndrome. This disorder involves invol-
untary movements of the face, neck, and jaws with other muscles being
affected in rare cases. A typical feature of this disorder is uncontrollable
spasms of the eyelids which result in obstruction of vision." t8 Unlike
the dystonias, Meige's Syndrome does not respond to anti-parkinsonian
medication. Complete withdrawal of antipsychotic drugs may lead to
recovery if the disorder is diagnosed in its early stage." 9
The final category of extrapyramidal side effects involve the dy-
skinesias, characterized by chronic, repetitive, involuntary movements
and tremors.2 0 These bizarre movements are not usually painful but are
114. Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 52.
115. Dilip V. Jeste & Richard J. Wyatt, Understanding and Treating Tardive Dyskinesia
43 (1982). See also Herrera et al., supra note 109, at 560 (stating that "it has been well-
observed clinically that akathisia often appears despite prophylactic anti-parkinsonian
medication and is often resistant to such treatment"); Van Putten & Marder, supra note
99, at 17 (finding that even with an anti-parkinson drug, a persisting akathisia is not
uncommon).
116. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 108; Beyer, supra note 38, at 531-32.
117. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 108. However, a recent study revealed
a sixty-seven percent misdiagnosis rate with dystonic reactions often being attributed to
psychopathology. Weiden et al., supra note 94, at 1151-52. One type of dystonic disorder,
tardive dystonia, appears to be immune from treatment with anticholinergic agents in
most victims. This impairment can appear within three months of drug treatment and
may continue indefinitely in some patients even after drug therapy is terminated. Joanne
D. Wojcik et al., A Review of 32 Cases of Tardive Dystonia, 148 Am. J. Psychiatry
1055 (1991).
118. Jambur Ananth et al., Meige's Syndrome Associated with Neuroleptic Treatment,
145 Am. J. Psychiatry 513, 513 (1988).
119. Id. at 515.
120. Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 4. A tremor is "a regular rhythmic movement
of a part of the body, resulting from alternate contractions of agonist and antagonist
muscles .... The usual frequency is 3 to 12 per second, although occasionally it may
be as high as 20 per second. The body parts most commonly affected by tremors include
fingers, toes, head, and tongue." Id. at 39-41.
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often extremely distressing and disruptive to a patient. 2' Acute dyski-
nesias are usually responsive to anti-parkinsonian drugs. 22 However,
there is one type of dyskinesia which is so prevalent and dangerous that
it deserves its own separate classification.
b. Tardive Dyskinesia
Tardive dyskinesia (TD) is a syndrome associated with the chronic
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 23 TD is manifested by uncon-
trollable repetitive movements principally affecting the face, tongue,
mouth, trunk (including respiratory muscles), upper and lower extrem-
ities, neck, shoulders, and pelvis. In the more pronounced cases, patients
may have difficulty in swallowing (resulting in weight loss), talking, and
breathing (with potentially fatal results). 24 This impairment not only
presents serious physical complications, but even slight cases can be
socially disabling and embarrassing. 25 One group of medical researchers
described TD as follows:
Typically, TD begins insidiously and is initially detectable only
as worm-like contractions of the tongue when the patient is
asked to open his mouth but not protrude the tongue. In other
patients, tic-like movements of the lips, face or frequent blinking
are early harbingers of TD. Later manifestations include obvious
protruding, curling and twisting tongue movements; pouting,
sucking, smacking and puckering lip movements; retraction of
mouth corners (bridling); bulging of the cheeks; chewing and
lateral jaw movements. Finally, arms, legs, and digits can display
rhythmical movements, while involuntary swaying to and fro
trunk movements as well as abnormal postures, expiratory grunts
and noises on respiration may occur. 26
As its name suggests, the symptoms of TD usually do not appear
until later in the drug treatment program. 2 7 In some cases, however,
121. Breggin, supra note 30, at 74.
122. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 108.
123. Gideon Salzberger, Tardive Dyskinesia: A Risk in Long-Term Neuroleptic Therapy,
31 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 203, 203 (1984).
124. Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 44-54 (setting forth a detailed explanation of
tardive dyskinesia and including a vivid series of photographs showing the debilitating
effects of the disorder); Daniel E. Casey & Peter Rabins, Tardive Dyskinesia as a Life-
Threatening Illness, 135 Am. J. Psychiatry 486 (1978); DuBose, supra note 46, at 1204.
125. In one case, an institutionalized patient was unable to wear her dentures because
of involuntary mouth movements. As a result, she was put on a diet of ground food
and became the object of disparaging and humiliating staff treatment. See Brooks, supra
note 50, at 185.
126. Joseph T. Smith & Robert I. Simon, Tardive Dyskinesia Revisited, 31 Med. Trial
Tech. Q. 342, 343 (1985).
127. Id. at 342-43.
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the impairment has developed within weeks of the initiation of drug
therapy.'28 Although initial symptoms of the affliction are often reversible
by drug withdrawal, early detection of the syndrome is extremely dif-
ficult. Usually, by the time the impairment is diagnosed, it has been
present for months or years and has already become disabling. '2 9 To
make matters worse, symptoms of TD are often unmasked only by
withdrawal of medication for two to four weeks. And yet, ironically,
drug withdrawal may only aggravate the condition. In other cases,
symptoms will appear after lowering the dosage of medication. 130
The most frightening aspect of TD is that, if not detected in its
early stages, it is usually irreversible.' 3' There is no effective cure or
treatment for TD. 32 Use of anti-parkinsonian drugs is ineffective. In
fact, these agents can trigger or exacerbate the condition. The most
effective means of managing the symptoms of TD is to increase the
dosage of the antipsychotic drug. 3  However, treatment with the caus-
ative agent is unacceptable as structural brain damage may result. 34 In
fact, studies have associated TD with brain cell degeneration."'
The traditional psychiatric perception was that the risk of TD was
slight and well worth taking given the benefits of antipsychotic drugs.3 6
Although this attitude is still prevalent among institutional clinicians,3 7
recent studies have led several noted psychiatrists to label TD as a major
128. George Gardos & Jonathan 0. Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues in Tardive
Dyskinesia, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 776, 777 (1980); C. Thomas Gualtieri et al., Tardive
Dyskinesia Litigation and the Dilemmas of Neuroleptic Treatment, 14 J. Psychiatry & L.
187, 201, 204 (1987); Beyer, supra note 38, at 532; Breggin, supra note 30, at 92-93.
129. Salzberger, supra note 123, at 204; Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 57; Brooks,
supra note 50, at 185.
130. Smith & Simon, supra note 126, at 343; Hollister, supra note 29, at 49; Gualtieri
et al., supra note 128, at 199-200.
131. Salzberger, supra note 123, at 204; Breggin, supra note 30, at 90.
132. Ronald S. Lipman, Overview of Research in Psychopharmacological Treatment
of the Mentally Ill/Mentally Retarded, 22 Psychopharmacology Bull. 1046, 1052 (1986);
Gelman, supra note 50, at 1743; Beyer, supra note 38, at 533 and n. 165.
133. Salzberger, supra note 123, at 203; Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 56.
134. Hollister, supra note 29, at 50; Breggin, supra note 30, at 99-103; Gualtieri et
al., supra note 128, at 203.
135. Hollister, supra note 29, at 49; see generally Breggin, supra note 30, at 103-06
(citing studies which link neurologic syndromes induced by antipsychotic drugs with brain
pathology).
136. Brooks, supra note 50, at 185.
137. Id. at 185-86; Mark J. Mills, The Rights of Involuntary Patients to Refuse
Pharmacotherapy: What is Reasonable?, 8 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 313, 320-21
(1980); M. Jerome Fialkov & Steven Hasley, Psychotropic Drug Effects Contributing to
Psychiatric- Hospitalization of Children: A Preliminary Study, 5 J. Developmental &
Behavioral Pediatrics 325, 325 (1984); Breggin, supra note 30, at 106-07.
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public health concern.' a Due in part to the difficulty in diagnosing TD,
estimated prevalence rates vary considerably. Based on data gathered
before 1980, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) estimated an
affliction rate of ten to twenty percent for patients exposed to anti-
psychotics for more than a year. 3 9 Prevalence rates have been rising
steadily since the APA released its initial report.' Recent studies indicate
much higher prevalence rates ranging up to in excess of fifty-five percent
for patients exposed to antipsychotic drugs over a prolonged period.' 4'
Susceptibility to TD is even higher among children and the elderly.' 42
The affliction rate may be as high as sixty percent for individuals between
the ages of fifty and seventy, and seventy-five percent for patients over
seventy. 141
With increasing study devoted to the diagnosis of TD, prevalence
rates are growing annually.'" And yet, this serious disorder continues
to be underdiagnosed at an extremely high rate in clinical settings. In
138. Gardos & Cole, supra note 128, at 778; Smith & Simon, supra note 126, at 342;
Lipman, supra note 132, at 1052.
139. American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report 18, Tardive Dyskinesia (1980),
summarized in Tardive Dyskinesia: Summary of a Task Force Report of the American
Psychiatric Association, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 1163, 1165 (1980). The report questioned
other existing studies which indicated much higher affliction rates by stating that "[alt
present, it is impossible to say whether patients showing slight hyperactivity of the tongue
and slight choreic movements of the finger have tardive dyskinesia." Id. Recent studies
indicate that the higher rates were, indeed, a more accurate estimation of the prevalence
of tardive dyskinesia.
140. The American Psychiatric Association released an updated report on tardive
dyskinesia in 1992. This report summarizes several prevalence and incidence rate studies.
Tardive Dyskinesia: A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association 61-91
(1992).
141. See, e.g., Alan F. Schatzberg & Jonathan 0. Cole, Manual of Clinical Psycho-
pharmacology 99 (1986) (fifty percent-sixty percent prevalence rate); T. R. E. Barnes et
al., Tardive Dyskinesia: A 3-Year Follow-up Study, 13 Psychol. Med. 71, 80 (1983) (forty-
seven percent prevalence rate); Breggin, supra note 30, at 91-99 (citing numerous affliction
rate studies); Leo E. Hollister, Antipsychotic and Antimanic Drugs (Lithium), in Review
of General Psychiatry 590, 596 (Goldman ed., 1984) (twenty percent-forty percent prev-
alence rate); Robert Sovner et al., Tardive Dyskinesia and Informed Consent, 19 Psy-
chosomatics 172, 173 (1978) (indicating a fifty-six percent prevalence rate among chronically
hospitalized schizophrenic patients).
142. Howell & Diamond, supra note 70, at 52; Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 38;
Gualtieri et al., supra note 128, at 201.
An issue which has been largely ignored is the effects of antipsychotic and other
psychotropic medications on children. Fialkov & Hasley, supra note 137, at 329; Richardson
et al., supra note 96, at 1322; Breggin, supra note 30, at 93. However, recent studies
indicate that susceptibility to many side effects is higher among children than adults. Id.
at 98-99. And yet, the use of drugs on children is widespread. See infra note 170 and
accompanying text.
143. Breggin, supra note 30, at 92.
144. Gualtieri et al., supra note 128, at 206.
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a recent study performed at an inpatient psychiatric facility, only one
of ten patients suffering from TD was accurately diagnosed by the
clinicians.' 4' This ninety percent non-recognition rate by clinical psy-
chiatrists is corroborated by another study performed at a Veterans
Administration teaching hospital. The results of this study demonstrated
a seventy-five percent clinical non-recognition rate of TD.'4
Considering the widespread use of antipsychotic drugs in institutions
for both the mentally ill and developmentally disabled, nursing homes,
facilities for children, and the community, the above cited prevalence
rates translate into an alarming number of individuals afflicted with TD.
One physician recently stated that among the mentally retarded popu-
lation alone, there are hundreds of thousands of individuals suffering
from the syndrome.' 14 If all individuals who receive prolonged treatment
with antipsychotic drugs are considered and a conservative prevalence
rate of Lwenty percent is used, one to two million persons suffer from
TD in any given year. 4 And as of yet, there is no available method
of predicting who will be afflicted by TD and no effective way to
prevent its occurrence nor to manage its symptoms once they are dis-
played. 49 Unfortunately, despite the growing medical concern with the
problem, a solution is not in sight. s0
c. Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome
Neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS) is one of the most devas-
tating side effects of antipsychotic medication. Although documented as
early as 1958, this disorder is only now beginning to receive attention
by academic psychiatrists in this country."' The cardinal features of
145. Weiden et al., supra note 94, at 1151. The researchers concluded that "[wlithout
significant remediation of errors in diagnostic methods and training insufficiencies, it is
likely that extrapyramidal side effects will continue to be underdiagnosed at an alarmingly
high rate." Id. at 1153.
146. Id. at n.12, citing T. E. Hansen et al., TD Prevalence: Research and Clinical
Differences, in New Research Abstracts, 139th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association (1986).
147. Lipman, supra note 132, at 1052.
148. Breggin, supra note 30, at 108.
149. Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 289-90; Smith & Simon, supra note 126, at
348.
150. Jeste & Wyatt, supra note 115, at 8.
151. Harrison G. Pope et al., Frequency and Presentation of Neuroleptic Malignant
Syndrome in a Large Psychiatric Hospital, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 1227 (1986). It is not
yet known whether neuroleptic malignant syndrome ("NMS") represents a severe distri-
bution of severe extrapyramidal effects or is a distinct impairment. Id. at 1231.
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NMS are hyperthermia (fever), severe skeletal rigidity, elevated blood
pressure, tachycardia, and alterations in consciousness including delirium,
mutism, stupor, and coma. 5 2 This syndrome typically develops swiftly,
often over a twenty-four to seventy-two hour period. 53 As one medical
commentary reported, "[iunsome cases, a patient takes only a few hours
to go from symptoms without serious illness to an inability to swallow,
coma, kidney failure or brain damage.' ' 5 4
NMS can last from several days to several weeks, even after antip-
sychotic medication is discontinued."' This disorder is fatal in twenty
to thirty percent of the cases with the risk of death being even higher
when depot (sustained action intermuscular) forms of antipsychotics are
used. Death usually occurs within three to thirty days after the onset
of symptoms and is frequently caused by respiratory failure, cardio-
vascular collapse and acute kidney failure. 5 6 NMS can also cause per-
manent neurological damage, indicated by dementia and signs of
parkinsonism. 117
152. Id. at 1227; B. Bower, When Antipsychotic Drugs Can Be Lethal, 130 Sci. News
260, 260 (1986).
153. Barry H. Guze & Lewis R. Baxter, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 313 New
Eng. J. Med. 163 (1985). Some cases develop more insidiously. Gerard Addonizio et al.,
Symptoms of Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome in 82 Consecutive Inpatients, 143 Am. J.
Psychiatry 1587, 1588 (1986).
154. Bower, supra note 152, at 260.
155. When oral antipsychotic medication is used, the symptoms usually last from five
to ten days. However, when depot antipsychotics are used, the symptoms usually last
from thirteen to thirty days. David E. Sternberg, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome: The
Pendulum Swings, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 1273, 1273 (1986); Guze & Baxter, supra note
153, at 163.
156. Guze & Baxter, supra note 153, at 164; Sternberg, supra note 155, at 1273. For
a vivid description of five reported deaths associated with NMS, see Amicus Brief for
the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems at 14, Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599). A typical account is as follows:
A second man, 20 years old, was allowed to refuse drugs until he broke -one
of the ward rules. He was then forcibly injected. One day later, he was found
lying on his back with his tongue protruding outward, his head contorted in a
grotesque position, unable to speak. When these reactions subsided, his dosage
was increased and physical reactions to the drugs continued. His mother and
uncle found him stiff as a board when they visited him during the last days
of his life. The day before he died, he was drooling, shuffling around the ward
with his arms out stiffly from his side, needing assistance getting in and out
of the shower and in dressing. The next morning, he was found dead in his
bed, face down in his pillow. The county medical examiner determined that the
severe muscle stiffness resulting from Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome had
prevented him from turning over, thus resulting in death by suffocation.
Id.
157. Pope et al., supra note 151, at 1227.
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All antipsychotic drugs are capable of inducing NMS, and all patients
exposed to these agents are at risk.' The onset of this disorder does
not appear to be related to either dosage level or the duration of exposure
to antipsychotic agents.5 9 A recent study in a large psychiatric hospital
revealed an annual frequency rate of 1.4 percent. '60 However, the re-
searchers believe that they may have underestimated the frequency of
NMS. Due to the retrospective nature of their study, it is likely that
some cases occurring during the one-year period either went unrecognized
or were forgotten by hospital staff members by the time they were
interviewed. In addition, this one-year study did not take into account
patients who had previously developed NMS or who are destined to
develop it at some point in the future. The researchers concluded that
"[iln short, the probability that a patient will develop neuroleptic ma-
lignant syndrome at some point during his or her lifetime exposure to
neuroleptics might exceed our estimate.' ' 6' Another recent study, which
did not take into account milder variants of NMS, revealed a prevalence
rate of 2.4 percent. 62 When one considers that up to three million people
are exposed to antipsychotic drugs each year, these affliction rates are
alarming. 163 As one group of investigators stated, "even a conservative
estimate would place the annual prevalence of neuroleptic malignant
syndrome in the United States in the thousands of cases, a significant
number of which may have fatal consequences.''6
Despite the seriousness and prevalence of NMS, most authoritative
texts fail to even mention the syndrome.' 65 This disorder continues to
be underdiagnosed by clinicians, even in sophisticated academic hospital
settings.' 6 Due to the explosive course of this condition, lack of early
recognition can prove fatal. And even when recognized, treatment re-
mains problematic. Other than the obvious measure of immediate dis-
158. Guze & Baxter, supra note 153, at 163. The syndrome appears to be more
common in young men.
159. Id.; Sternberg, supra note 155, at 1274.
160. Pope et al., supra note 151, at 1231.
161. Id. The authors also noted that the hospital in which their study was performed
administered lower doses of drugs than do many other hospitals. Thus, if NMS is eventually
associated with the level of dosage, it is even more likely that the affliction rate is higher
than estimated.
162. Addonizio et al., supra note 153, at 1588.
163. Bower, supra note 152, at 260. In 1983, six types of antipsychotic drugs qualified
as being among the 200 most prescribed medications in the United States. Guze & Baxter,
supra note 153, at 163.
164. Pope et al., supra note 151, at 1232.
165. Sternberg, supra note 155, at 1273; Pope et al., supra note 151, at 1232.
166. Pope et al., supra note 151, at 1231-32; Addonizio et al., supra note 153, at
1587; Sternberg, supra note 155, at 1274.
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continuation of antipsychotic agents, specific treatment recommendations
have been impeded by a lack of controlled studies. 167
III. THE PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION'S INITIAL RESPONSE
The discovery of antipsychotic drugs was followed by a period of
unguarded optimism among psychiatric professionals. Psychotic patients
who were formerly unamenable to treatment were being restored to a
greater degree of normalcy, and many were able to reenter the com-
munity. Patients on institutional rolls became less agitated and functioned
more rationally, thereby reducing problems for under-staffed and over-
burdened hospital personnel.
Unfortunately, because of the remarkable efficacy of the medications
in managing the symptoms of psychoses, their limitations and dangers
went unheeded for many years. Indeed, the few psychiatrists who made
the initial effort to study and publicize the potential dangers of the
drugs were admonished and derided. 6 8 Until the early 1970s, academic
psychiatrists even ignored one of the most symptomatic and serious of
the drugs' side effects-tardive dyskinesia.16 9 Despite the growing rec-
ognition of the drugs' dangers and limitations by academic psychiatrists
in the early 1970s, the next decade was marked by a general pattern
of unawareness and apathy on the part of state institutional clinicians.
Psychopharmacology continued to increase to the point of becoming
routine therapy in public mental hospitals. 170 The use of antipsychotic
167. Addonizio et al., supra note 153, at 1589; Sternberg, supra note 155, at 1274.
168. See generally Gelman, supra note 50, at 1752-54 and nn.136-41 (describing the
adverse reaction to the efforts of Dr. George Crane in studying and publicizing the
prevalence of tardive dyskinesia and other side effects).
169. Id. at 1754.
170. Furrow, supra note 6, at 24. Antipsychotic drugs began and continue to be used
for treatment of impairments other than schizophrenia and the affective disorders. The
drugs have been used to treat chronic organic brain syndrome, serious anxiety and
depression, manic-depressive disease, and neurotic conditions. Gualtieri et al., supra note
128, at 204; Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 49. As one commentary noted,
antipsychotic drugs are sometimes used for any mental disorder which presents serious
symptoms. Id.
Antipsychotic and other psychotropic drugs are also widely used for treating behavior
and adjustment problems in juveniles. A study at one psychiatric hospital revealed that
fifty-nine percent of child and adolescent residents were being administered antipsychotic
medication. Only twenty-eight percent of these juveniles had a diagnosis of psychosis or
major affective disorder; the others were being treated for various conduct, adjustment,
developmental, and personality disorders. Richardson et al., supra note 96, at 1324, 1326.
Studies reveal that approximately two percent of school children receive psychotropic
drugs for hyperactivity and 2.3% of elementary school children in special education classes
are administered these medications. Fialkov & Hasley, supra note 137, at 325. Indeed,
one study found that a substantial number of first admissions of children for psychiatric
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drugs became and continues to be the predominant form of treatment
hospitalization are apparently due to the side effects of previously administered antip-
sychotic or other psychotropic medications. Id. at 326, 328. See also Maureen Keiffer,
Comment, Establishing Standards for Treating Children in Mental Institutions With Psy-
chotropic Drugs, 5 Pub. L. Forum 215, 217-18 (1986) (estimating that 500,000 to 600,000
school age children are currently receiving antipsychotic or other types of psychotropic
medications). In addition, fifty-one percent of institutionalized mentally retarded children
receive psychotropic drugs, with antipsychotics as the most commonly prescribed. Twenty
percent of these children have been on medication for four years or more. Fialkov &
Hasley, supra note 137, at 325. Another study found that over one-third of autistic
children have been treated with antipsychotic drugs. See Gualtieri et al., supra note 128,
at 204. As one group of medical researchers concluded:
Despite the paucity of knowledge and the complexity of the interactions between
host and pharmacological agent, many practitioners appear to maintain a "lais-
sez-faire" attitude regarding the use of psychotropic agents in children. These
drugs are often assumed to be comparatively safe and relatively free of un-
desirable effects. Consequently, these drugs may be administered to a pediatric
population on a "trial and error" basis, without due consideration of the
significant risk to the child.
Fialkov & Hasley, supra note 137, at 325.
Furthermore, antipsychotic drugs are administered to a substantial number of mentally
retarded adults. Studies indicate that up to sixty-four percent of institutionalized mentally
retarded adults receive antipsychotic medications. Many of these individuals are admin-
istered the drugs on a long-term basis ranging from four years to an indefinite period.
These studies have also revealed that the universally condemned practice of polyphar-
macology and over-prescription are not uncommon. See Gordon T. Heistad et al., Long-
term Usefulness of Thioridazine for Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Patients, 87 Am.
J. Mental Deficiency 243 (1982). Antipsychotic drugs are also used for the treatment of
borderline personality disorders. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 102 n.150. The
extensive use of antipsychotic drugs for impairments other than schizophrenia and affective
disorders remains prevalent despite serious controversy over the drugs' effectiveness and
safety in such cases. See, e.g., Breuning et al., Effects of Thioridazine on the Intellectual
Performance of Mentally Retarded Drug Responders and Nonresponders, 40 Archives
Gen. Psychiatry 309 (1983); Paul et al., supra note 64, at 107; Gaughan & LaRue, supra
note 30, at 49.
The use of these drugs is also prevalent in nursing homes despite the elderly's increased
susceptibility to side effects. A recent Massachusetts study found that approximately two-
thirds of nursing home residents are prescribed psychoactive drugs with the practice of
polypharmacology being common. Mark Beers et al., Psychoactive Medication Use in
Intermediate-Care Facility Residents, 260 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 3016, 3016, 3018 (1988).
Studies indicate that twenty-one percent-forty-four percent of nursing home residents receive
antipsychotic medication. See Judith Garrard et al., Evaluation of Neuroleptic Drug Use
by Nursing Home Elderly Under Proposed Medicare and Medicaid Regulations, 265 J.
Am. Med. Ass'n 463, 466 (1991). Most disturbing is the finding that approximately fifty
percent of the prescriptions for antipsychotic drugs are ineligible under the Health Care
Financing Administration Guidelines due to inadequate documentation of a diagnosis
supporting the drugs' use or the inappropriate clinical use of the drugs. Id. at 466-67.
Antipsychotic agents are widely used for conditions other than psychosis despite a failure
to show specific therapeutic benefits. Beers et al., supra, at 3017. Given the above evidence,
"[t]here is good reason to fear, therefore, that psychoactive drugs in general, and neu-
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in state mental health facilities.171 And yet, as recently as 1978 when
thousands of patients were suffering from tardive dyskinesia, 72 an Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association Task Force Report stated that the condition
was rare. 173 Many clinical psychiatrists overlooked symptoms of drug
side effects and when they did take notice, simply viewed them as a
sign of drug effectiveness or merely as a drug-induced behavioral dis-
order. 74 The prevailing view was that side effects, when acknowledged,
were a necessary and inconsequential cost of drug therapy. 75
The inexcusable denial of one of the drugs' most serious side effects,
tardive dyskinesia, was evidenced in 1974. Two New Jersey social workers
issued a press release revealing the prevalence of the impairment in the
Ancora State Psychiatric Hospital. The Department of Mental Health
commissioned a study of the charges by faculty members of the New
roleptics in particular,-may be used to sedate and incapacitate patients rather than as
appropriate therapy for diagnosed mental disorders." Stephen F. Jencks & Steven B.
Clauser, Managing Behavior Problems in Nursing Homes, 265 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 502,
502 (1991).
171. Aaron S. Mason et al., Patterns of Antipsychotic Drug Use in Four Southeastern
State Hospitals, 38 Diseases of the Nervous System 541 (1977) (indicating that more than
ninety-three percent of patients in four state hospitals studied were receiving antipsychotic
medications); Breggin, supra note 30, at 10-12 (citing studies indicating that from eighty-
five percent to one hundred percent of state mental hospital patients are administered
antipsychotic drugs); Lipman, supra note 132, at 1046-48. As one pair of commentators
stated:
There appears to be a general presumption that every patient should be placed
on some sort of medication, including an antipsychotic drug. These presumptions
are probably not part of any institutional policy, but rather non-normative
principles determining a widespread course of institutional professional practice.
Rarely is an institutionalized patient encountered who has never been on med-
ication. Even taking into account controlled studies which are favorable to
antipsychotic medication, the evidence suggests that these drugs are overpres-
cribed in mental institutions.
Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 53-54.
172. One cannot help but assume that tardive dyskinesia was at least as prevalent
then as it is today. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
173. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n Task Force, Professional Liability Insurance and Psychiatric
Malpractice I1 (1978) cited in Brooks, supra note 15, at 349-50 n.31.
174. Van Putten & May, supra note 68, at 478. These researchers maintain that drug-
induced discomfort or depression is generally overlooked in at least forty percent of the
cases. They note that physicians rarely inquire into how the drugs make their patients
feel. Id. at 480; Gelman, supra note 50, at 1757-60 and n.175 (citing blatant examples
of state psychiatrists ignoring obvious and painful side effects in their patients).
175. Brooks, supra note 50, at 187. For a description of one advocate's personal
experience in confronting this attitude and its effects on patients, see Gelman, supra note
50, at 1758 n.175. See also Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1302-03 (D.N.J. 1979)
(court noting that the failure to acknowledge patients' side effects "appears to be a result
of institutional self-interest. A diagnosis of possibly irreversible side effects would impugn
the wisdom of previous use of psychotropics and would necessitate less reliance on drugs
in treating the patient in the future.").
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Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry. The investigation consisted
merely of sending questionnaires to hospital doctors and reviewing patient
charts supplied by the hospitals. Not surprisingly, the investigators re-
ported that they could find no evidence of tardive dyskinesia, an in-
credible conclusion given the actual prevalence of the impairment. 7 6 This
refusal by state psychiatrists and mental health bureaucrats to acknowl-
edge existing cases of tardive dyskinesia was repeated in 1978. After
the filing of Rennie v. Klein,177 a suit challenging drug practices at
Ancora, a second study was commissioned. This investigation, performed
by state department of mental health officials, consisted only of a survey
of patient charts. Predictably, the results once again indicated no cases
of tardive dyskinesia and, in addition, indicated that the prevalence of
other drug-induced side effects was minimal. At about the same time,
Ancora hospital officials reported to the Joint Commission on Accred-
itation of Hospitals that tardive dyskinesia was nonexistent .
17
The truth behind the New Jersey investigations and reports was
revealed in testimony during the Rennie litigation. An independent expert,
Dr. George Crane, personally examined a sampling of one hundred
patients at Ancora. Dr. Crane found that twenty percent of these patients
suffered from obvious symptoms of tardive dyskinesia and in nearly all
the cases, the symptomology was not charted. Dr. Crane also reported
that another fifteen percent of the patients studied suffered from drug-
induced parkinsonism." 9 Under legal pressure, Ancora's medical director
finally admitted that approximately twenty-five to forty percent of the
hospital's patients were probably suffering from tardive dyskinesia. s0
The Rennie litigation not only revealed existing cases of drug-induced
side effects, but also widespread abuse, incompetence, and callousness
in the administration of medications.'' Inappropriate and unnecessary
drugs which actually harmed patients were regularly prescribed. Poly-
pharmacology, the universally condemned practice of administering a
variety of antipsychotic drugs at the same time, was a common practice.
Medical charts and records containing critical information were often
176. Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging-Atomistic and Structural Remedies,
32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 221, 231-32 (1983-84); Brooks, supra note 50, at 187.
177. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
178. Gelman, supra note 176, at 232-33; Brooks, supra note 50, at 187.
179. Gelman, supra note 176, at 233; Brooks, supra note 50, at 187. Other admin-
istrative investigations during this period also ignored the existence of tardive dyskinesia.
A 1975 survey of drug practices and side effects in Veterans Administration Hospitals by
the General Accounting Office made no mention of tardive dyskinesia. Gelman, supra
note 50, at. 1755 and n.152. In 1979, a similar study of New York mental hospitals
likewise ignored the existence of tardive dyskinesia. Id. at 1755 and n.153.
180. Brooks, supra note 50, at 187.
181. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. 1131.
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misplaced and lost. 8 2 Patients who resisted medication were subjected
to retaliation by doctors and staff. In one case, a patient who complained
of the distressing effects of Prolixin had his dosage doubled. In another
case, when a patient complained of a side effect, his physician withdrew
a medication intended to alleviate that side effect." 3 Patients were accused
of "faking" side effects although testimony revealed that these accu-
sations were absurd. Staff who called attention to side effects were
criticized and intimidated by their supervisors.184 The court described
doctors as "blatantly ignoring" side effects and prescribing drugs in a
"grossly irresponsible" manner. 5
Such practices were not limited to New Jersey state hospitals. A
federal court in Ohio found widespread use of antipsychotic drugs in
a counter-therapeutic manner, being prescribed merely for the conven-
ience of staff and for punitive purposes.8 6 The court found that
"[p]sychotropic drugs are . . . freely prescribed ... by both licensed
and unlicensed physicians [who] ... regularly prescribe drugs for any
patient without regard to whether he is personally assigned to the patient
or whether he has even seen the patient.' 8 7 The court further noted
that physicians often accepted recommendations by attendants for in-
creased dosages without having examined the patient.' Investigations
of hospitals in other states during the late 1970s revealed similar
practices.8 9 It is not surprising then that institutionalized mental patients
turned to the courts for legal enforcement of a right to refuse the
unwanted administration of drugs.
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
The values of bodily integrity and self-determination are deeply
imbedded in the philosophy of Western Civilization.' 90 Common law
protection of these values is displayed, in part, through the torts of
assault, battery, and infliction of emotional distress.' 9' The Supreme
182. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1301 (D.N.J. 1978).
183. Brooks, supra note 15, at 351 (describing the Rennie litigation). For detailed and
vivid accounts of such individual case histories, see Gelman, supra note 176, at 254-59.
184. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
185. Id.
186. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
187. Id. at 926.
188. Id. at 926-27.
189. See generally Brooks, supra note 50, at 189 and nn.50-51 (describing the discovery
of such practices in both California and New York state mental hospitals); Davis, 506
F. Supp. at 926 n.7 (noting that misuse of drugs is common in large institutions for the
mentally ill).
190. See supra note land accompanying text.
191. Fredrick W. Maitland, The Forms of Action of Common Law 40, 43, 53 (1985);
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
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Court has recognized the importance of these values, stating: "No right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 92
The tort of battery has long included medical procedures performed
on patients without their consent. 93 The judiciary has expanded this
protection through the development of the informed consent doctrine.
This doctrine requires that a patient's consent be made in a competent,
knowledgeable and voluntary manner in order to be legally valid.'9
Traditionally, the institutionalized mentally ill were not protected by
the informed consent doctrine. Courts were not only reluctant to subject
institutional staffs to liability in damages, 195 but there was a widespread
assumption that institutionalized patients, due to their mental impair-
ments, were per se incompetent to make rational treatment decisions.'9
As a result of this perceived inapplicability of tort law protection, lawyers
representing patients in the initial drug refusal cases turned to the United
States Constitution and state constitutions for a remedy.
A. Constitutional Sources for the Right to Refuse
A number of constitutional provisions have been relied on as sources
for the right to refuse potentially hazardous psychiatric treatments. Some
courts have relied on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. Other courts have turned to the First Amendment's
guarantees of free exercise of religion and freedom of thought and
expression as a basis for the right to refuse. Most frequently, courts
have relied upon the protections offered by the Due Process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
192. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, I1 S. Ct. 1000, 1001
(1890).
193. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972) (en banc); In re Quackenbush, 383
A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978); Schloendorf v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. App. 1914). See generally Harper & James, supra note 2, at 211-20.
194. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal.
App. ist Dist. 1957); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960). See generally
Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137 (1977);
Plotkin, supra note 4, at 486.
195. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1383 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442
(1982).
196. See Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976) (relying on "the need
for the state to assume the decision-making role regarding the psychiatric treatment for
one who, presumptively, based on the fact of commitment on the grounds of mental
illness, is unable to rationally do so for himself"). See also Denny v. Tyler, 85 Mass.
(3 Allen) 225, 227 (1861); In re Oakes, 8 L. Rep. 122, 125 (Mass. 1845). See generally
Litman, supra note 10, at 1722-23.
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1. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment has, in some limited situations, provided a valid basis for the
challenge of psychiatric interventions. 97 Although the state has a legit-
imate interest in treating committed mental patients, it does not have
such an interest in punishing them because of their illness. 98 The key
issue then becomes, what constitutes punishment as opposed to treat-
ment?
Merely characterizing an act as "treatment" does not automatically
insulate it from Eighth Amendment scrutiny.' 99 In Mackey v. Procu-
nier,2' ° for example, a state prisoner was forcibly administered the drug
succinycholine which induced sensations of paralysis and inability to
breathe, resulting in extreme fright. The state claimed the drug was
administered as part of an aversive conditioning behavior treatment
program. 20 ' The Ninth Circuit, nonetheless, applied the Eighth Amend-
ment in reversing the lower court's dismissal of the complaint and
emphasized that experimental use of the drug on fully conscious prisoners
was inappropriate. 20
2
In Knecht v. Gillman,203 inmates of a forensic mental institution
were forcibly injected with the drug apomorphine for minor breaches
of the behavior protocol. After injection, the inmates were exercised
which induced vomiting for up to an hour. The state labeled this
procedure aversive therapy and presented evidence of its long-term ben-
efits.2' 4 The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the state's "treatment"
contention and applied the cruel and unusual punishment clause while
noting the unproven nature of the drug and its painful and debilitating
effects. 205 In Nelson v. Heyne, 206 the Seventh Circuit relied on the Eighth
197. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. The Supreme Court held this amendment applicable to the states in 1947. Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S. Ct. 374 (1947).
198. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962).
199. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95, 78 S. Ct. 590, 595 (1958) (stating that the
legislative classification of a statute is not conclusive in determining an Eighth Amendment
violation. The substance of the statute must be examined as "even a clear legislative
classification of a statute as 'nonpenal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a
plainly penal statute"); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973).
200. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
201. Id. at 878.
202. Id. The drug was "recommended as an adjunct to electric-shock therapy and as
a relaxant in conjunction with administration of anesthesia." Id.
203. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
204. Id. at 1138.
205. Id. at 1140.
206. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 3183 (1974).
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Amendment in enjoining the use of antipsychotic drugs in a juvenile
correctional facility. The court emphasized the lack of monitoring by
medical personnel and the fact that the drugs were administered "not
as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but for the purpose
of controlling excited behavior.' '27
These cases indicate that courts will look through the label of
"treatment" and apply the Eighth Amendment when psychiatric inter-
vention is experimental or of unproven therapeutic benefit, is excessive
or improper, causes unnecessarily harsh adverse consequences, or is used
merely for punishment and control.2oa However, when the intervention
is part of a bona fide treatment program, the Eighth Amendment will
generally be inapplicable.2 °9 Thus, because the administration of anti-
psychotic drugs in conjunction with a treatment plan is widely accepted
as legitimate therapy, the Eighth Amendment will be of little use to
patients wanting to refuse such therapy absent exceptional circum-
stances .210
207. Id. at 356-57. See also Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating
that "neither the label which a state places on its own conduct, nor even the legitimacy
of its motivation, can avoid the applicability of the Federal Constitution. We have no
doubt that well intentioned attempts to rehabilitate a child could, in extreme circumstances
constitute cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment").
208. In Rennie v. Klein, 426 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978), the district court
found the Eighth Amendment applicable to psychiatric treatment in mental institutions,
but only when it was "found to have no proven therapeutic value and its use was not
recognized as acceptable medical practice" or "the adverse effects seemed unnecessarily
harsh" or it was "used improperly and for punishment rather than as part of an ongoing
psychotherapeutic program").
209. Id.; Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
210. David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and
the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. Va. L. Rev. 375, 417 (1981);
Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the
Law and Beyond, in The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication 7, 15 (David Rapoport
and John Parry eds., 1986). As Professor Winick points' out, in a case scrutinizing
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of "intent" behind state action
over the "affect" of the action in defining the 'term punishment. As the Court stated:
Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part of detention facility
officials, that determination generally will turn on "[w]hether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it]" . . . . Thus, if a particular condition or restriction ... is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount
to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably
related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly
may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1873-74 (1979), cited in Winick,
supra n.210, at 15.
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There is also a question as to whether the Eighth Amendment is
even applicable outside the criminal context. In refusing to apply the
cruel and unusual punishment proscription to disciplinary corporal pun-
ishment in public schools, the Supreme Court stated that the Eighth
Amendment "was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.''211 In
explaining its holding, however, the Court emphasized the safeguards
already available to public schoolchildren. The Court noted that public
schools, unlike prisons, are open institutions subject to community su-
pervision and common law constraints; thus, there is little need for the
protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment.2 1 2 One can certainly make
a convincing argument that mental institutions lack similar safeguards
and are more analogous to the prison setting.2 13 In fact, the Court
expressly withheld judgment on whether the Eighth Amendment could
be applied to involuntarily committed patients in mental institutions. 21 4
Courts remain split on this issue.2 15
211. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1409 (1977).
212. Id. at 670, 975 S. Ct. at 1416. The Court also pointed out that children in school
are generally not physically restrained from leaving during school hours and are free to
return home after the school day; they have the support of family and friends; and
witnesses are available to report any mistreatment. Id. The situation of an involuntarily
committed mental patient is much different. A state mental institution is a culture within
itself, closed-off from the general community. Many committed mental patients lack the
support of interested and caring family members and friends. In addition, the number
of witnesses willing to report instances of abuse is reduced in institutions because many
staff members tend to be protective of each other and because patients may be hesitant
to report abuse for fear of staff retaliation. See generally Erving Goffman, Asylums
(1961).
213. See supra note 212.
214. The Court stated:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be suf-
ficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they
are administered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment .... We have
no occasion in this case, for example, to consider whether or under what
circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions
can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37, 97 S. Ct. at 1411 n.37.
215. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rennie
v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981), disagreed with the district court's opinion
that the Eighth Amendment's protection extends beyond the criminal context to committed
mental patients. See supra note 208. The Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment
provided inadequate minimal protection for mental patients, stating:
It is a throwback to a more callous attitude of the past to equate the mentally
ill or retarded person's constitutional right of personal integrity to that of
criminals. We reject the eighth amendment, therefore, as the proper minimal
standard for the treatment of the plaintiff classes. They are entitled to more
humane consideration.
Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844.
The court relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), in resolving
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2. The First Amendment
The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech has provided
another basis for the right of an institutionalized individual to refuse
certain types of psychiatric treatment. 2 6 Although the amendment refers
to "freedom of speech," that clause has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to include other rights deemed essential to free speech. 1 17 The
"freedom to think" or "freedom of the mind" has been held as one
such prerequisite to free speech.2"' In holding that the First Amendment
prohibits the criminalization of the private possession of obscenity, the
Supreme Court stated that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."219
Psychiatric interventions which affect a patient's thought processes, emo-
tions, attitudes, and concentration would certainly seem to implicate
First Amendment values. 2 0
One of the initial cases applying the First Amendment to psychiatric
treatment was Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health.22'
A detainee under a sexual psychopath law was selected for experimental
psychosurgery to control his aggression. The surgery was enjoined, in
part, on First Amendment grounds. 22 The court noted that the First
Amendment "protects the generation and free flow of ideas from un-
any doubt left by Ingraham on whether the Eighth Amendment is available only to those
convicted of crimes. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844 n.10. However, the Supreme Court did not
necessarily go that far in Bell. The Court merely held that the Due Process Clause, not
the Eighth Amendment, was the appropriate vehicle for analyzing the claims regarding
conditions and restrictions brought by pretrial detainees. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S. Ct.
at 1872. The Court did not hold that the Eighth Amendment protects only those convicted
of crimes. Compare with In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) ("[T]he use of
drugs [on an involuntarily committed mental patient] for control or punishment, rather
than as part of an on-going psychotherapeutic program designed to aid the patient, violates
the eighth amendment respecting cruel and unusual punishment").
216. The First Amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech...." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court held this amendment
applicable to the states in 1925. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
217. See Winick, supra note 27, at 13-14.
218. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.
Ct. 2479 (1985) (plurality opinion). See generally Winick, supra note 27, at 17-19.
219. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565, 89 S. Ct. at 1248.
220. Winick, supra note 210, at 9. For a comprehensive overview concluding that the
First Amendment is implicated by intrusive forms of psychiatric treatment, see Winick,
supra note 27.
221. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973) reprinted
in The Legal Rights of Handicapped Persons 808 (Robert Burgdorf ed., 1980).
222. Id. at 820-22.
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warranted interference with one's mental processes. '2 3 In examining the
side-effects of psychosurgery, the court stated:
Experimental psychosurgery ... often leads to the blunting of
emotions, the deadening of memory, the reduction of affect,
and limits the ability to generate new ideas. Its potential for
injury to the creativity of the individual is great, and can impinge
upon the right of the individual to be free from interference
with his mental processes. 2 4
Other intrusive forms of psychiatric treatment have also been held
to implicate First Amendment values. After noting several adverse effects
on a patient's intellect, memory, and personality, the Seventh Circuit
held that electroconvulsive therapy may invade First Amendment inter-
ests.2 5 The Ninth Circuit held that the forced administration of the drug
succinylcholine which caused the patient in Mackey to have frightening
nightmares raised serious constitutional questions respecting "impermis-
sible tinkering with the mental processes. "226
Whether the effects of antipsychotic drugs rise to a First Amendment
level of interference with a patient's mental processes has been the.subject
of controversy. Psychiatrists have criticized judicial characterization of
antipsychotic drugs as "mind altering" and "thought controlling.' '227
They emphasize the primary effects of the medications in reducing
psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations, agitation, delusions, and
disordered thinking. And although the drugs are admittedly "mind al-
tering," psychiatrists argue that courts often fail to recognize that this
alteration in mental functioning is in the direction of normality; 28 that
although the drugs may modify behavior, the behavior which is modified
is derived from the mental illness itself.2 9 Accordingly, it is argued that
a decision not to medicate can, in fact, result in more restrictions on
freedom of thought than would occur with forced administration of the
drugs. As one psychiatrist forcefully stated after noting "the failure of
the legal mind to grasp clinical realities": 230
[A] psychosis is itself involuntary mind control of the most
extensive kind and itself represents the most severe "intrusion
on the integrity of a human being." The physician seeks to
223. Id. at 822.
224. Id.
225. Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983).
226. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973).
227. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 4; Gutheil, supra note 4; Schwed, supra note
4; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5.
228. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100, 118.
229. Id. at 80.
230. Gutheil, supra note 4, at 327.
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liberate the patient from the chains of illness: the judge, from
the chains of treatment. The way is paved for patients to "rot
with their rights on."2 31
The beneficial primary effects of antipsychotic drugs on psychotic
symptomology are widely recognized.232 The argument has been made
that even these ameliorative and normalizing effects implicate First
Amendment values. The basis of this argument is that the First Amend-
ment protects the mental process from government intrusion, even though
that mental process is characterized by disordered thought. 233
Professor Winick convincingly argues that involuntary government
alteration of the mental process, even if in the direction of normalcy,
should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 3 4 He points out that
there is no definitive method for "[dlistinguishing 'normal' from 'ab-
normal' mental states .... -231 Likewise, because of the vague criteria
for defining a mental illness, "the distinction between sane and disor-
dered thought is elusive. ' 23 6 In addition, such criteria are value laden
and inconsistently applied by clinicians.23 7 As a result of all' this im-
precision, the potential for abuse is high. 238 Finally, as Professor Winick
emphasizes, subjecting involuntary psychiatric treatment to First Amend-
ment scrutiny does not necessarily mean that the patient will go un-
treated. "Rather, it erects a presumption against forced governmental
intrusion into the mind, one that may be overcome only on a showing
of compelling necessity, thus requiring careful scrutiny both of the ends
sought by intrusive treatment and the means selected to accomplish those
ends."'239
Despite the above reasoning, courts have been hesitant to extend
First Amendment protection to disordered thoughts.24 Therefore, legal
advocates of a right to refuse antipsychotic medication generally base
their First Amendment arguments on the secondary effects of the drugs
231. Id.
232. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 100 and nn.141-42.
233. Beyer, supra note 38, at 513. This assertion has been labeled the "unconditional"
argument "because its force does not depend upon the existence of any actual impairment
but rather upon the very goal of the treatment." Id. at 514.
234. Winick, supra note 27, at 41-60.
235. Id. at 58.
236. Id. at 46.
237. Id. at 46-52.
238. Professor Winick analogizes to psychiatric practice in the Soviet Union where
political dissidents are labeled mentally ill, committed to hospitals, and subjected to
intrusive treatment to alter their views. It is not incomprehensible that many Soviet
psychiatrists view this practice as benevolent in nature. Id. at 52.
239. Id. at 60.
240. In Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (P.N.J. 1978), the court made
reference to the issue but found it unnecessary to address it.
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on a patient's otherwise normal mental processes and communicative
ability. As described earlier, antipsychotic drugs are capable of producing
numerous adverse side effects. At the onset of medication, patients often
experience drowsiness and fatigue to varying degrees. Although this
sedation often decreases for many patients as they become accustomed
to the drugs, for others it can severely limit the ability to think and
function normally.2 4'
Thus, neurological side effects impair otherwise normal mental func-
tioning and awareness and, even if they successfully treat the abnor-
mality, they do not "liberate the patient from the chains of illness. ' 242
For example, akinesia, which is characterized by a decrease in spon-
taneous mobility and speech along with a general feeling of emotional
apathy and indifference, impairs the ability to concentrate, read, and
talk. 243 Akathisia, an emotional state characterized by a painful irritability
and constant desire to move, also adversely affects mentation.244 Dystonic
reactions, often involving acute and very painful spasms of muscle groups
in the neck, face, eyes, pelvis, and extremities, can seriously interfere
with concentration and communication.2 45 In addition, the chronic, re-
petitive, involuntary movements and tremors induced by the dyskinesias
are often extremely distressing and disruptive to patients. 246 Although
many of these side effects can be reduced or alleviated by anti-parkin-
sonian medications, only a discontinuation of antipsychotic therapy will
eliminate others.2 47 Long-term use of antipsychotic drugs may perma-
nently impair memory, learning, and reasoning ability. 248
Most courts which have addressed the First Amendment issue in
right to refuse cases have concluded that First Amendment protections
can be infringed by drug side effects. 249 The Third Circuit was the first
court to recognize First Amendment guarantees as a basis for the right
241. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Winick, supra note 27, at 70-71.
242. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra
note 5, at 109.
245. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 103, 115, and 133 and accompanying text; Gutheil & Appelbaum,
supra note 5, at 109 n.190.
248. Winick, supra note 210, at 11.
249. Id. Another First Amendment argument in support of drug refusal arises from
the amendment's protection of free exercise of religion. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d
65, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S. Ct. 450 (1971), the court held that
the forced medication of an involuntary but competent mental patient over her religious
objection stated a valid First Amendment claim. Thus, a competent mental patient who
refuses antipsychotic medication on bona fide religious grounds may not be forcibly treated
absent an emergency sufficient to override the constitutional interest. Id. at 69.
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to refuse antipsychotic drugs in Scott v. Plante.250 After noting that the
variety of drugs forcibly administered to Scott can produce "a dazed
condition, engendering apathy and slowing the thought process,''25 the
court stated that "the involuntary administration of drugs which affect
mental processes, if it occurred, could amount, under an appropriate
set of facts, to an interference with Scott's rights under the first amend-
ment.
2 2
In Rogers v. Okin, z11 the Massachusetts federal district court also
referred to the First Amendment in finding a source for the right to
refuse antipsychotic medication. The court labeled the drugs as mind-
altering, but in the sense that they "reduce the level of psychotic
thinking."25 4 However, the court then focused on the range of possible
side effects which accompany drug therapy2"' and noted that the com-
munication of ideas "presupposes a capacity to produce ideas" which
is protected by the First Amendment.25 6 The court further stated:
Whatever powers the Constitution has granted our government,
involuntary mind control is not one of them, absent extraor-
dinary circumstances. The fact that mind control takes place in
a mental institution in the form of medically sound treatment
of mental disease is not, itself, an extraordinary circumstance
warranting an unsanctioned intrusion on the integrity of a human
being. 25 7
250. 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1101, 102 S. Ct.
3474 (1982).
251. Scott, 532 F.2d at 945 n.8.
252. Id. at 946. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(favorably citing First Amendment cases in finding a constitutional right to refuse anti-
psychotic medication while basing its holding on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
253. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), qff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
254. Id. at 1360.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1367.
257. Id. The court's opinion can possibly be interpreted as supporting the "uncon-
ditional" argument that First Amendment protections encompass the generation of even
disordered thought. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. In finding First Amendment
implications, the court made the broad statement that "psychotropic medication has the
potential to affect and change a patient's mood, attitude and capacity to think." Id. at
1366 (emphasis added). The court also stated that "[the right to produce a thought ...
is a fundamental element of freedom." Id. at 1367. These statements, standing alone,
could imply that any thought, even if psychotic, is entitled to First Amendment protection.
However, the court noted that "[w]ithout the capacity to think, we merely exist, not
function." Id. It is doubtful that the court intended psychotic thought to be included
within the statement "capacity to think" which allows "functioning." See Beyer, supra
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0
In Bee v. Greaves,258 the Tenth Circuit stated that the First Amend-
ment protects both the capacity to produce and to communicate ideas.23 9
After noting the adverse side effects of antipsychotic medications, 216 the
court concluded that "[a]ntipsychotic drugs have the capacity to severely
and even permanently affect an individual's ability to think and com-
municate. "261
In the 1987 panel decision of United States v. Charters (Charters
I),261 the Fourth Circuit found that a pretrial detainee retained a con-
stitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs based, in part, on the First
Amendment. 263 The court noted that even if a patient's mental disorder
renders him incapable of making treatment decisions, he may, none-
theless, remain capable of engaging in other activities protected by the
First Amendment. Drug side effects may, however, diminish these oth-
erwise unaffected capabilities. 264 The court compared the potential effects
of antipsychotic drugs on a patient's freedom of thought with the effects
of psychosurgery, stating, "There is, at least, no principled distinction
between the chemical invasion of drug therapy and the mechanical
invasion of surgery.' '263 The court concluded that "[s]uch mind altering
medication has the potential to allow the government to alter or control
thinking and thereby to destroy the independence of thought and speech
so crucial to a free society.' '26 However, this decision was deprived of
its precedential effect by an en banc review of the case. 267 Although a
constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication was affirmed, the
note 38, at 517. In addition, the court later concluded that "a competent patient has a
fundamental right to decide to be left alone, absent an emergency situation." Rogers,
478 F. Supp. at 1367. This statement indicates that even if the court intended to protect
psychotic thinking, it was relying primarily on an individual's right to privacy. See id.
at 1366 & n.28. See also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. -Supp. 915, 933 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(stating that "[ilt is enough to observe that 'the power to control men's minds' is 'wholly
inconsistent' not only with the 'philosophy of the first amendment but with virtually any
concept of liberty') (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66, 89 S. Ct. 1243,
1248 (1964)).
258. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985).
259. Id. at 1393-94.
260. Id. at 1390-91 & nn.3-4.
261. Id. at 1394.
262. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
263. Id. at 490.
264. Id. at 489. The court noted that "[tlhe drugs may affect mood and emotion,
dull the senses and make reading and concentration difficult." Id.
265. Id. Numerous courts have likened the intrusiveness of treatment with antipsychotic
medication to that of electroshock and psychosurgery. See infra note 326.
266. Id. at 492.
267. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990) (Charters II).
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court based this holding on a due process liberty interest rather than
on the First Amendment.26 8
It should be noted that there may be some limitations on First
Amendment applicability to involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment.
In Rennie v. Klein,269 the district court suggested that the First Amend-
ment could be implicated by the forced administration of antipsychotic
drugs, stating, "Any court must be deeply concerned with potential state
control of individual thought and carefully scrutinize instances of forced
psychiatric treatment. ' 270 The court, however, relied on the constitutional
right to privacy, rather than the First Amendment, as a basis for the
right to refuse. 2 1 The court declined to apply the First Amendment for
two reasons. First, because the plaintiff asserted in his action a desire
and right to be treated and cured, he was deemed to have Waived his
First Amendment claim against the hospital's efforts to alter his thinking
disorder.272 The facts of this particular case were the basis for the court's
second reason. It was noted that the plaintiff's ability to perform on
intelligence tests was not impaired and that his side effects were only
expected to last a short period. 273 The court concluded that this "tem-
porary dulling of the senses" did not rise to the level of a First
Amendment violation. 274
The assertion of a desire and right to be treated and cured would
appear to be an inappropriate justification for holding that a waiver of
First Amendment claims has taken place. The mere fact that a person
asserts a desire to receive treatment does not mean that he is willing
to submit to any type of treatment regardless of its risk/benefit ratio.
If a proposed treatment has the primary or secondary effects of inter-
fering with a person's otherwise functional mental or communicative
processes, that person should retain his First Amendment protections
from those undesired consequences regardless of any initial assertion of
a right to treatment. The particular treatment, in that instance, should
not be deemed appropriate or adequate to meet the patient's desires
and asserted rights. 27
268. Id. at 305-06.
269. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
270. Id. at 1144.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See generally Shari L. Kahn, Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the
Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric Patient, 33 Emory L.J. 441 (1984) (setting forth a
philosophical explanation of why the emerging constitutional right to adequate treatment
for involuntarily committed mental patients is consistent with a constitutional right to
refuse particular psychiatric interventions).
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The court's second reason for not applying the First Amendment-
that the plaintiff's side effects in this particular case were not serious
and were of short duration-indicates that there may be some minimum
level of impairment which must be reached before courts will apply First
Amendment scrutiny 7.2 6 Patients react differently to antipsychotic med-
ications depending on their physiology, the type and number of drugs
administered, the dosage and the duration of their use. Rennie suggests
that First Amendment applicability will depend, in part, on the eviden-
tiary showing of the drugs' potential side effects in any particular case. 277
3. Liberty and Self-Autonomy
Even after legal confinement, an individual retains a constitutionally
protected right to remain free from unwarranted government intrusions
upon his person.2 78 This right has been cast in various terms, often
depending on the type of proposed governmental action, including a
liberty interest in bodily integrity, 279 freedom from restraint,280 personal
security, 28' or as an aspect of the right to privacy.282
Recently, in Washington v. Harper,283 the United States Supreme
Court held that a convicted prisoner "possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 284 Pre-
viously, the Court had held that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital for treatment in a mandatory behavior modification program
implicated one of the historic liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause: "[a] right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief
276. This requirement arises from what has been termed the "conditional" analysis
of First Amendment applicability. Unlike the "unconditional" argument, see supra note
233 and accompanying text, conditional application of the amendment's protections depends
upon whether there is an impairment of the patient's normal mental processes by the
treatment and how serious that impairment is. See Beyer, supra note 38, at 513.
277. See Winick, supra note 27, at 75 (asserting that the typical treatment program
with antipsychotic drugs will exceed any de minimis level of intrusiveness required for
First Amendment scrutiny).
278. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982); Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263-64 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 688, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2572 (1978).
279. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836 (1966).
280. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316, 102 S. Ct. at 2458; Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2109 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
281. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16, 102 S. Ct. at 2458; Hutto, 437 U.S. at 683,
98 S. Ct. at 2570.
282. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1616 (1985); Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S. Ct. at 1835.
283. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
284. Id. at 221-22, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
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for, unjustified intrusions on personal security." '285 In a case involving
the commitment of juveniles into a state mental hospital, the Supreme
Court stated that "[it is not disputed that a child, in common with
adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnec-
essarily for medical treatment .... 11116 And in Youngberg v. Romeo,28 7
the Court held that an involuntarily committed mentally retarded in-
dividual retains Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in reasonably
safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily re-
straint, and such minimally adequate training as is reasonably necessary
to assure those interests. 28
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Harper, numerous
federal and state courts applied this liberty or privacy interest in freedom
from unjustified governmental intrusions to involuntary treatment with
antipsychotic drugs. 2 9 For example, in Bee v. Greaves2'9 the Tenth Circuit
285. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1413 (1977)).
286. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 89 S. Ct. 2493, 2503 (1979). The Supreme
Court has held that involuntary commitment to a mental institution constitutes a "massive
curtailment of liberty." Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S. Ct. 1048, 1052
(1972). See also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131, 110 S. Ct. 975, 986 (1990) (an
individual has a "substantial liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital").
287. 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
288. Id. at 316, 102 S. Ct. at 2458.
289. United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 979 (8th Cir.), reh'g granted in part,
vacated in part sub nom., United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Watson v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990) (intrusion on personal security
represented by the "potential of psychotropic drugs for altering a patient's mental processes
and the risk of severe side effects" gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest).
Accord Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984); Opinion of the Justices,
465 A.2d 484, 489 (N.H. 1983); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 400 N.W.2d 1, 6
(Wis. App. 1986), aff'd, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st
Cir. 1980). Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-31 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (constitutional
liberty interest implicated by compulsory treatment with antipsychotic drugs because such
treatment invades bodily integrity and personal dignity). Accord Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp.
& Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 249-50 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987), opinion superceded,
751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), dismissed, 774 P.2d 698 (1989); In re Mental Commitment of
M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ind. 1987); United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977,
979 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Williams v. Wilzack,
573 A.2d 809, 820 (Md. 1990); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983); Savastano v. Saribeyoglu, 480 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (S. Ct.
1984); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980); Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A,
mem. op. at 9 (S.D. ist Cir. 1987), aff'd, 438 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (table opinion),
reported in 11 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 327 (1987); State ex rel. Jones v.
Gerhardstein, 400 N.W.2d at 6; Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 653. United States v.
Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317
(1990) (forced drugging is analogous to the intrusion presented by physical restraints and
therefore gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest). Accord Dautremont v.
Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp.
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held that pretrial detainees retain a liberty interest in "freedom from
physical and mental restraint of the kind potentially imposed by antip-
sychotic drugs. ' 291 The Third Circuit stated that the forced administration
of antipsychotic drugs "implicates the 'right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security'....
This intrusion rises to the level of a liberty interest warranting the
protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 29
A second interest protected by the constitutional privacy doctrine is
the right to make fundamental decisions in certain matters concerning
one's person. This right of self-autonomy was first accorded constitu-
tional recognition by the United States Supreme Court in 1965 . 29 Courts
have reasoned that this right encompasses the same values protected by
the common law doctrine of informed consent. 294 Ironically, courts have
1319, 1321 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d
399, 406 (Ariz. 1986); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570, 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (forced medication implicates the con-
stitutionally protected interest in privacy which encompasses the right to protect one's
mental processes and bodily autonomy from government interference). Accord Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d at 653; Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 n.9 (3d Cir. 1976); Souder
v. McGuire, 432 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical
Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50; Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-49 (Minn. 1988);
Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A, mem. op. at 9.
290. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985).
291. Id. at 1393.
292. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102
S. Ct. 3506 (1982) (citation omitted).
293. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). The Constitution
does not expressly mention the right to privacy and various constitutional provisions have
been pointed to as its source. In Griswold, Justice Douglas' plurality opinion stated that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras" which create "zones of privacy"
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 484, 85 S. Ct. at
1681. In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, found the right to privacy emanating from the Ninth Amendment. Id.
at 487, 85 S. Ct. at 1683 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan found that the privacy
right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus encompassed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 500, 85 S. Ct. at 1690 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-3 at
1308-12 (2d ed. 1988).
294. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 931-33 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (the constitutional
right of privacy to refuse medication is based on the tort law concept of informed consent);
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (the. constitutional privacy right
to refuse medical treatment "accords with the usual common law rule against involuntary
medical treatment") (citing Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985, 92 S. Ct. 450 (1971)); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (the constitutional privacy right arises "from
the same regard for human dignity and self-determination" as that encompassed by the
informed consent doctrine).
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not hesitated in utilizing this branch of the privacy doctrine as a source
for the right to refuse psychiatric treatment despite the traditional notion
that the mentally ill were incapable of providing informed consent.2 95
In Davis v. Hubbard,29 an Ohio federal district court stated that
the forced administration of psychotropic drugs implicates the "principle
that the constitution recognizes the individual's right to make intimate
decisions which fundamentally affect the individual. 2 97 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that:
an individual has a constitutionally protected interest in making
his own decision whether to accept or reject the administration
of potentially dangerous drugs .... Thus, we agree ... that
the decision whether to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs
is of sufficient importance to fall within this category of privacy
interests protected by the Constitution. 291
Similarly, in Rogers v. Okin,299 the First Circuit stated:
We begin our analysis with what seems to us to be an intuitively
obvious proposition: a person has a constitutionally protected
interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself
whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical
295. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144-45 (constitutional right of privacy includes a patient's
decision to accept or decline treatment with antipsychotic drugs); Jarvis v. Levine, 418
N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988) (right to refuse treatment with neuroleptic drugs is en-
compassed within the state constitutional right to privacy as "the final decision to accept
or reject a proposed medical procedure and its attendant risks is ultimately not a medical
decision, but a personal choice"); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 9.10 (Minn. 1976)
(right to refuse electroshock is encompassed within the "concept of personal autonomy-
the notion that the Constitution reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion,
certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or her life"); Rivers
v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (mentally ill patient has state constitutional
liberty interest with respect to "decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to
insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from
unwanted interference with the furtherance of his own desires"); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d
747, 749-50 (Okla. 1980) (right to refuse based on constitutional right of privacy which
recognizes that "liberty includes the freedom to decide about one's own health"); In re
Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Wash. 1986) (even an incompetent mental patient retains
the constitutionally protected privacy interest to choose "one type of medical treatment
over another, or to refuse medical treatment altogether"); Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40, 51 n.9 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing a constitutionally protected interest in being
left free to decide whether to submit to treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
296. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
297. Id. at 932-33.
298. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
299. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (ist Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
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treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs.3a°
However, in its recent opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,3 °0 the Supreme Court appears to have limited
the scope of the constitutional privacy doctrine by suggesting that it
does not encompass the right to refuse medical treatment. In a footnote
to the majority opinion drafted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
stated that "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right to
refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of
privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly
analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." 30 2 The
Court then cited its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick"3 in which it held
that consensual homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right of the
type protected by the constitutional privacy doctrine.) 4
B. Common Law and Statutory Sources
As explained above, the institutionalized mentally ill were tradition-
ally deprived of the protections afforded by the informed consent doc-
trine due to their perceived incompetency. Evidence brought forth in
treatment refusal litigation and through medical research, however, has
documented the fact that many mentally ill individuals are capable of
making informed treatment decisions. 0 As a result, judicial reluctance
to apply the common law as a form of relief for the forced treatment
of mentally ill patients is declining. 3°0
300. Id. at 653.
301. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
302. Id. at 2851 n.7.
303. 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
304. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 & n.7. For ramifications of the Court's preference
in labeling the right to refuse treatment as a liberty interest rather than as a right protected
by the privacy interest in personal decisionmaking, see infra notes 332-334 and accom-
panying text.
305. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated,
458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657-59 (lst Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Davis
v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d
961, 973 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986);
In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980); Mills, supra note 137, at 321; Richard
Jaffe, Problems of Long-term Informed Consent, 14 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L.
163, 167 (1986); James C. Beck, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Psychiatric
Assessment and Legal Decision-Making, 11 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 368,
369 (1987).
306. See, e.g., Nolen v. Peterson, 544 So. 2d 863, 867 (Ala. 1989); Riese v. St. Mary's
Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 249 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987), opinion
superseded, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), dismissed, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); Keyhea v.
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Virtually every state now has legislation which provides that mentally
ill individuals are not deemed incompetent to exercise personal and civil
rights solely by reason of commitment or mental health treatment. °7
Some courts have relied on this type of legislation in finding a statutory
right to refuse antipsychotic medication. 0 s In addition, since the initial
drug refusal cases, a number of states have enacted legislation which
specifically provides for at least a qualified right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs and other intrusive forms of psychiatric treatment.3a 9
V. BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Even when a constitutional source is relied on to support a patient's
refusal of antipsychotic drugs, there is no guarantee that the refusal
will be upheld. Constitutional rights are not absolute; they must be
balanced against the government's reasons for infringement. 10 Generally,
the more important the constitutionally protected interest, the stronger
the government's justification must be to override the interest.' As
explained earlier, an individual has a constitutionally protected liberty
or privacy interest in being free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sions. Whether an intrusion is unwarranted depends upon its nature and
the justification supporting it. At a minimum, a governmental infringe-
ment of this protected liberty or privacy interest must be "reasonably
related to legitimate government objectives." ' 2 However, as the intru-
Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 754 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d
961, 967 (Colo. 1985); Goedecke v. State Dep't of Inst., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979);
In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 74 (II. App. 4th Dist. 1988); Rogers v. Commissioner of
Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983); In re Guardianship of Roe,
421 N.E.2d 40, 41, 51 n.9 (Mass. 1981); In re Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Wash.
1986).
307. See Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot"
Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. Rev.
447, 471-72 nn.87-88 (1990) (listing state legislation providing that individuals committed
to institutions do not forfeit civil rights and are not automatically presumed incompetent);
Samuel V. Brakel et al., The Mentally Disabled and the Law 375 and Table 7.2 (1985)
(survey of the relationship between involuntary institutionalization and legal competence
in state legislation).
308. E.g., Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846 n.12; Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A, mem.
op. at 8-9 (S.D. 1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 438 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (table opinion).
309. See Blackburn, supra note 307, at 466-72 (describing state legislation on the right
to refuse psychiatric treatment).
310. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2461 (1982); Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299, 102 S. Ct. 2442, 2448 (1982).
311. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1976). See generally Tribe, supra
note 293, at § 15-9, 1329-37. The United States Supreme Court has carved an exception
to this rule in a recently developed line of prison cases. See infra notes 814-818 and
accompanying text.
312. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320, 102 S. Ct. at 2460. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 539, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1874 (1979).
19921
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
siveness of the government's action rises, the sufficiency of its justifi-
cation must also increase. Highly intrusive conduct must be supported
by a compelling governmental interest and a showing that there are no
less intrusive means available to achieve the objective." 3
Thus, in Schmerber v. California,3 4 the United States Supreme Court
validated the slight intrusion into "human dignity and privacy" presented
by a pin prick for a blood test based on the legitimate state interest
in gathering evidence of a crime."' The Court qualified its holding by
emphasizing a number of factors, including the necessity of the test,
the fact that it was performed by a physician in a hospital environment,
and the lack of potential adverse side effects.31 6 However, in Winston
v. Lee,3"7 the Supreme Court held that the surgical removal of a bullet
under general anesthesia for the same legitimate purpose of collecting
evidence of a crime is impermissible when other evidence of the crime
already exists.' s And in Rochin v. California,2 9 the Court invalidated
the forced insertion of a stomach pump, even if it is the only available
means of collecting criminal evidence, because the legitimate state interest
did not justify the highly intrusive procedure.3 20 Various attempts have
been made at defining criteria for measuring the intrusiveness of gov-
ernment action. 2' Professor Tribe believes that some of the crucial
313. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1619-20 (1985); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-70, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834-35 (1966). See generally Tribe,
supra note 293, at § 15-9, 1329-37.
314. 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966).
315. Id. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836.
316. Id. at 772, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. Other factors the Court referred to include the
high effectiveness of the test in accomplishing its purpose; that such tests are commonplace;
the blood extracted was minimal; that for most people, the test involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain; and the petitioner did not protest on grounds of fear, concern for health,
or religious reasons. Id. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. The Court emphatically limited its
holding to the particular facts of the case and stated:
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That
we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the State's minor intrusions
into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates
that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id.
317. 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
318. Id. at 755-56, 105 S. Ct. at 1614. The Court noted that the surgery sought by
the state was "an example of the 'more substantial intrusion' cautioned against in Schmer-
ber ..... Id. at 755, 105 S. Ct. at 1614. The Court further stated that "[a] compelled
surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence ... implicates expectations of
privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if
likely to produce evidence of a crime." Id. at 759, 105 S. Ct. at 1616.
319. 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
320. Id. at 172, 72 S. Ct. at 209-10.
321. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. 1976), where the court
listed the following considerations in determining the intrusiveness of psychiatric treatment:
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factors to consider are "the presence of physical pain, the creation of
anxiety and apprehension of medical or other damage, the permanence
of any disfigurement or any ensuing complication, the risk of irreversible
injury to health, and the danger to life itself."32 ' Professor Tribe main-
tains that it would be proper for courts to invalidate "an intrusion that
fared ill along any of those dimensions. ' 3 23 Additionally, he suggests
(1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns and mental activity
effected by the treatment, (2) the risks of adverse side effects, (3) the experimental
nature of the treatment, (4)"its acceptance by the medical community of this
state, (5) the extent of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain connected
with the treatment, and (6) the patient's ability to competently determine for
himself whether the treatment is desirable.
Another proposed set of criteria for measuring the intrusiveness of government action on
mental processes contains the following considerations:
(i) the extent to which the effects of the therapy upon mentation are reversible;
(ii) the extent to which the resulting psychic state is "foreign," "abnormal" or
"unnatural" for the person in question, rather than simply a restoration of his
prior psychic state .... ; (iii) the rapidity with which the effects occur; (iv) the
scope of the change in the total "ecology" of the mind's functions; (v) the
extent to which one can resist acting in ways impelled by the psychic effects
of the therapy; and (vi) the duration of the change.
Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 237, 262 (1974). For criticism of
Shapiro's criteria in the context of First Amendment analysis, see Rhoden, supra note
43, at 390-96. For additional commentary on the intrusiveness of psychiatric treatment,
see Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 Minn.
L. Rev. 331 (1981); Alan A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition
103-05 (1976).
322. Tribe, supra note 293, at § 15-9, 1333.
323. Id. More generally, Tribe lists four separate tests, any of which would constitute
an unauthorized intrusion on the body: "(1) that the imposition was deficient in procedural
regularity, or (2) that it was needlessly severe, or (3) that it was too novel, or (4) that
it was lacking in a fair measure of reciprocity." Id. at 1332. The criteria stated are those
for determining whether the intrusion is needlessly severe.
In explaining the first test regarding procedural regularity, Tribe feels that because
bodily invasions are not as easily remedied by damage awards as deprivations of property,
"the state, absent a clear emergency, must precede any deliberate invasion by an adversary
hearing, even if only an informal one." Id. Thus, absent an emergency, the forced
administration of drugs which is not preceded by a prior adversarial hearing would arguably
be excessively intrusive.
Whether the third test is met-that the treatment of mental illness with antipsychotic
drugs, is, as of yet, too novel-is a debatable issue. Tribe's criteria for this test is
frequency and regularity of use demonstrating wide acceptability. Id. at 1334. Antipsychotic
drugs are regularly prescribed and are well-accepted by the psychiatric community as an
effective treatment for psychoses. However, their efficacy is not without serious contro-
versy. This form of treatment is relatively new, the drugs' physiological action remains
undetermined, whether they will be effective or harmful for any particular patient is not
known until after administration, and dosage is determined on a trial and error basis.
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that any intrusion sufficiently minimal to pass the above test should,
nonetheless, be invalidated if there are any less restrictive means available
to effectively achieve the government's objective.3 24
The forced administration of antipsychotic drugs appears to meet
several of Tribe's suggested criteria. It should also be emphasized that
antipsychotic drugs act directly upon the chemical structure of the brain
in a manner which is not yet understood and the effects of these drugs,
both primary and secondary, cannot be resisted. 25 While the appropri-
ateness of these and other proposed criteria can be disputed, it appears
that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs is a highly intrusive
form of treatment. Therefore, a compelling government justification is
needed to override the individual's protected interest in remaining free
from unwarranted governmental intrusions of this nature. 2 6
When the constitutional source of the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs is the privacy interest in personal decisionmaking, the government
See supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.The fourth test, that of reciprocity, is intended to "minimize the danger that a bodily
invasion will be justified solely on the basis that the greater good of the society is served
thereby," so that the person cannot be used "as means to the ends of others .. "
Tribe, supra note 293, at 1334-35. When drug therapy is used as part of a bona fide
treatment program rather than for patient control and convenience of staff, this standard
would not appear to be violated.
324. Id. at 1333-34.
325. See id. at 1327 ("there is little doubt that constitutional objections to coercive
therapy rise in direct proportion to the therapy's power to produce changes against the
will of the person subjected to it, and to the irreversibility of any such results."); Winick,
supra note 321, at 365-68.
326. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 489 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990) (likening
the "chemical invasion of drug therapy" to the "mechanical invasion" of psychosurgery;
In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 52-53 (Mass. 1981):
We can identify few legitimate medical procedures which are more intrusive
than the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication .... Because of both
the profound effect that these drugs have on the thought processes of an
individual and the well-established likelihood of severe and irreversible side effects
... we treat these drugs in the same manner we would treat psychosurgery or
electroconvulsive therapy.
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 146 (Minn. 1988) (explanation of why antipsychotic
drugs are as intrusive as electroshock and psychosurgery); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747,
749.51 (Okla. 1980) (a compelling state interest is needed to override a competent patient's
refusal of antipsychotic drugs, the effects of which can be classified with those resulting
from electroshock and psychosurgery); Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 362-64 (Wash.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)
(requiring a compelling state interest to override a refusal because antipsychotic drugs are
no less intrusive than electroshock).
For an analysis of various criteria proposed for measuring the concept of intrusiveness
and how under any such criteria the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs should
be deemed highly intrusive, hazardous, and uncertain, see Beyer, supra note 38, at 528-
42.
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must likewise justify its intrusion with a compelling objective. The right
to freedom of choice in certain matters affecting a person's life has
been found to be of "fundamental" value. 317 The freedom to make
such decisions has been characterized as 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' or 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition.' 3 2 And, as the Supreme Court has stated, "Where such 'fun-
damental rights' are involved ... regulation limiting these rights may
be justified only by a 'compelling state interest."' 3 9 In addition,
"[L]egislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.1 330
As described earlier, however, the Supreme Court has recently in-
dicated that the right to refuse medical treatment is more properly
classified as a liberty interest rather than as an aspect of the right to
privacy. 33 1 Such classification suggests that the Court is unwilling to
grant "fundamental" status to the right to refuse treatment. This de-
termination is surprising considering the common law's historical rec-
ognition of the value of self-determination in medical matters.3 2 This
decision, however, is in accord with the Court's earlier opinion in Bowers
in which it suggested that the only fundamental decisionmaking rights
encompassed by the privacy doctrine are those concerning family, mar-
riage, or procreation, which have been previously recognized.333 The
Court indicated its unwillingness to add to these established fundamental
rights by stating that "[t]here should be . . . great resistance to expand
the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments] particularly if it requires redefining the category
of rights deemed to be fundamental. 334
The scope of the right to refuse treatment has been diminished by
its characterization as a liberty interest. A fundamental right encompassed
within the privacy doctrine can be overridden only by a compelling
327. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726-27 (1973). See generally
John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Jesse N. Young, Constitutional Law 371 (4th
ed. 1991).
328. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92, 102 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (citations
omitted).
329. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728. Accord Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1338 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
627, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 1889-90 (1969); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368 (D. Mass.
1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom.
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d at 751.
330. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728.
331. See supra notes 301-304 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
333. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
334. Id. at 195, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
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governmental objective. However, when classified as a liberty interest,
a refusal of treatment-at least when such treatment is deemed less than
highly intrusive-may be outweighed by a mere rational or legitimate
governmental interest.
When the First Amendment is utilized as the basis for the right to
refuse, there is no question that the government's interest must be
compelling. First Amendment protections have traditionally enjoyed a
"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional rights.335 There-
fore, an encroachment on these protections 'cannot be justified upon
a mere showing of a legitimate state interest'. . . . The interest advanced
must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the
government to show the existence of such an interest.''336 Furthermore,
in achieving its interest, the government "must do so by narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily inter-
fering with First Amendment freedoms .... It is not enough to show
that the government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully
tailored to achieve those ends. 33 7 Indeed, given the historical and deep-
seated value attributed to First Amendment interests, "the first amend-
ment claim should stand as the most significant barrier protecting in-
voluntary mental patients against state imposition of mind-altering
drugs." 38
VI. THE GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Courts have identified two governmental interests which, under ap-
propriate circumstances, may justify the forced administration of anti-
335. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115, 63 S. Ct. 870, 876 (1943).
336. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2684 (1976). Accord West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (1943);
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27, 109 S. Ct. 2829,
2836 (1989). In limited situations addressing certain types of expression, such as commercial
and sexually explicit speech, the Supreme Court has used a less exacting standard of
review. See, e.g., Posados de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.
Ct. 2968 (1986); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S. Ct. 925
(1986). However, as Professor Winick points out:
Unlike these activities ... the mentation and expressive conduct of the mentally
ill serve important values within the core of those traditionally protected by the
first amendment. As a result, this lesser scrutiny applied in cases involving what
some members of the court regard as "lower value" speech should be inapplicable
in the context of forced treatment of the mentally ill. Because freedom of mental
processes is a predicate for the exercise of all first amendment protection,
including the "exacting scrutiny" typically applied in the first amendment con-
text.
Winick, supra note 27, at 91-92.
337. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S. Ct. at 2836 (citations omitted).
Accord Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252-53 (1960); Elrod,
427 U.S. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 2684-85.
338. Comment, The Forcible Medication of Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients
with Antipsychotic Drugs-Rogers v. Okin, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 739, 760 (1981).
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psychotic drugs. The first is the government's police power interest in
preventing the mentally ill from harming themselves or others. The
second is the government's parens patriae authority to care for those
citizens who are unable to care for themselves 3 9 The situations in which
these government objectives are deemed sufficient to outweigh an in-
dividual's interest in refusing treatment have not been uniformly defined
and vary according to the particular jurisdiction.
A. The Police Power
While it is undisputed that the state has a legitimate interest in
preventing the mentally ill from harming themselves or others, a40 the
issue is: under what circumstances does this interest become sufficient
to override the patient's interest in refusing medication? Courts ad-
dressing this question have agreed that while the police power interest
authorizes the state to commit a mentally ill individual to prevent physical
harm to himself or others, the authority does not automatically extend
to involuntary treatment of that person once confined) a41 Even when
the initial commitment is based on emergency grounds, that finding
alone does not indicate that the person will continue to present a threat
to himself or others once hospitalized.3 42 The state's police power to
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs must be justified within the in-
stitutional environment rather than the community setting.
The scope of the state's police power authority has been defined in
terms of either an "emergency" or "dangerousness" standard or both.
Courts have used these labels interchangeably, but there is a major
difference in scope between the underlying standards. Although the literal
definitions vary slightly, emergency authority is limited to situations
where the threat of physical violence is current or imminent.3 43 In emer-
339. Note, supra note 11, at 1212, 1307-09.
340. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979); Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1980).
341. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S.
Ct. 450 (1971); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368-69 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2422 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J.
1978); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747,
751 (Okla. 1980). But see Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 297-300 (8th
Cir. 1987) (basing the police power authority to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs
on a hospitalized patient's previous activity within the community).
342. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (N.H. 1983); State ex rel. Jones v.
Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 894 (Wis. 1987).
343. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1313 (D.N.J.), stay denied in
part, granted in part, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1981) (an emergency is a
"sudden, significant change in the patient's condition which creates danger to the patient
himself or to others in the hospital"); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570, 573 (Ariz. Ct.
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gency situations, courts agree that the state's police power is sufficient
to justify forced administration of drugs for a limited time period, at
least when no less intrusive measures are available. 344 Some courts have
expanded the scope of the police power authority by employing a "dan-
gerousness" standard. Under this standard, forced medication is au-
thorized on the prediction that a patient will present a future threat of
violence if not on medication. Courts have differed on the criteria and
procedures necessary to authorize forced treatment based on danger-
ousness.
In Rennie v. Klein,345 the district court upheld police power authority
to administer antipsychotic medication on the basis of dangerousness.
The standard the court employed required an informal adversarial pro-
ceeding presided over by an independent psychiatrist as decisionmaker. 46
The court's standard broadly defined dangerousness as "the patient's
physical threat to other patients and staff at the institution. 3 47 However,
the court held that a threshold finding of dangerousness is only one
factor in the forced medication determination. The decisionmaker must
then weigh the potential for permanent side effects from the proposed
medication. Consideration must also be given to the availability of less
restrictive treatments .341
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the sufficiency of the police
power authority to medicate forcibly based on a dangerousness stan-
dard.34 9 The circuit court, however, vacated the lower court's required
App. 1982) (an emergency situation is "an immediate threat of physical injury"); Rivers,
495 N.E.2d at 343 (an emergency means "imminent danger to a patient or others in the
immediate vicinity"); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d
308, 321 n.25 (Mass. 1983) (an emergency calls for "immediate action").
344. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396-97 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985) (emergency treatment cannot be extended indefi-
nitely); Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1313-14 (limiting emergency treatment to seventy-two
hours); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 975 (Colo. 1985) (court approval for emergency
treatment must be obtained as soon as practicable); Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 322 (requiring
judicial authorization for continued emergency treatment); In re Guardianship of Roe,
421 N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 1981) (judicial review of emergency treatment must be obtained
with reasonable diligence).
345. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), stay denied in part, granted
in part, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
346. Id. at 1314. The court criticized the in-house review process established by a
New Jersey regulation as being compromised by institutional pressures. Id. at 1310. For
an explanation of the different procedural models adopted by courts for forced medication
determinations, see infra notes 533-626 and accompanying text.
347. Id. at 1297.
348. Id.
349. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845-48 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119,
102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
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procedures and balancing considerations which the lower court held had
to accompany the initial prediction of dangerousness before medication
could be authorized. Instead, the Third Circuit found adequate the
-existing New Jersey regulatory procedures which left the dangerousness
determination and the resulting decision to medicate within the judgment
of hospital psychiatrists subject to supervisory review. 5 0
In Rogers v. Okin,35 the district court also justified forced admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs based on the police power standard of
dangerousness. The court rejected a "psychiatric" definition of dan-
gerousness proffered by the state as being "too broad, subjective and
unwieldy. 3 5 2 Instead, the court required a situation in which a failure
to medicate would result in a "substantial likelihood of physical harm
to that patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution." '
Although this definition is more restrictive than the one adopted in
Rennie, the court did not temper this initial predictive determination
with any further balancing of other considerations.
On appeal, the First Circuit drastically broadened the district court's
dangerousness standard for involuntary medication.31 4 The appellate court
accepted the state's argument that a requirement of predicting a sub-
stantial likelihood of physical harm is "overly rigid and unworkable" 5 5
and criticized the lower court's definition as a "simplistic unitary stan-
dard" forcing psychiatrists to make impossible predictions of violence
that meet a "quantitative level of probability."135 6 Instead, the First
Circuit instructed the district court to design procedures which would
merely ensure that state psychiatrists exercise professional judgment in
medication determinations based on police power grounds.3 7 The court
noted that professional judgments should be based on such considerations
350. Id. at 851.
351. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
352. Id. at 1365. The state argued that forced medication would be justified in the
following situations: (1) suicidal behavior, whether seriously meant or a gesture; (2)
assaultiveness; (3) property destruction; (4) extreme anxiety and panic; (5) bizarre behavior;
(6) acute or chronic emotional disturbance having the potential to seriously interfere with
the patient's ability to function on a daily basis; (7) the necessity for immediate medical
response in order to prevent or decrease the likelihood of further severe suffering or the
rapid worsening of the patient's clinical state. Id. at 1364.
353. Id. at 1365 (emphasis added). Although the court labeled this situation an emer-
gency, it is actually a dangerousness standard based on a prediction of violence if
medication is not administered.
354. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
355. Id. at 654-55.
356. Id. at 656.
357. Id. at 656-57.
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as "the possibility and type of violence, the likely effects of particular
drugs on a particular individual, and an appraisal of alternative, less
restrictive courses of action." '358
In Bee v. Greaves,3 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed the state's police
power authority to medicate jailed pre-trial detainees. The court indicated
a concern over whether the concededly legitimate goals of jail safety
and security were sufficiently compelling to justify the forced admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs. The court concluded that "[a]bsent an
emergency . . . we do not believe forcible medication with antipsychotic
drugs is 'reasonably related' . . . to the concededly legitimate goals of
jail safety and security." 316 However, despite this concern and the use
of the term "emergency," the court appeared to fashion a broad dan-
gerousness standard similar 'to the one adopted by the First Circuit in
Rogers. The court held that the determination of whether a situation
exists sufficient to warrant involuntary treatment is within the discretion
of state medical authorities.3 61 The court left the balancing of the jail's
safety concerns against the inmate's interest in refusal to the professional
judgment of those state authorities.3 62 However, the Tenth Circuit did
require that the medical decisionmakers evaluate all "the relevant cir-
cumstances, including the nature and gravity of the safety threat, the
characteristics of the individual involved, and the likely effects of par-
ticular drugs. 3 63 The court also required consideration of available, less
restrictive courses of action such as segregation or the use of tranquilizers
or sedatives. 3"
Although the criteria and requirements vary, other courts have af-
firmed the use of the dangerousness standard in authorizing forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs.165 The Colorado Supreme Court
fashioned the most restrictive standard of dangerousness and required
that the forced medication determination under this standard be made
by a court of law.366 The court ruled that a threshold determination
358. Id. at 655-56.
359. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985).
360. Id. at 1395 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1874
(1979)).
361. Id. at 1395-96.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1396.
364. Id.
365. E.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986) (broadly defining dan-
gerousness as a determination that "the patient presents a danger to himself or other
members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the
institution"); United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 980 (8th Cir.), reh'g granted in
part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Watson v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990).
366. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 972-73 (Colo. 1985).
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must be made that without medication, the patient will likely constitute
a continuing and significant threat of serious harm to himself or others
in the institution.3 67 The court emphasized that past occasions of violence
or the mere risk of some possibility of future violence were not sufficient
to meet its standard, as "[sluch a method of institutional control would
be irreconcilable with the personal dignity of the individual and would
render the patient's interest in bodily integrity nothing more than an
illusion. 3 6 If it is established that the patient does present a "continuing
and significant threat" of serious harm, the reviewing court must take
additional steps before it can authorize forced medication. The court
must next weigh the threat presented against the individual's reasons
for objecting to treatment. In addition, the court must determine whether
there are any less intrusive methods of alleviating the danger created
by the patient's condition. 369
Other courts'have rejected a prediction of dangerousness as a suf-
ficient justification for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication. These courts are concerned with the potential for abuse
inherent in allowing forced medication determinations to be based on
predictions of future violence. Litigation and investigations have revealed
that forced medication based on predictions of danger is, at times,
motivated by such reasons as management, control, punishment, and
staff convenience.3 70 For example, in Davis v. Hubbard,37' the court
discovered that approximately seventy-three percent of the patients at
an Ohio state hospital received psychotropic drugs with polypharma-
cology routinely practiced. 37 The court found that "the testimony at
trial established that the prevalent use of psychotropic drugs is coun-
tertherapeutic and can be justified only for reasons other than treat-
ment-namely, for the convenience of the staff and for punishment. ' 373
The court noted that in this regard, the Ohio facility appeared to be
"little different than any other large institution for the mentally ill."' 314
In addressing the state's police power authority to forcibly administer
drugs, the court stated that danger must be "sufficiently grave and
imminent" in order to overcome the patient's interest in refusal. 37 The
court held that:
367. Id. at 973-74.
368. Id. at 974.
369. Id.
370. See supra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
371. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
372. Id. at 926.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 926 n.7.
375. Id. at 934.
19921
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
[a]s a constitutional minimum, therefore, the State must have
at least probable cause to believe that the patient is presently
violent or self-destructive, and in such condition presents a pres-
ent danger to himself, other patients or the institution's staff
before it may disregard the patient's interests in refusing treat-
ment. 
76
The court further suggested that even when danger. is imminent, the
forced medication determination should be made at an informal hearing
by an independent decisionmaker. 3 7
The concern that drugs were being used to keep prisoners at a
mental health facility "docile and manageable regardless of potential
serious physical and emotional consequences" led the Arizona Supreme
Court to reject the dangerousness standard as a basis for forced med-
ication . 37  The court held that even if an inmate presented a legitimate
security problem, less intrusive measures, such as incarceration or iso-
lation, should be taken.3 79 The court stated that "[aibsent a true emer-
gency, we do not believe that forcible medication with dangerous
psychotropic drugs 'is reasonably necessary for the security of the in-
stitution."' ' 80 The court held that "forcible medication with dangerous
drugs should be limited to specific emergencies under procedural safe-
guards. "31
A number -of other courts have likewise invalidated the use of a
dangerousness standard as insufficient to justify forced administration
of antipsychotic drugs.8 2 An Illinois appellate court recently overturned
376. Id. at 935.
377. Id. at 938-39. However, the court stated that when the urgency of the situation
does not permit time for these procedures, the state may act immediately, as long as
notice and a hearing follow as soon as possible. Id. at 939.
378. Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 409 (Ariz. 1986).
379. Id. at 408. Evidence indicated that the petitioner was highly disruptive and
assaultive and was placed on a drug program to prevent further dangerous behavior. Id.
at 403.
380. Id. at 407-08 (citation omitted).
381. Id. at 408. The court emphasized the urgency required to constitute a true
emergency by analogizing to situations where prison authorities would be justified in
shooting the prisoner. Id. at 409.
382. For example, in Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), the trial
court permitted forced administration of antipsychotic drugs on the allegation by a state
psychiatrist that a committed mental patient was a danger to both himself and others.
Evidence indicated that the patient had a long history of antisocial behavior, presented
a management problem even when on a maximum security ward, and lacked insight into
the dangerousness of his acts. Id. at 571. After noting the potential side effects of
antipsychotic drugs, the appellate court did not deem the situation urgent enough to
warrant the forced treatment. The court held that drugs may be forcibly administered
only when "the patient poses an immediate threat of physical injury to himself or others."
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a lower court's decision allowing the forced medication of an institu-
tionalized patient based on the treating physician's prediction of future
violence. 8 The court indicated concern that "the request for authority
to force medications was made to enable behavioral control and the
elimination of 'pestiness' and noncompliance with institutional rules.9
384
Forced medication on police power grounds was authorized only when
"an emergency situation exists where the individual poses an immediate
threat of physical harm to himself or others." '385 The court also held
that even in such emergency situations, "psychotropic medications may
be forcibly administered as a last resort, only after alternative treatment
plans have been considered. '3 6
In Rogers v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Health,38 7 an
opinion which contained numerous cites to commentary, litigation, and
investigations revealing abuse of antipsychotic drugs for purposes of
management and convenience, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that "[n]o State interest justifies the use of antipsychotic drugs in
a non-emergency situation without the patient's consent. '"8 The court
stated that when antipsychotic drugs are used for public safety and
security purposes, they function as chemical restraints. As such, under
state law the drugs can only be used with written authority "in cases
of emergency such as the occurrence of, or serious threat of, extreme
violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide." 38 9 The court defined
"emergency" as a situation that calls for immediate action3' 9 and noted
that "[p]redictable crises are not within the definition of emergency." ' 39'
The court further held that even in an emergency situation, less intrusive
alternatives to antipsychotic drugs must be used, if available. 392
Id. at 573.
Likewise, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that forced medical care on police
power grounds is justified only in emergency situations where an immediate and urgent
need for treatment is required. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 489-90 (N.H.
1983). See also In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. 1987):
the fact there is a possibility the patient might harm himself or another person
is not a sufficient justification for permitting forced medication with anti-
psychotic drugs. Given the significant risks inherent in the use of these drugs,
the propensity for dangerousness is not sufficient to overcome the patient's
liberty interest in being free from unreasonable intrusions into his body and
mind.
383. In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (I1. App. Ct. 1988).
384. Id. at 73.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
388: Id. at 310.
389. Id. at 321.
390. 'Id. at 321-22 n.25.
391. Id. at 322 n.26.
392. Id. at 321-22.
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The case law indicates a split of authority on what substantive police
power interests are sufficient to override a patient's constitutionally
protected interests in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Courts
have held, however, that police power interests based on considerations
other than the prevention of harm to the patient or others within the
institution are not sufficient to override a patient's right to refuse.
Therefore such concerns as administrative convenience,39 3 finances,3 94
patients' length of stay,3 9 staff turnover,39 and intrusion into the realm
of medical decisionmaking and treatment authority 397 are inadequate to
outweigh patients' constitutionally protected interests.
B. The Parens Patriae Power
The government's parens patriae authority has also been deemed
sufficient, under certain circumstances, to justify the forced treatment
of mentally ill individuals. The benevolent intentions behind this power
do not shield the exercise of it from the requirements of substantive
due process. 9 Even when the government's objective is compelling, if
fundamental individual interests are implicated, its action must not merely
be related to its objective, but must be necessary to achieve its goal. 99
When invoked for the purpose of forced psychiatric treatment, the parens
patriae power is based on the need to help citizens who, due to their
mental disorder, are incapable of evaluating their need for psychiatric
treatment.4° Without this finding of incompetence, the very justification
for the government's exercise of its parens patriae power would be
lacking. Accordingly, most courts have held that before forced treatment
393. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1370 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nor. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 756 (Cal. Ct. App.
1st Dist. 1986); Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 320; Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 n.6
(N.Y. 1986); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 895 (Wis. 1987).
394. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 937 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Okin, 478 F. Supp.
at 1370; Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6; Jones, 416 N.W.2d at 895.
395. Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1369-70; Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 320.
396. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 320.
397. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 937-38; Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1370; Rogers, 458 N.E.2d
at 320; Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 149 (Minn. 1988); Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 343
n.6; Jones, 416 N.W.2d at 895.
398. Note, supra note 11, at 1210. As Justice Brandeis remarked, "Experience should
teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when ... purposes are beneficent ....
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48
S. Ct. 564, 572-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
399. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728 (1973).
400. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979). See generally
Note, supra note 11, at 1207-09.
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with antipsychotic drugs can be justified by the beneficent purpose
underlying the government's parens patriae authority, a separate deter-
mination of incompetency to make treatment decisions is necessary.40
1. Mental Illness and Competence to Make Treatment Decisions
Despite its importance in the treatment decisionmaking process, com-
petence has proven to be an illusive and confusing concept. There is
no universally accepted definition of competence, and the methods used
to measure treatment decisionmaking capability are still rudimentary. 402
However, two principles have become widely accepted by both mental
health professionals and the courts.
a. Mental Illness is Selective
The first principle legally and medically accepted is that mental
illness is highly selective in nature, often affecting only limited areas of
functioning while leaving other faculties intact. In most cases, even the
most severely mentally ill retain a certain amount of reasoning power.4 3
Therefore, as one court stated, mental illness "is not the equivalent of
401. See infra note 435 and cases cited therein.
402. One commentator pointed out that a number of factors will affect a competency
determination, including the following: (1) the specific types of decisions that are at issue;
(2) the professional point of view used to analyze competency; (3) the particular jurisdiction
in which the definition is determined; and (4) the vicissitudes and eccentricities of the
individual being evaluated and those doing the evaluation. John Parry, Psychiatric Care
and the Law of Substitute Decision-making, II Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 152,
153 (1987).
Doctors Appelbaum and Roth have noted that an evaluation of competency, regardless
of the test used, may be affected by a number of clinical factors: "(1) psychodynamic
elements of the patient's personality; (2) the accuracy of the historical information conveyed
by the patient; (3) the accuracy and completeness of the information disclosed to the
patient; (4) the stability of the patient's mental status over time; (5) the effect of the
[evaluation] setting;" and (6) the nature of the person performing the evaluation. Paul
S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138
Am. J. Psychiatry 1462, 1462 (1981).
403. Brooks, supra note 50, at 191; Maurice D. Ford, The Psychiatrist's Double Bind:
The Right to Refuse Medication, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 332, 333 (1980); Benjamin
Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise, 4 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 53, 54 (1981).
One study indicated that the degree of psychopathology is a poor indicator of a patient's
evaluative abilities, and the mentally ill appear to be as competent to make treatment
decisions as their medical counterparts. Barbara Stanley et al., Preliminary Findings on
Psychiatric Patients as Research Participants: A Population at Risk?, 138 Am. J. Psychiatry
669, 671 (1981).
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incompetency, which renders one incapable of giving informed consent
to medical treatment. ' '
Patients' subjective responses to antipsychotic drugs have, until re-
cently, been given little credence and have received virtually no systematic
inquiry. 405 A growing body of evidence brought forth in drug refusal
litigation and medical research, however, verifies that many drug refusals
are the product of rational and considered decisions. Recent medical
studies refute the traditional assumption held by the psychiatric com-
munity that drug reluctance is merely a form of symptomatic behavior.
Although many drug refusals are delusionally based, significant corre-
lations have been documented between many patients' refusals and the
side effects they experience.
A study by Van Putten and colleagues revealed a strong association
between an initial dysphoric response to medication and subsequent drug
refusals.407 The researchers noted that the refusers found the extrapyr-
amidal side effects (EPS) which they experienced intolerable-" an assault
on their personality." ' 4 8 Other studies have also found a strong corre-
404. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978). See also Charles M.
Culver et al., ECT and Special Problems of Informed Consent, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry
586 (1980) ("in the view of most psychiatrists serious mental illness does not usually
render a patient incapable of making informed decisions about treatment"); Robert Wein-
stock et al., Competence to Give Informed Consent for Medical Procedures, 12 Bull.
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 117, 124 (1984) (study indicating that psychiatric patients
who are incompetent for some purposes may nonetheless be competent to give informed
consent). But see Schwed, supra note 4, at 195 (implying that individuals suffering from
severe mental illness retain very little, if any, rational reasoning power to make treatment
decisions).
405. Theodore Van Putten et al., Response to Antipsychotic Medication: The Doctor's
and the Consumer's View, 141 Am. J. Psychiatry 16 (1984); Van Putten et al., supra
note 108, at 189-90.
406. Many courts confronted with drug refusals have pointed to evidence indicating
that the objections are associated with adverse side effects or a considered appraisal that
the drugs are ineffective. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1305
(D.N.J.), stay denied in part, granted in part, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified
and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506
(1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.N.J. 1978); Large v. Superior Court,
714 P.2d 399, 404 (Ariz. 1987); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 243 Cal.
Rptr. 241, 244 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987), opinion superseded, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988),
dismissed, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d
645, 647 (Ind. 1987); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Minn. 1988); Henderson
v. Yocom, No. 7948A, mem. op. at 4 (S.D. 1st Cir. 1987), aff'd, 438 N.W.2d 225 (S.D.
1989) (table opinion).
407. Van Putten et al., supra note 108, at 188-89.
408. Id. at 189. The researchers also discovered that an early dysphoric response
resulted in a poor prognosis for further drug treatment. Id. at 187.
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lation between drug refusals and side effects.4 One study found that
eighty-nine percent of the drug refusers experienced EPS, whereas only
twenty percent of the compliers experienced these side effects. 410 The
study indicated that drug reluctance is most notably associated with
akathisia.4 1' Because the symptoms of akathisia are purely subjective, it
is frequently misdiagnosed or unrecognized. This difficulty in diagnosis
may account for the failure to lend credence to patients' drug refusals .41
Evidence that the patients studied were aware of the drug-induced side
effects was emphasized by the fact that many insisted on increases of
anti-parkinsonian agents and even privately stored these medications.41
3
The author also noted that some of the patients who took less than
the prescribed dosage functioned better on the lower dose, "thus sup-
porting the possibility that the patient's view of optimal dosage is very
much worth listening to.1 414
A study by Marder and associates revealed that although some
reasons for drug refusal are bizarre, others were associated with a history
of severe side effects, suggesting that such refusals were rationally con-
sidered. 415 Hasenfeld and Grumet compared in-hospital and post-hospital
outcomes of ten refusers and ten compliers. 416 They discovered that "[imn
general, the two groups were found to be remarkably similar in all
important outcome measures. ' ' 417 When examining the *patients who were
later readmitted, however, it was found that refusers remained outside
the hospital twice as long as compliers. 418 In addition, those who refused
drugs initially and then later accepted, fared better post-hospital than
did compliers. The authors speculated that perhaps these patients "re-
tained a healthy skepticism about doctors, medicine, and psychiatry and
some sense of themselves as not without power and control over their
lives. These qualities may have helped the 'refusers' to better cope with
life outside the hospital. '419 Another possible explanation was that the
refusers were "healthier" than the compliers to begin with. 420 The in-
vestigators concluded that perhaps "some patient refusal [sic] represent
409. See, e.g., Van Putten, supra note 104; Van Putten & May, supra note 68.
410. Van Putten, supra note 104, at 70.
411. Id. at 71.
412. Id. at 70-71.
413. Id. at 70.
414. Id.
415. Stephen R. Marder et al., A Comparison of Patients Who Refuse and Consent
to Neuroleptic Treatment, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 470, 472 (1983).
416. Irwin N. Hassenfeld & Barbara Grumet, A Study of the Right to Refuse Treat-
ment, 12 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 65, 68 (1984).
417. Id. at 72.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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a relatively healthy expression of autonomous strivings, while others are
driven to refuse by delusional necessity.''421
In recent research performed at a large New York state hospital,
Zito and associates studied twenty instances of drug refusal. 422 The
treating psychiatrist classified a refusal as meritorious or non-meritorious
based on the reasons for objections. Four patient refusals were classified
as meritorious. Non-meritorious refusals included seven patients who
feared that the drugs were poisonous, five patients who denied their
mental illness, and two patients who objected based on unconfirmed
religious reasons. 423
The researchers admit that this data is "biased by the interpretation
of the treating psychiatrist. ' 424 They found that the "meritoriousness"
of refusal needs better definition due to the "difficulty of objective
assessment of behavioral side effects which involve a subjective, internal
state, such as akathisia and dysphoria and in the use of metaphorical
language by patients.''425 Thus, the patients who objected out of fear
that the medications were poisonous may have been conveying legitimate
concerns about side effects. 426 Therefore, fifty-five percent of the refusals
may have been rationally based. These and other studies refute the
traditional assumption that mentally ill patients are necessarily unable
to make rational treatment decisions.4 27
b. Involuntary Commitment Is Not Equivalent to a Finding
of Incompetency
The second point of general consensus is that involuntary commit-
ment into a mental hospital is not, as has been traditionally assumed,
421. Id. at 73.
422. Julie M. Zito et al., One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State
Psychiatric Facility, 12 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 295 (1990).
423. Id. at 299.
424. Id. at 304.
425. Id.
426. See Beck, supra note 305, at 370; Brooks, supra note 15, at 358.
427. See supra notes 403-404 and accompanying text. One recent study revealed that
even children and adolescents refuse antipsychotic medication due to a recognition of side
effects. -In discussing the prevalence of parkinsonism among juveniles treated with anti-
psychotic drugs at one psychiatric center, the researchers found that "the patients were
well aware of these [parkinsonism] symptoms in themselves and their peers, describing
them as 'zombie-like' and implicating them as a reason for outpatient treatment non-
compliance." Richardson et al., supra note 96, at 1326.
Another interesting study indicated that some patients make a considered refusal out
of a preference for psychotic symptoms. Theodore Van Putten et al., Drug Refusal in
Schizophrenia and the Wish to Be Crazy, 33 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 1443 (1976). The
researchers compared a group of habitual refusers with a group of compliers and found
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ipso facto evidence of a person's incompetence. As noted earlier, most
states now have legislation which expressly provides that a patient is
not deemed incompetent to exercise personal and civil rights solely by
reason of commitment. Patients, therefore, generally retain the legal
ability to contract, hold professional and vehicle licenses, marry, divorce,
vote, make a will, and exercise other such rights.42 8 Nonetheless, some
mental health professionals argue that a judicial decision to commit is,
at least, an implicit finding that the person is incapable of making
treatment decisions.4 2 9 This argument, however, ignores the fact that a
decision to commit and a finding of incompetency are separate and
distinct determinations resting upon different criteria.
A commitment decision is basically medical in nature. One common
basis for commitment is a finding, based on medical evidence, that an
individual is mentally ill and, due to that mental illness, poses a danger
to himself or others in the community. 40 But a finding of mental illness
and dangerousness does not mean that the person is incapable of making
treatment decisions. The other typical basis for commitment is a finding
that a mentally ill person is incapable of caring for himself and is in
need of treatment.43' These essentially medical determinations, however,
do not necessarily mean that once in the institution, the patient is
incapable of making a rational decision regarding proposed treatments. 432
A commitment determination does not address the individual's capability
that while the refusers experienced grandiose delusions upon discontinuation of drugs, the
compliers suffered from high levels of anxiety and depression. Id. at 1444. The researchers
believe that some patients refuse out of a preference for a psychotic state over drug-
induced, relative normality. Id. at 1443.
For a synopsis of various studies related to the causes and effects of drug refusal,
see Phil Brown, Psychiatric Treatment Refusal, Patient Competence, and Informed Con-
sent, 8 Int'l. J.L. & Psychiatry 83 (1986).
428. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
429. E.g., Rachlin, supra note 4, at 100-01 (stating that [tlhe involuntarily hospitalized
psychiatric patient has, as indicated by such status, a judgmental impairment. How, then,
can we say that he is able to make an informed choice as to whether or not treatment
is indicated?").
430. See Richard Van Duizend et al., An Overview of State Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment Statutes, 8 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 328 (1984) (summarizing and
tabulating state commitment criteria); Brakel et al., supra note 307, at 114 Table 2.6
(survey of state criteria for involuntary commitment).
431. See supra note 430.
432. The fact that a person is committed for treatment or, once committed, asserts
a right to treatment does not mean that the person has a correlative obligation to submit
to any treatment which is proposed. For a discussion on how a right to treatment does
not conflict with a right to refuse a particular treatment, see Kahn, supra note 275;
Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 30, at 44-45; Brooks, supra note 50, at 195.
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of contributing to treatment decisions. 4 a Thus, as one commentator
stated, "the commitment order should have no effect whatsoever on
the individual's liberty interest regarding treatment decisions. Neither the
substantive norms nor the procedural regularity of a commitment hearing
can support the legitimacy of a decision never reached in that context. 43 4
The modern legislative and judicial trend is not only to distinguish
the concept of competency to make treatment decisions from commit-
ment, but to presume the competency of committed individuals until a
separate determination holds otherwise.4 35 Likewise, recent psychiatric
433. It should be noted that a few states have enacted legislation requiring that a
separate determination of competency to make treatment decisions be made at the initial
commitment hearing once an individual is found to meet the commitment criteria. See
infra note 691 and accompanying text.
434. Zlotnick, supra note 210, at 409. Zlotnick notes, separating the concepts of
competency and commitment does not necessarily mean that the commitment order au-
thorizes only mere custody of the individual. Although arguable, the commitment order
may authorize minimally intrusive forms of treatment, such as group or milieu therapy,
vocational rehabilitation, occupational therapy, and psychiatric consultation. Id. at 411.
See also Winick, supra note 27, at 63-84 (providing a continuum of mental health treatments
based on intrusiveness and determining those that implicate the First Amendment).
435. For a listing of state statutes which provide that committed individuals are
presumed competent, see Blackburn, supra note 307, at 472 n.88. See also Bee v. Greaves,
744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985)(parens patriae authority does not authorize the forced treatment of a competent pretrial
detainee); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S.
1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982) ("[ilt is simply not true that all persons involuntarily
committed are always incapable of making a rational decision on treatment"); Scott v.
Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976) (even though an individual is properly committable,
due process demands a separate judicial hearing to determine if he is incapable of giving
informed consent to medical treatment); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68, 71 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S. Ct. 450 (1971) (because commitment does not
raise even a presumption of incompetency under state law, a judicial determination of
incompetency is required before treatment may be forcibly administered under the parens
patriae power); United States v. Waddell, 687 F. Supp. 208, 209 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (a
judicial finding of incompetence required before an inmate can be forcibly medicated);
United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed,
729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (suggesting a mental patient must be determined incompetent
before treatment can be forcibly administered on parens patriae grounds); Davis v. Hub-
bard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (no necessary relationship exists between
mental illness and incompetency to provide informed consent to medical treatment);
Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570, 573 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("[elven if the court
finds that the patient is 'unwilling to accept or incapable of accepting treatment voluntarily,'
such a finding is not the equivalent of a finding that the patient is incompetent to
participate in treatment decisions, once a treatment program is started. We believe there
is a significant difference between getting the patient into treatment in the first place and
subsequently determining the course of that program"); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. &
Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 248-49 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987), opinion superseded,
751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), dismissed, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989) (incompetency may not
be presumed solely because of hospitalization, and state statutory and common law protect
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literature indicates a growing professional consensus that there is no
necessary relationship between commitment and the ability to make
rational treatment decisions.43 6
Beyond the above two areas of concurrence, there is a wide disparity
of professional opinion regarding treatment decisionmaking ability. De-
spite an increasing sophistication in the complex area of incompetency
determinations, there are still no well-articulated standardized criteria
for measuring a person's ability for rational decisionmaking. Various
substantive standards for determining competency to consent to medical
treatment have been proposed, but these tests vary widely. 47 The less
the right of a patient not adjudicated incompetent to give or withhold consent to medical
treatment); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985) (non-consensual drugging
of mental patient for treatment purposes requires judicial determination of incompetence
to participate in the treatment decision); Goedecke v. State, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo.
1979) (a patient's common law right to decline medical treatment is not abrogated by
commitment); In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 73 (III. App. 4th Dist. 1988) ("lain involuntarily
committed person is not necessarily legally incompetent"); Rogers v. Commissioner of
Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) (a committed mental patient
"has the right to make treatment decisions and does not lose that right until the patient
is adjudicated incompetent by a judge through incompetence proceedings"); Jarvis v.
Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-49 & n.7 (Minn. 1988) (a separate finding of legal incom-
petency is a prerequisite to involuntarily medicating a committed patient); Rivers v. Katz,
495 N.E.2d 337, 342 (N.Y. 1986) ("there is no significant relationship between the need
for hospitalization of mentally ill patients and their ability to make treatment decisions");
In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255, 257-58 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied sub nom, Ohio Dep't of
Mental Health v. Milton, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987) (a "person properly committed
to a mental institution may be legally competent .... Thus, it is apparent that the state
may not act in a parens patriae relationship to a mental hospital patient unless the patient
has been adjudicated incompetent"); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980)
("competency is not a medical decision and should not merge with the commitment
decision .... Commitment in an institution does not necessarily mean a person is incapable
of appropriately deciding whether or not he prefers to be treated with psychotropic drugs");
Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A, mem. op. at 10-11 (S.D. Ist Cir. 1987), aff'd, 438
N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (table opinion) (the burden is on the state "to show a person
involuntarily committed is not competent to make the decision to refuse antipsychotic
drugs as part of its treatment plan"); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d
883, 896 (Wis. 1987) ("[ain involuntary commitment is not equivalent to a finding of
incompetency with respect to involuntary treatment decisions").
436. See, e.g., Alan A. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrists
Should and Can Make It Work, 38 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 358, 359 (1981); Beck, supra
note 305, at 369; Henry C. Weinstein, The Right to Refuse Treatment, 5 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 425, 427 (1977); Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent
to Treatment, 134 Am. J. Psychiatry 279, 279 (1977).
437. Various approaches for determining competency to make treatment decisions are
categorized in Roth et al., supra note 436. These categories and variations thereof have
been utilized or proposed by a number of commentators. See Elyn Saks, Competency to
Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 945 (1991). Richard M. Ratzan, Informed Consent
from the Mentally Incompetent Elderly, Postgraduate Med., Oct. 1986, at 81; Laurence
Tancredi, Competency for Informed Consent; Conceptual Limits of Empirical Data, 5
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stringent approaches are the most respectful of individual autonomy in
the sense that most patients will have their decisions respected as com-
petently made. The more difficult standards elevate an interest in health
over autonomy. The basic problem is that competency is not merely a
descriptive, evaluative, or empirical concept. Each proposed standard
presupposes a moral theory and reflects different social values. Every
competency proceeding reflects the tension between respect for self-
determination and concern for protection and health. As one commen-
tator notes, in the search for an appropriate standard:
We cannot know where to look unless we know what we are
looking for. A theory of the values embedded in the ascription
of competency, and of its significance, needs to be provided.
Insofar as this theory will be one which is intended to guide
conscientious action, it will be of necessity an ethical theory. 48
An appropriate standard for determining competency is one which en-
compasses an acceptable balance between concern for providing needed
medical care and preservation of individual autonomy.
2. A Parens Patriae Emergency Exception?
As explained above, a finding of incompetency is necessary before
the government can forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs based on its
parens patriae power. The great majority of courts faced with this issue
have refused to recognize any exception to this limit on the government's
parens patriae authority. A few courts, however, have fashioned a narrow
"emergency" exception to this requirement.
In Rogers v. Okin, 4 9 the state urged the court to recognize a
"psychiatric emergency" which would allow forced medication without
an initial incompetency determination. Situations which qualified as psy-
chiatric emergencies included extreme anxiety and panic, bizarre behavior,
emotional disturbances having the potential to interfere with daily func-
tioning, the likelihood of further severe suffering, or the rapid worsening
of the patient's clinical state." 0 The district court rejected the proffered
definition as "too broad, subjective and unwieldy," and limited any
Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 51 (1982); Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Competency to
Consent to Research, 39 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 951 (1982); Freedman, supra note 403;
Paul R. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions
and Prisons, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 39 (1975); James H. Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal
Fiction, 48 Wash. L. Rev. 735 (1973).
438. Freedman, supra note 403, at 56.
439. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102
S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
440. Id. at 1364.
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emergency exception to the context of the state's police power consid-
erations."' On review, the First Circuit broadened the district court's
definition of emergency to include the parens patriae interest in situations
where any delay in medication could "result in significant deterioration
of the patient's mental health" such as the slipping into "possibly chronic
illness while awaiting an adjudication of incompetency.""' 2 Even in these
situations, however, the First Circuit merely waived the necessity of a
judicial appraisal of incompetency and remanded the case for consid-
eration of alternative procedures for making an incompetency deter-
mination.43
Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has fashioned
a limited parens patriae emergency exception by waiving the necessity
of a judicial determination of incompetency where any delay would
result in the "possibility of immediate, substantial, and irreversible de-
terioration of a serious mental illness." 4" However, the court expressly
noted that "[eixpert testimony indicated that the prognosis for most
individuals with untreated schizophrenia was 'gradual worsening,'"45
and that "the possibility that the ward's schizophrenia might deteriorate
into a chronic, irreversible condition at an uncertain but relatively distant
date does not satisfy our definition of emergency. . ."446 The Massa-
chusetts high court subsequently reaffirmed this parens patriae emergency
exception in Rogers v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Health."7
However, the court made it clear that such emergencies merely obviated
the need for a prior adjudication of incompetency. The court required
that before medication could be forcibly administered, the doctors must
make an incompetency determination based on their professional judg-
ment with an expedited adjudication to follow." 8 The Colorado Supreme
Court also abrogated the need for a prior adjudication of incompetency
when forced medication is necessary to prevent the "immediate and
irreversible deterioration of the patient due to a psychotic episode."" 49
This court also required judicial authorization of the forced treatment
as soon as practicable.4 50
441. Id. at 1365. The court stated that a "committed mental patient may be forcibly
medicated in an emergency situation in which a failure to do so would result in a
substantial likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other patients, or to staff members
of the institution." Id.
442. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
443. Id.
444. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 1981).
445., Id. at 54.
446. Id. at 55.
447. 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983).
448. Id. at 322 & n.29.
449. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 974 (Colo. 1985).
450. Id. at 975.
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It should be emphasized that, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court noted, immediate and substantial deterioration caused by a delay
in treatment with antipsychotic drugs is extremely rare s. 4  Furthermore,
studies indicate that patients who are medicated after a delay respond
just as well as patients medicated immediately.45 2 Perhaps this is the
reason that most courts do not recognize an emergency exception to
the incompetency determination required before medication is forcibly
administered. A broader definition of emergency-such as the potential
for any deterioration in the patient's mental condition-would seem
inappropriate and vulnerable to abuse given the values protected by the
doctrine of informed consent. 453 As one commentator stated, "If ...
the consequence of withholding treatment is merely that the patient may
suffer pain but not permanent physical detriment, to permit the physician
to treat without first obtaining informed consent seriously undermines
individualism without any substantial countervailing gain in promoting
the societal interest in health. 4
54
VII. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE
Even when the government's interest in restricting a constitutionally
protected right is sufficiently important, the least restrictive alternative
doctrine imposes an additional burden. The essence of the doctrine is
that the government may not pursue its ends, however compelling, by
means which unnecessarily encroach upon fundamental rights. The classic
exposition of the doctrine came in Shelton v. Tucker,45 in which the
United States Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
451. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 54-55 (Mass. 1981). The authors
of one study claim that the additional delay created by the requirement of a court hearing
caused some patients to decompensate and necessitated the use of emergency medication,
seclusion, or restraint. J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of
Rivers v. Katz, 18 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 203, 213 (1990). However, neither
the number of patients nor the type or severity of decompensation was addressed.
452. Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A State of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 Am.
J. Psychiatry 340, 345 (1980); Hassenfeld & Grumet, supra note 416, at 72; Joseph D.
Bloom et al., The Influence of the Right to Refuse Treatment on Precommitment Patients,
16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 5, 7 (1988).
453. See Brooks, supra note 15, at 357; Vicki Anderson, Note, Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Medication: A Proposal for Legislative Consideration, 17 Ind. L. Rev. 1035,
1056 (1984).
454. Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 413,
436.
455. 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960).
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stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.4 5 6
The least restrictive alternative principle is an analytical guideline for
determining whether the government has exercised prudence in selecting
the means to accomplish an otherwise legitimate end.
Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has invoked the
doctrine in a number of contexts where government action has unnec-
essarily restricted fundamental personal liberties. Fundamental liberties
which have received the doctrine's protection include the right to as-
sociation, expression, privacy, vote, marry, travel, and freedom from
bodily restraint.45 7
The least restrictive alternative doctrine was first applied in the
mental health area in Lake v. Cameron.4 5 1 In that case, Chief Judge
Bazelon questioned the necessity of the "complete deprivation of liberty"
attendant to the continued institutionalization of a non-dangerous elderly
woman.4 59 The court, based on a District of Columbia commitment
statute, held that the government must demonstrate that no less restrictive
placement alternatives are available prior to involuntary institutionali-
zation. 60 Only three years later, the same court expanded the application
of the doctrine in Covington v. Harris."' The court indicated that the
least restrictive alternative principle had a constitutional basis as applied
to commitment decisions and ward assignments within the institution. 62
456. Id. at 488, 81 S. Ct. at 252 (footnote omitted).
457. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-36, 83 S. Ct. 328, 338-40 (1963)
(association); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488, 81 S. Ct. at 252 (association); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S. Ct. 524, 525-26 (1957) (expression); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644-46, 94 S. Ct. 791, 198-99 (1974) (privacy); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (1965) (privacy); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2496 (1975) (freedom from restraint);
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 248-50, 92 S. Ct. 2083, 2086-87 (1972)
(freedom from restraint); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003
(1972) (vote); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S. Ct. 673, 682 (1978) (marriage);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268-69, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 1087-88
(1974) (travel); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2236 (1973) (travel);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-37, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1331-33 (1969) (travel).
458. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.C. 1966).
459. Id. at 660-61.
460. Id. at 659-60.
461. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C.C. 1969).
462. Id. at 623-24. The court stated:
The principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with the legitimate
purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which
entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty .... A statute sanctioning such
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Thereafter, courts began applying the doctrine to commitment deci-
sions,43 conditions of confinement,4 " and treatment decisions within the
institution.4 65 Additionally, the doctrine has been urged in support of a
right to adequate treatment.4"
In the context of the right, to refuse psychiatric treatment, the issue
is whether the least restrictive alternative doctrine requires that, when
a patient objects to a particular treatment, the state must attempt, or
at least consider, less intrusive interventions before administering the
proposed treatment. 467 The doctrine was applied in a number of early
right to refuse cases. In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Price
v. Sheppard,46s ruled that before psychiatrists could perform intrusive
forms of therapy, such as electroshock or psychosurgery, on a committed
patient, the authorizing court must examine whether the intrusive pro-
cedures are necessary and reasonable in light of less intrusive treat-
ments. 469 Two years later, the district court in Rennie v. Klein470 extended
a drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly
construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
Id. at 623. The court went on to hold:
The principle of the least restrictive alternative is equally applicable to alternate
dispositions within a mental hospital. It makes little sense to guard zealously
against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only
to abandon the watch once the patient disappears behind hospital doors. The
range of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person within a hospital, from
maximum security to outpatient status, is almost as wide as that of dispositions
without. The commitment statute no more authorizes unnecessary restrictions
within the former range than it does within the latter.
Id. at 623-24.
463. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493-94 (1975);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 103-08 (3d Cir. 1979), stay
granted in part, 448 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 3046 (1980), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct.
1531 (1981); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Haw. 1976), modified
sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala.
1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1995-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 473, 94 S. Ct. 713 (1974).
464. Halderman, 612 F.2d at 113; Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 978-79
(D.D.C. 1975); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), opinion supplemented,
68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn), aff'd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975).
465. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20, 1228-31 (E.D. La. 1976);
Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373, 379-81 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
466. See Roy G. Spece, Jr., Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment
and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 Ariz.
L. Rev. 1, 33-46 (1978).
467. See generally Winick, supra note 210, at 18-21; Zlotnick, supra note 210, at 375.
468. 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976), cited in Winick, supra note 27, at 18.
469. Id. at 912-13.
470. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). Accord Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
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the application of the principle to a case involving the refusal of treat-
ment with antipsychotic drugs. Quoting Professor Winick, the court
stated that under the least restrictive alternative doctrine, a patient "may
challenge the forced administration of drugs on the basis that alternative
treatment methods should be tried before a more intrusive technique
like psychotropic medication is used.1 471 Because evidence indicated that
lithium plus an antidepressant would be a reasonable alternative to
antipsychotics, the court ordered that the patient be given a fair trial
on this less intrusive treatment program.4
72
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the applicability of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine but modified the district court's ap-
proach. 413 Central to the appellate court's least restrictive analysis was
a balancing of the costs and benefits to the patient presented by the
proposed treatment. The court stated:
The least intrusive means standard does not prohibit all intru-
sions. It merely directs attention to and requires avoidance of
those which are unnecessary or whose cost benefit ratios, weighed
from the patient's, standpoint, are unacceptable. There must be
a balancing of the patient's interest with those to be furthered
by administering the psychotropic drug.47 4
The Third Circuit qualified the district court's application of the doctrine
in two ways. First, it did not require that less intrusive therapies nec-
essarily be attempted before administration of the proposed treatment,
but merely that they be consciously considered. 47 1 Second, the appellate
court construed the doctrine as applying to a "regimen or treatment
935 n.24 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (even in an emergency situation, the state has the obligation
to provide the least restrictive treatment).
471. Id. at 1146, quoting Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence
to Stand Trial, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 769, 813. The court held that the availability
of less restrictive treatments was one of four considerations in determining whether
antipsychotic drugs could be forcibly administered in a non-emergency situation. The other
relevant factors were the patient's physical threat to others within the institution, the
patient's capacity to make treatment decisions, and the risk of permanent side effects
from the proposed medication. Id. at 1148.
472. Id. at 1146.
473. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 847 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102
S. Ct. 3506 (1982). Four of the nine judges sitting en banc felt that it was inappropriate
to apply the least restrictive alternative principle to drug refusal cases, believing instead
that reviewing courts should defer to the judgment of medical professionals. See id. at
854-55 (Seitz, C.J., concurring), 855, 861-63 (Garth, J., concurring).
474. Id. at 847. The court emphasized that "what is reviewable is whether the choice
of a course of treatment strikes a proper balance between efficacy and intrusiveness."
Id.
475. Id. at 847, 851. The court held the least restrictive alternative doctrine applicable
even in emergencies but suggested that in such situations more discretion be granted to
the attending physician. Id. at 847.
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program" rather than discrete instances of medication, stating that such
"hourly or daily judicial oversight" would be "unworkable. ' 476 Such a
standard, in the court's view, "merely serves to advise the psychiatric
community that a conscious weighing of the constitutional liberty interest
in any determination of proper treatment alternatives is necessary. ''77
In Rogers v. Oki;1,478 the district court went so far as to suggest
that the least restrictive alternative doctrine would always preclude the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs in non-emergency situations.
The court reasoned:
There are alternative methods of treating mental patients, though
some may be slower and less effective than psychotropic med-
ication. . . .Given the alternatives available in non-emergencies,
subjecting a patient to the humiliation of being disrobed and
then injected with drugs powerful enough to immobilize both
body and mind is totally unreasonable by any standard. 479
On review, the First Circuit upheld the use of the least restrictive
alternative principle but rejected the district court's blanket preclusion
of antipsychotic drugs. 480 In addressing the police power authority to
compel treatment with drugs, the court required that physicians balance
the relevant patient and state interests. In so doing, "reasonable alter-
natives to the administration of antipsychotics must be ruled out. Oth-
erwise, the administration of the drugs would not be necessary to
accomplish the state's objective. Indeed, it may be possible that in most
situations less restrictive means will be available." 4 8'
476. Id. at 847-48.
477. Id. The Third Circuit's opinion left the standard of review unclear. At one point
the court states that "what is reviewable is whether the choice of a course of treatment
strikes a proper balance between efficacy and intrusiveness." Id. at 847. This statement
suggests that the reviewing court determine whether the professional judgment strikes the
proper balance. However, the court's statement that the doctrine merely serves to advise
the physicians that a conscious weighing of interests is required, id., and that "Itlo the
extent that other possibilities are discussed and discarded, the process ... provides a
reasonable. exploration of the least intrusive means," id. at 851, indicates that the court
is limited to reviewing only whether such considerations took place and not the correctness
of the conclusion.
478. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1369 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
479. Id.
480. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d. 650, 656 (lst Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
481. Id. at 655-56. The First Circuit in Okin was much clearer than the Third Circuit
in defining the standard of review. In remanding the case, the First Circuit directed that
when the police power is asserted, the district court "limit its own role to designing
procedures for ensuring that the patients' interests in refusing antipsychotics are taken
[Vol. 53
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
While the Rennie appeal was pending, the Third Circuit issued its
decision in Romeo v. Youngberg.482 Romeo involved the claims of an
institutionalized, mentally retarded individual to freedom from bodily
restraint, safe conditions, and adequate treatment. The court held that
restraints could only be used when necessary for protection or treatment
and when it was demonstrated that restraints were the "least restrictive
means of handling the resident-that other, less severe measures had
been tried or considered and found unworkable. ' 483 Regarding treatment
programs, as in Rennie, the Third Circuit applied the least restrictive
alternative approach focusing on risk-benefit ratios. The court noted
that where the possibility of both improvement and serious side effects
existed, treatment decisions should err on the side of patient safety. 484
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and remanded the Third
Circuit's decision in Romeo.45 The Court held that an involuntarily
committed, mentally retarded individual retains constitutionally protected
liberty interests in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom
from unreasonable bodily restraint, and such minimally adequate treat-
ment as reasonably may be required to assure those interests. 46 However,
the Court noted that these protected interests could, in appropriate
circumstances, be overridden by legitimate state concerns. 4817 In weighing
the competing interests, the Court held that a proper balance is struck
when restrictions on these personal rights are the result of decisions
made by appropriate institutional authorities exercising professional judg-
ment.488 The Court further ruled that such decisions are entitled to a
presumption of correctness and "liability may be imposed only when
into consideration and that antipsychotics are not forcibly administered absent a finding
by a qualified physician that those interests are outweighed in a particular situation and
less restrictive alternatives are unavailable." Id. at 657:
Shortly after the First Circuit's opinion in Okin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court applied the least restrictive alternative principle in a drug refusal case. In re
Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). The issue presented was whether a non-
institutionalized mentally ill ward could be forcibly medicated with antipsychotics upon
the consent of his guardian. The Massachusetts court held that authorization was necessary
by a reviewing court exercising substituted judgment and taking into account the least
restrictive alternative doctrine. Id. at 61.
482. 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307
(1982).
483. Id. at 172.
484. Id. at 166 and n.45.
485. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
486. Id. at 324, 102 S. Ct. at 2462. The Court expressly limited its standard for the
amount of training constitutionally required to the facts of this particular case. The Court
felt it unnecessary to go further as the respondent requested nothing more than that
which the Court granted. Id. at 319 and n.25.
487. Id. at 319-21, 102 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
488. Id. at 321, 102 S. Ct. at 2461.
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the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
a judgment. '489 The Court, however, did not address the applicability
of the least restrictive alternative principle, explicitly noting that the
respondent did not feel it a necessary issue to the determination of the
case.
49 °
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and remanded Rennie to
the Third Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Youngberg decision.49'
The Third Circuit's en banc decision split three ways over the appli-
cability of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to drug refusal cases. 492
Five judges determined that because the Supreme Court failed to apply
a least restrictive analysis in Youngberg, it was inappropriate to employ
the concept in Rennie.493 Four judges would have applied the doctrine,
noting that the Supreme Court believed that the issue was irrelevant to
the Youngberg fact situation which was distinguishable from drug refusal
cases.494 One judge did not explicitly address the question.
Despite the majority's refusal to apply the least restrictive alternative
doctrine in Rennie, several other courts have continued to apply the
principle in drug refusal cases. In Bee v. Greaves,49 where the Tenth
Circuit found that pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs, 496 the court held that "less restrictive
alternatives, such as segregation or the use of less controversial drugs
like tranquilizers or sedatives, should be ruled out before resorting to
antipsychotic drugs" in response to safety or security threats. 497 The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court declined to apply
489. Id. at 323, 102 S. Ct. at 2462.
490. Id. at 313 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2457 n.14. As evidenced by the following exchange
during oral presentation before the Court, Mr. Tiryak, respondent's counsel, affirmatively
argued that the Court need not address the least restrictive alternative issue:
Mr. Tiryak: We don't feel as though the least intrusive standard is a standard
that is necessary to be used to decide this case. To the extent that the Court
of Appeals has used that standard, we don't feel it's necessary. We accept the
fact that-
Question: You don't think that's necessary.[sic]
Mr. Tiryak: Yes. It's unnecessary to decide the case, to get to those issues.
And we haven't urged them in our brief.
Transcript of oral argument, Youngberg v. Romeo, 55 (Anderson Reporting Co.).
491. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
492. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
493. Id. at 269.
494. Id. at 275 (Weis, J., concurring).
495. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985).
496. Id. at 1394.
497. Id. at 1396.
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the doctrine in Youngberg,491 but found that case distinguishable because
it "involved temporary physical restraints rather than mental restraints
with potentially long term effects. ' '4 99 The court also noted that "Romeo
had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself"
while the present case involved a pretrial detainee who "ha[d] not been
declared mentally incompetent under appropriate state procedures."100
In the 1987 panel decision of United States v. Charters ("Charters
P), 01 the Fourth Circuit also held that pretrial detainees have a con-
stitutionally protected interest in refusing treatment with antipsychotic
medication 02 and followed the Tenth Circuit's lead in applying a least
restrictive alternative analysis in discussing the government's authority
to medicate forcibly to prevent violence. 03 The Fourth Circuit elaborated
on the rationale used by the Tenth Circuit in distinguishing Youngberg
from cases involving forced drugging of a mentally ill individual. The
potentially serious side effects presented by antipsychotic drugs were
emphasized.10 The Fourth Circuit also distinguished Youngberg on the
basis of competency. The court noted that Romeo had no ability to
participate in treatment decisions due to the profundity of his retardation.
However, because a mentally ill individual such as Charters can be
competent to make decisions regarding medical care, "Itihe balance of
individual and governmental interests is quite different." 05 In addition,
the court relied on the fact that "unlike the purely physical restraints
considered in Romeo, antipsychotic medication has the potential to
infringe upon an individual's freedom of thought." 5°6
A South Dakota circuit court, while focusing on the potentially
serious side effects of antipsychotic drugs, held that a least restrictive
alternative analysis is constitutionally required when reviewing a forced
medication determination made under either the state's police or parens
patriae power.507 In addition, the Washington Supreme Court held that
an authorizing court is constitutionally required to engage in a least
restrictive alternative analysis when reviewing a patient's refusal of elec-
troshock therapy. 08
498. Id. at 1396 n.7.
499. Id.
500. Id. For an excellent discussion in support of the court's reasoning, see Winick,
supra note 210, at 20-21.
501. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
502. Id. at 491-92.
503. Id. at 493.
504. Id. at 489.
505. Id. at 488.
506. Id. at 489.
507. Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A mem. op. at 4-5, 12 (S.D. Ist Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 438 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (table opinion).
508. In re Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
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On the other hand, several federal courts have failed to explicitly
address the least restrictive alternative doctrine in drug refusal cases.
Under the influence of Youngberg, these courts have simply held that
constitutional requirements are satisfied if forced medication decisions
are made in the exercise of professional judgment.1 9 For example, the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc in United States v. Charters ("Charters
I/"),511 relied on the professional judgment standard in reversing much
of its decision in Charters I. In listing some of the factors which a
professional should consider in making a forced medication decision,
the court made no mention of less intrusive alternative treatments."'
The Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the doctrine in addressing the
government's police power authority to drug a prison inmate determined
to be dangerous." 2 Citing Rennie, the court stated:
If the government shows that it cannot control a mentally ill
prisoner in the general prison population, due process does not
require it to provide the least restrictive treatment modality....
Rather, we hold that psychotropic drugs may be constitutionally
administered to a mentally ill federal prisoner whenever, in the
exercise of professional judgment, such an action is deemed
necessary to remove that prisoner from seclusion and to prevent
the prisoner from endangering himself or others." 3
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Arizona Supreme Court, relying on
the state constitution, required a least intrusive means analysis in re-
viewing the state's police power authority to drug prisoners.,1 4 In de-
termining the state's authority to medicate incompetent mental patients
on either police power or parens patriae grounds, the Colorado Supreme
Court used both state statutory and common law to mandate application
of the least restrictive alternative principle." ' Several other courts have
applied the doctrine in treatment refusal cases based on state consti-
tutional, statutory, and common law.
1 6
509. Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnson
v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960,
980 (2d Cir. 1983); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
510. 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct.
1317 (1990).
511. Id. at 312.
512. United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 982 (8th Cir. 1990).
513. Id. (citation omitted).
514. Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 408 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
515. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 974 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
516. In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 73 (I1. App. 4th Dist. 1988); In re Mental Commitment
of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. 1987); In re Foster, 426 N.W.2d 374, 379-80 (Iowa
1988) (dictum); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308,
321-22 (Mass. 1983); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147 (Minn. 1988); Rivers v. Katz,
495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986). As explained infra, in the recent case of Riggins v.
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VIII. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A patient's protected interests in refusing antipsychotic medication
may be outweighed only by sufficiently important governmental concerns.
However, the patient's rights are rendered meaningless without accom-
panying procedural mechanisms to establish the validity of an asserted
governmental objective in a given situation. The Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that procedural safe-
guards be employed when balancing a constitutionally protected right
against a competing governmental interest. 1 7 In addition, even if not
expressly protected by the Constitution, state law can create liberty
interests which are entitled to the minimum procedural protections man-
dated by the Due Process Clause."' Therefore, when a right to refuse
treatment is conferred by state constitutional, statutory, or common law,
Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections must be observed.1 9 A
state may also confer procedural protections of liberty interests that
extend beyond those minimally required by the Federal Constitution.5 20
Procedural due process is a flexible concept.52 In Mathews v. Eld-
ridge122 the United States Supreme Court enunciated the following con-
siderations which must be balanced in determining the procedures due
in a particular situation:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would entail . 23
Prior to Washington v. Harper12 4 the Supreme Court did not have
frequent opportunity to review the sufficiency of procedural safeguards
surrounding institutional decisionmaking in the mental health context.
In the cases it had examined, the mandated procedural protections varied
extensively according to the particular situation. For example, in Parham
Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992), the United States Supreme Court suggested the
constitutional applicability of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to drug refusal cases.
See infra notes 878-890 and accompanying text.
517. See generally Nowak et al., supra note 327, at 527.
518. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300, 102 S. Ct. 2442, 2449 (1982); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1261 (1980); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974).
519. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir. 1983); Opinion of
the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 489 (N.H. 1983).
520. Mills, 457 U.S. at 300, 102 S. Ct. at 2449.
521. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972).
522. 424 U.S. 319, 86 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
523. Id. at 335, 86 S. Ct. at 903 (citation omitted).
524. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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v. J.R. ,525 the Court addressed the procedural mechanisms necessary to
protect a minor's liberty interests upon a parental or guardian request
for commitment. In applying the balancing formula previously announced
in Mathews to the facts of Parham, the Court authorized the use of
minimal informal procedures as sufficient under the Due Process Clause.
These procedures consisted merely of a properly filed application fol-
lowed by staff examination, observation, and periodic review. 26
In Vitek v. Jones,5 27 the Supreme Court held that a convicted prisoner
retains a residuum of liberty which is implicated by transfer to a mental
hospital for mandatory behavior modification treatment . 2 The Court
found that the stigma associated with being labeled mentally ill and the
threat to personal security presented by the compelled treatment gave
rise to this liberty interest.529 The Court held that the Due Process Clause
requires procedural safeguards including an adversarial hearing before
an independent institutional decisionmaker (as opposed to a judge). 30
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v. Romeo53" ' and
addressed the rights of a profoundly retarded, institutionalized individual
to freedom from bodily restraint, safe conditions, and minimal treatment.
Youngberg was to have a substantial impact on subsequent drug refusal
cases. As described earlier, the Court in Youngberg announced the
professional judgment standard as striking the proper constitutional bal-
ance between the competing personal and state interests at issue in the
case.532 Under Youngberg's influence, a number of courts have applied
the professional judgment standard, in varying degrees, to drug refusal
cases. Several of these courts have authorized an in-house or independent
professional review procedural system for treatment refusals. A few
courts have gone further, displaying a virtually unqualified deference to
professional decisionmaking. Other courts have rejected the applicability
of Youngberg's professional judgment standard to drug refusal cases.
These courts have adopted a more protective due process procedural
model for reviewing a patient's refusal of antipsychotic drugs.
525. 442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
526. Id. at 614-17, 99 S. Ct. at 2510-11.
527. 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
528. Id. at 493-94, 100 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
529. Id. at 492, 100 S. Ct. at 1263.
530. Id. at 494-95, 100 S. Ct. at 1264-65. The Court also required written notice;
disclosure of the evidence on which the state is relying; the opportunity to be heard and
present documentary evidence; the right to present witnesses and cross-examine except
upon finding of good cause for not permitting such presentation and confrontation; a
written opinion by the factfinder; availability of legal counsel, furnished by the state to
indigent prisoners who are unable to understand or exercise their rights; and "effective
and timely" notice of the foregoing rights. Id, at 494-97, 100 S. Ct. at 1264-66.
531. 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
532. See supra notes 485-490 and accompanying text.
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A. Professional Review Models
In Rennie v. Klein,5" the district court examined the New Jersey
administrative regulations governing medication refusals by hospitalized
patients. Procedurally, the regulations provided for a three-step, in-house
review of treatment refusals. The attending physician must first disclose
treatment information to the patient. If the patient continues to refuse,
the treatment team meets (with the patient present if his condition
permits). If the treatment team does not resolve the issue, the facility's
medical director or his designee must personally examine the patient
and review the patient's records. The assistance of an independent psy-
chiatrist is optional. The medical director then has the authority to
authorize forced medication."14
Pointing to evidence that institutional pressures compromised the
in-house review process, the Rennie court stated that the procedures did
"not constitute the independent determination required by the due proc-
ess clause." 5" The court required the implementation of a number of
procedural safeguards including an informal adversarial hearing before
an independent psychiatrist appointed by the Commissioner of Mental
Health.536 An authorization of forced medication was limited to sixty
days. 537
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit modified and remanded the
district court's decision, finding that the New Jersey administrative re-
gulations satisfied both substantive and procedural due process require-
ments. 3 In applying the considerations announced in Mathews, the Third
Circuit was satisfied that the "state's procedures, if carefully followed,
pose only a minor risk of erroneous deprivation" and that "this risk
will not be significantly reduced by superimposing the district court's
own requirements on those already required by the state. 5 39 Central to
the Third Circuit's reasoning was its characterization of the decisions
necessary in a forced medication determination as "medical" in nature. 5
40
Accordingly, the court believed that the adversary hearing envisioned
by the district court was "ill-suited" to these types of decisions.5 4
533. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.), stay denied in part, granted in part, 481 F. Supp.
552 (D.N.J. 1979), modoied and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458
U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
534. Id. at 1303.
535. Id. at 1310.
536. Id. at 1312. The court also required the use of patient consent forms and the
establishment of a system of patient advocates. Id. at 1311.
537. Id. at 1315.
538. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102
S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
539. Id. at 850.
540. Id.
541. Id.
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The Third Circuit supported its reasoning by quoting from the
Supreme Court's decision in Parham, stating that 'due process is not
violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques"'
when dealing with essentially medical determinations.4 2 The court further
relied on Parham in stating that adversary proceedings are "more likely
to be counterproductive, adding to the tensions that may have contributed
to the patient's initial commitment to the institution. ' 54 The court
rejected the need for an independent review and asserted that the district
court's procedures would impose "substantial additional financial bur-
dens on the state and even greater expenditures of staff time at the
hospitals."1544
In R.A.J. v. Miller,545 a federal district court in Texas approved a
two-tiered, in-house, non-adversarial review process for medication re-
fusals in non-emergency situations. Although the procedures included
an incompetency determination by the clinical director, patients found
competent could, nonetheless, be forcibly medicated after a third-level
review of the decision by an independent psychiatrist. The court indicated
that involuntary commitment sufficiently extinguishes a competent pa-
tient's interest in refusing medication for treatment purposes. 546
Relying on the Supreme Court decisions in both Parham and Young-
berg, the Second Circuit has allowed ultimate authority to rest with
state officials exercising professional judgment in deciding whether to
forcibly medicate even competent patients on either parens patriae or
police power grounds. 47 The court, however, stated that "[w]hile we
are aware that deference must be accorded medical judgment in such
matters, . . . we are also mindful that '[t]he medical nature of the
inquiry . . . does not justify dispensing with due process require-
ments. ''1 4 The court held that "due process requires an opportunity
for hearing and review of a decision to administer antipsychotic med-
ication-but such a hearing need not be judicial in nature. ' 549 The
Second Circuit upheld a New York three-tiered administrative review
procedure in which patients were permitted to be represented by legal
counsel as sufficient under due process. However, this case was undercut
542. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607, 97 S. Ct. 2493, 2507 (1979)).
543. Id. at 851 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 610, 99 S. Ct. at 2508).
544. Id.
545. 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
546. Id. at 1322-23.
547. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 971 (2d Cir. 1983).
548. Id. at 979 (citations omitted) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96, 100
S. Ct. 1254, 1265 (1980)).
549. Id. at 981.
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by a subsequent state court decision which adopted an approach more
protective of patient interests. 5 0
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia applied
a more limited version of the professional judgment standard to drug
refusal cases. In United States v. Leatherman,"' the court strongly
implied that competent patients have an absolute right to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs proposed for treatment purposes."' The court, however,
held that judicial determinations of incompetency are unnecessary because
"[t]o require the courts to pass on such issues would embroil them in
a never-ending controversy concerning medical judgments for which
courts have neither the institutional resources nor the necessary exper-
tise." '553 Relying on Youngberg, the court affirmed the hospital's internal
administrative review procedures for determining incompetency and the
necessity of forced medication for those patients found incompetent-
which included consideration of available alternative treatment options-
as sufficient under due process requirements.
5 4
Likewise, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that although
a finding of incompetency is necessary before the state may exercise its
parens patriae authority to compel drug therapy, a judicial determination
on this matter is not necessary to satisfy due process requirements. 55
The court held that before medication could be forcibly administered
on police power grounds, a true emergency must exist as determined
by more than one physician." 6
B. Unqualified Deference to Professional Judgment
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court decisions in Parham and
Youngberg, a few courts have gone as far as abrogating a patient's
right to even an in-house review of a nonconsensual medication decision
if made with professional judgment. In Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hos-
pital 5 7 the Eighth Circuit held that committed patients can be forcibly
medicated on either police power or parens patriae grounds by treating
physicians exercising professional judgment."' The court made no dis-
550. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (see infra notes 608-611 and accom-
panying text).
551. 580 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1983).
552. Id. at 979.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 980.
555. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 490 (N.H. 1983). See also In re Bryant,
No. 1428-85 (D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Div., Oct. 13, 1986) (dicta indicating a preference
for nonjudicial determinations of incompetency).
556. Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d at 489-90.
557. 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987).
558. Id. at 300.
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tinction between competent and incompetent patients.559 Moreover, the
Eighth Circuit required no procedures, in-house or otherwise, to assure
the integrity of the medical decisionmaking process. In arriving at its
conclusion, the court emphasized that according to Youngberg, freedom
from bodily restraint (and therefore, arguably, mental restraint) is 'pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental ac-
tion.' ' '56 An evaluating court's standard of review is merely to ensure
that a treatment decision has not deviated from accepted professional
standards to such an extent that it can only be described as arbitrarily
made. 56 The Eighth Circuit stated that the decisions to forcibly medicate
in this case were not arbitrary because they were "made by professionals
exercising their professional judgment" in an attempt to meet "the
government's legitimate objective to return [the patient's] behavior to
that which is acceptable to society. '562
In 1984, the Fourth Circuit addressed the right of an involuntarily
committed mental patient to refuse antipsychotic drugs. In Johnson v.
Silvers,563 the Fourth Circuit focused on the liberty interest in freedom
from physical restraint recognized by the Supreme Court in Youngberg
and held that "the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs presents
a sufficiently analogous intrusion upon bodily security to give rise to
such a protectable interest.' '564 The court relied on Youngberg's pro-
fessional judgment standard in allowing treating physicians to retain
discretion to medicate patients on an involuntary basis. 6
However, only three years later the Fourth Circuit turned full circle
in adopting a very protective due process procedural model for reviewing
559. The Eighth Circuit believed that the petitioner, Dautremont, was competent.
Dautremont argued that certain of his claims were not barred by the statute of limitations
due to Iowa's tolling statute. That statute extends the limitation periods in favor of
mentally ill individuals for one year after their disability terminates. The court held the
tolling statute inapplicable, reasoning that although Dautremont was mentally ill he was
nonetheless cognizant of his legal rights. Id. at 296. The court supported its holding by
citing Iowa legislation, Iowa Code Ann. § 229.27 (West 1985), which explicitly stated that
involuntary hospitalization is not to be equated with, nor does it raise a presumption of,
incompetency for any purpose. Id.
560. Id. at 300 (court's emphasis) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316,
102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982)).
561. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323, 102 S. Ct. at 2462.
562. Dautremont, 827 F.2d at 300. See also Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128,
130-31 (W.D. Wis. 1985), where the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin took the unprecedented step of holding that involuntary commitment itself
justifies nonconsensual treatment decisions if made with professional judgment. Id. at
130-31. This ruling, however, was stripped of precedential effect by a subsequent state
court holding. See infra note 619 and accompanying text.
563. 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984).
564. Id. at 825.
565. Id.
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medication refusals. In the panel decision of Charters 1,166 the Fourth
Circuit shifted its focus from the interest in freedom from physical
restraint to the interests in privacy and free expression as sources for
a federal pretrial detainee's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.5 6 The
court authorized forced medication on police power grounds only in
emergency situations where "it is determined that, without medication,
a patient presents an immediate threat of violence that cannot be avoided
through the use of less restrictive alternatives.""5
The Fourth Circuit adopted the modern scientific view that com-
petency is situation-specific and thereby refused to equate a finding of
incompetency to stand trial with incapacity to make treatment deci-
sions.5 69 The court held that absent a prior judicial determination of
incompetency to make treatment decisions, an involuntarily confined
individual retains an absolute right to refuse antipsychotic medication
proposed for treatment purposes . 70 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
argument that the government's interest in ensuring that the defendant
regains competency to stand trial is sufficient to justify forced drug
therapy. The court stated that "[a]lthough we do not intend to downplay
the importance of the government's obvious interest in resolving the
guilt or innocence of a particular defendant, the interest does not permit
such a draconian invasion of the individual's freedom and the risk of
permanent physical injury." '5 7'
The Fourth Circuit held that for patients who are adjudicated in-
competent, the court is the appropriate body to determine the necessity
of compelled medication . 72 The court expressly rejected the professional
judgment standard and reasoned:
The decision here, whether to hazard the substantial risks of a
course of antipsychotic medication, is an individual decision,
not normally delegated to professionals. Furthermore, the use
of antipsychotic medication may present a substantial conflict
of interest for institutional professionals because, quite apart
from its therapeutic benefits, the medication serves the institu-
tional goals of maintaining control and ameliorating staffing
costs.573
566. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
567. Id. at 491-92.
568. Id. at 493.
569. Id. at 495.
570. Id.
571. Id. at 494. The court also expressed concern that the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs may mislead the jury concerning the defendant's mental state or may make the
defendant apathetic and unable to assist his attorney in the defense. Id.
572. Id. at 498-99.
573. Id. at 497.
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In making the medication determination, the authorizing court is to be
guided by the substituted judgment standard, at least to the extent that
it is "possible clearly to ascertain what a patient would have done if
he were competent.15 74 This approach, reasoned the Fourth Circuit,
avoids depriving "the incompetent patient of rights which are afforded
competent patients, by ignoring their uniqueness and imposing upon
them the views of a hypothetical majority or 'reasonable man."' 5"7
However, when clear evidence of intent is lacking, the court should
decide on the basis of the patient's best interests. 7 6
As described earlier, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Youngberg by
noting that the Supreme Court did not address the interests of competent
patients. In addition, the Court did not have occasion to consider the
serious side effects posed by antipsychotic medication and the drugs'
potential to infringe upon first amendment values. 77 The Fourth Circuit
also found the situation in Youngberg to be an emergency because the
patient's history unmistakenly indicated the need to take some action
to prevent further physical injury to the patient and perhaps to others.
Thus, as when the government exercises its police power authority in
an emergency situation, deference to professional judgment was more
appropriate, especially when the preventive measure employed posed no
threat of permanent injury. 78
Approximately fourteen months later, the Fourth Circuit once again
reversed its position on the scope of a patient's right to refuse medication.
In Charters II,179 the court (sitting en banc) essentially overruled its
decision in Charters I and returned to an approach of unqualified
deference to professional judgment. The Fourth Circuit began its opinion
in Charters II by recognizing that legally confined individuals retain
significant constitutionally protected interests.8 0 Citing its earlier decision
in Johnson v. Silvers, the court again relied on the liberty interest in
freedom from restraint as a source for the right to refuse and ignored
the privacy and first amendment interests identified in Charters L., In
evaluating the sufficiency of countervailing governmental objectives, the
court stated that the protected interests retained by legally confined
individuals "must yield to the legitimate governmental interests that are
incidental to the basis for legal institutionalization.15 2 In determining
574. Id. at 498.
575. Id. at 497.
576. Id. at 498.
577. See supra notes 503-506 and accompanying text.
578. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 489.
579. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
580. Id. at 305.
581. Id. at 305-06.
582. Id. at 305.
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which such governmental interests are legitimate, the court held that the
protected rights retained by involuntarily confined individuals "are only
afforded protection against arbitrary and capricious government ac-
tion."' 83
The Fourth Circuit then shifted to a procedural due process analysis
to determine the mechanisms necessary to protect the individual sub-
stantive interests from arbitrary and capricious government action. The
court looked to the considerations enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews to determine the procedures due in this particular situation. 8 4
Referring to the "'mind-altering' quality of the proposed treatment"
and "the risk of possibly drastic mental and physical side effects," the
court considered the private interest at stake as "sensitive.""8 ,
The Fourth Circuit next inquired into whether the government's
current process of placing responsibility for compelled medication de-
cisions in the institution's medical personnel was sufficient protection
against the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest. The
court quoted from the Supreme Court's opinion in Parham, stating that
"it has long been recognized that '[w]hat process is constitutionally due
cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is
being made.' 5 6 Like the Third Circuit in Rennie, the Fourth Circuit
characterized the determinations necessary in a forced medication decision
as "medical" in nature. 87 For example, the court viewed the potential
for side effects and the patient's capacity to make rational treatment
decisions as mere factors "in the ultimate [best interests] medical decision
to administer the medication involuntarily." ' Having characterized such
determinations as "medical," the court relied on both Parham and
Youngberg in holding that the committing of these decisions to the
government's professionals, subject to judicial review for arbitrariness,
satisfies due process requirements. 8 9 The Fourth Circuit relied on Parham
in reasoning that "while medical and psychiatric diagnosis obviously was
fallible," because the questions involved are medical and psychiatric in
nature, "there was no reason to suppose that it was more so than would
be the comparable diagnosis of a judge or hearing officer." 519 The role
of the court, therefore, is merely to guarantee professional judgment
was exercised in the base-line decisionmaking prior to deprivation. 9'
583. Id.
584. Id. at 306-07.
585. Id. at 307.
586. Id. at 308 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2507
(1979)).
587. Id.
588. Id. at 311-12.
589. Id. at 307-08.
590. Id. at 308.
591. Id. at 309.
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The court criticized the adjudicatory regime envisioned in Charters
I as installing "the federal courts as the base-line providers of procedural
due process, collapsing their normal review function into this threshold
function."5 92 Thus, "[d]istrict judges would thereby be cast in the role
of making the primary decisions on purely medical and psychiatric
questions, rather than reviewers of such decisions made by qualified
professionals." 5 93 The court also believed that the proposed adjudicative
system would impose heavy burdens on the government in efforts to
discharge its duties as a "benign custodian of one legally committed to
it for medical care and treatment. 594 The Fourth Circuit thus held that
adequate due process protection is found, first, "in the general profes-
sional competence and integrity of the government's medical personnel,
and second, in the availability of judicial review to guard against ar-
bitrariness in making particular decisions." '595
In addressing how the government's current regime should be prop-
erly administered, the Fourth Circuit again relied on Parham and stated:
"Making an acceptable professional judgment of the sort here in issue
does not require any internal adversarial hearing. The decision may be
based upon accepted medical practices in diagnosis, treatment, and prog-
nosis, with the aid of such technical tools and consultative techniques
as are appropriate in the profession." 596
In accentuating the limited scope of judicial review, the Fourth
Circuit cited Youngberg and stated that only one question is relevant:
"[W]as this decision reached by a process so completely out of pro-
fessional bounds as to make it explicable only as an arbitrary, nonpro-
fessional one? '5 97
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id. at 312.
595. Id. at 307-08.
596. Id. at 312 (citation omitted). Later, the court seemingly contradicted itself by
stating that "under the approved regime such a decision is of a piece with other pre-
deprivation governmental decisions such as those leading to job or social benefit termi-
nations, prison transfers, disciplinary sanctions and the like." Id. at 314. However, many
such determinations have been held to require procedural safeguards, often including an
adversarial hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, which go far beyond those mandated
by the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the professional judgment standard. See, e.g.,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980) (the determination to transfer a
prisoner to a mental health facility requires an adversarial hearing before an impartial
decisionmaker); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) (requiring
procedural safeguards, including an adversarial hearing before a neutral and detached
hearing body, for parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011
(1970) (a decision to terminate Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits requires
procedural safeguards, including an adversarial hearing before an impartial decisionmaker).
597. Charters I1, 863 F.2d at 313.
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C. Due Process Models
As illustrated by the above case law, the Supreme Court's deference
to institutional professional decisionmaking displayed in such cases as
Parham and Youngberg has persuaded several courts to apply the pro-
fessional judgment standard to drug refusal cases. Other courts have
rejected the professional judgment standard as insufficient under due
process requirements. These courts have stressed the different interests
and types of determinations that are involved when an individual refuses
antipsychotic drugs.
In Bee v. Greaves,sgs the Tenth Circuit rejected the professional
judgment standard in holding that a non-dangerous detainee, who had
not been determined incompetent to make treatment decisions by a court
of law, retained the absolute right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.5 99 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a similar decision in a case involving
an involuntarily hospitalized patient.6 The court stated that because
"competency is not a medical decision," a separate judicial determination
is necessary. 0 1 For those patients adjudicated incompetent, the court
required an appointment of a guardian to make the treatment decision.
It was suggested that the guardian be governed by the substituted judg-
ment standard. 2
598. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187
(1985). The court held that jailed pretrial detainees retain a constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs. Id. at 1394. As described earlier, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
Youngberg on the grounds that "it involved temporary physical restraints rather than
mental restraints with potentially long term effects, and because [the patient) had been
certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself." Id. at 1396 n.7 (citations
omitted). Rather than relying on the liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint,
the court pointed to the privacy interest in making fundamental personal decisions, the
liberty interest in personal security and the First Amendment interest in producing and
communicating ideas. Id. at 1392-94.
599. Id. at 1395. The government's contention that it was entitled to forcibly medicate
the appellant in order to maintain his competency for trial was rejected. The court pointed
out that the detainee had not been found incompetent, and suggested that because of the
potentially dangerous side effects of drugs, the governmental interest in bringing an accused
to trial is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the individual interest in refusing. Id.
As described earlier, the Tenth Circuit left police power authority to medicate within the
discretion of governmental authorities exercising professional judgment. See supra notes
359-364 and accompanying text.
600. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980). The court equated antipsychotic drugs
with such intrusive therapies as psychosurgery and electroshock and relied on the federal
constitutional right to privacy as a source for the right to refuse. Id. at 749-50. Absent
a police power emergency, it was held that competent patients have an absolute right to
refuse medication. Id. at 750.
601. Id. at 749-50.
602. Id. at 751-52 & n.16.
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In Rogers v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Health,63 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court required a judicial determination
of incompetency before the state could forcibly administer medication
on parens patriae grounds. For patients adjudicated incompetent, the
court, as opposed to state professionals, is to make the treatment decision
based on a substituted judgment standard. Only when medication is
necessary to prevent the 'immediate, substantial, and irreversible de-
terioration of a serious mental illness"' can it be forcibly administered
for a limited time without a prior adjudication of incompetency.60
Relying on the federal and state constitutional interest in privacy,
as well as state statutory law, a South Dakota court held that competent
mental patients have an absolute right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in
non-emergency situations.6 The court expressly rejected the professional
judgment standard, stating that an adversarial judicial hearing "wherein
'professional judgment' testimony can be weighed with other testimony
is a better method of determining both competency and necessity of use
of antipsychotic drugs."6'
In Rivers v. Katz, 60s the New York Court of Appeals relied on state
constitutional and common law in holding that the administrative review
procedures previously affirmed by the Second Circuit in Project Release
v. Prevost" were inadequate to protect the privacy interests of committed
mental patients.6 10 The court mandated a finding of incompetency before
a patient could be medicated against his will for treatment purposes
because .'[o]therwise, the very justification for the state's purported
exercise of its parens patriae power-its citizen's inability to care for
himself-would be missing. '"' 61 An adjudication of incompetency was
required because "(sluch a determination is uniquely a judicial, not a
medical function. '61 2 For patients adjudicated incompetent, the court is
603. 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). The court relied on state statutory and common
law in defining the scope of a committed mental patient's right to refuse drugs. Absent
a police power emergency requiring immediate intervention, a competent patient has the
absolute right to refuse drug treatment. Id. at 321-22.
604. Id. at 314-15.
605. Id. at 322 (quoting In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 1981)).
606. Henderson v. Yocom, No. 7948A mem. op. at 8-11 (S.D. 1st Cir. 1987), aff'd,
438 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (table opinion).
607. Id. at 12.
608. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
609. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
610. Id. at 341.
611. Id. at 343 (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980)) (citation
omitted). The court limited nonconsensual medication on police power grounds to emer-
gency situations. Id.
612. Id. (citations omitted).
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to make the forced medication determination by considering all relevant
circumstances. 61 3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court avoided the Youngberg decision by
relying on the federal and state constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection in holding that involuntarily committed individuals who have not
been adjudicated incompetent have an absolute right to refuse unless
antipsychotic drugs are required to prevent serious physical harm to the
patient or others. 61 4 The court required an adversarial judicial hearing
to determine incompetency "in order to avoid having individuals rou-
tinely declared incompetent for the sake of mere convenience, control,
or expense." 6"' If the individual is determined incompetent, court au-
thorization is needed before medication can be forcibly administered. 616
While noting that the judgment of treating physicians is valuable in
assisting in the incompetency determination, the court rejected the pro-
fessional judgment standard.617 The court reasoned that "[clonstitutional
guarantees may not be replaced by professional judgment, and their
protection and enforcement cannot be considered to be judicial inter-
ference. ' 61 8 This ruling nullified a previous holding by a federal district
court which had adopted an unqualified professional judgment ap-
proach. 619
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished Youngberg by noting
that unlike many mentally ill individuals, the patient in that case was
incompetent. The court stressed the intrusiveness of antipsychotic drugs6 0
and criticized the applicability of the professional judgment standard to
drug refusal cases as being insufficient to protect the basic human right
of privacy as recognized by the Minnesota Constitution. 62 Absent an
emergency, the court required a judicial hearing on the issues of in-
competency and the appropriateness of nonconsensual medication for
patients adjudicated incompetent.6 22
Several other courts have issued similar opinions rejecting the pro-
fessional judgment standard.6 23 The Colorado Supreme Court relied on
613. Id. at 344. The relevant circumstances include: the patient's best interests; the
benefits to be gained from treatment; the adverse side effects associated with the treatment;
and, any less intrusive alternative treatments.
614. State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 894-95 (Wis. 1987).
615. Id. at 898.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 895-96.
618. Id. at 896.
619. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis. 1985). See supra note 562.
620. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-48 (Minn. 1988).
621. Id.
622. Id. at 147-48 & n.7.
623. See, e.g., In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64, 73 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1988); Goedecke v.
State Dep't of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
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state statutory and common law in requiring an adjudication of incom-
petency and court authorization before drugs can be forcibly administered
for treatment purposes. 624 A California appellate court also relied on
state law in reaching a similar decision. 625 For a patient adjudicated
incompetent, medication may be authorized by the court for up to
fourteen days. Thereafter, permission must be granted by an appointed
surrogate exercising a substituted judgment. 62 6
IX. THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD
TO DRUG REFUSAL CASES
As illustrated in the prior section, the Supreme Court's deference
to institutional professional decisionmaking displayed in Parham and
Youngberg has persuaded several courts to apply the professional judg-
ment standard, in varying degrees, to drug refusal cases. Other courts
have rejected the professional judgment standard as insufficient under
procedural due process requirements. These courts have emphasized the
different interests and types of determinations that are involved when
an individual refuses antipsychotic drugs. In analyzing the application
of the professional judgment standard under the procedural considera-
tions announced by the Supreme Court in Mathews, the latter approach
appears most persuasive.
A. The Private Interests Affected by the Government Action
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing
that a profoundly retarded institutionalized patient retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from physical restraint protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Noting that constitu-
tional rights are not absolute, the Court balanced the asserted liberty
interests against the state's reasons for infringement. 628 The Court noted
that the private interests at stake were to some extent in conflict, as
physical restraint was necessary to assure the respondent's safety. 629 In
addition, the type of restraint was mild, posing little threat of injury.
624. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
625. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. App. Ist
Dist. 1987), opinion superseded, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), dismissed, 774 P.2d 698 (Cal.
1989). See also Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 747, 754-55 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986).
626. Riese, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
627. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982).
628. Id. at 319-20, 102 S. Ct. at 2460. As explained earlier, a government encroachment
on interests of this nature must, at a minimum, be reasonably related to legitimate
government objectives. However, as the intrusiveness of the government action rises, the
sufficiency of its justification must also increase.
629. Id. at 320, 102 S. Ct. at 2460.
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In light of the nature of the individual interest at issue and the level
of intrusiveness presented, the Court concluded that the restrictions
should be upheld upon the minimal showing of a reasonable relation
to legitimate objectives. 630 The Court then provided guidance to reviewing
courts by articulating the professional judgment standard as a method
of determining whether the government's showing is sufficient.
Courts extending the professional judgment standard to drug refusal
cases have analogized the bodily restraints at issue in Youngberg to the
intrusion presented by the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.
However, as demonstrated by such courts as the Tenth Circuit in Bee
v. Greaves and the Fourth Circuit panel in Charters I, the protected
interests at stake in Youngberg are distinguishable.
Youngberg involved the use of soft arm restraints for short periods
of time. 61' While these physical restraints are certainly a restriction on
liberty, they arguably served only the respondent's best interest by pro-
tecting him from his own violence and that of other patients.632 The
effects of physical restraints are predictable and can be easily identified
and monitored. Soft arm restraints pose little risk of injury, and the
restriction on liberty ceases once they are removed. The intrusion pre-
sented by the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs is not com-
parable to temporary physical restraints. Physicians cannot predict the
adverse effects drugs may have on a patient.633 Indeed, as described
earlier, many side effects may remain undetected during drug treat-
ment. 63 4 Antipsychotic drugs also pose a threat of serious harm-harm
which, as evidenced by tardive dyskinesia and neuroleptic malignant
syndrome, may be irreversible and sometimes fatal. Other adverse effects,
although reversible, may afflict the patient for months after termination
of drug therapy. Thus, antipsychotic drugs are much more intrusive
than temporary physical restraints, encroaching upon bodily integrity
and personal security to a far greater degree.
In analogizing to the protected interests recognized in Youngberg,
courts applying the professional judgment standard have ignored the
possible First Amendment implications posed by the forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs. As addressed earlier, unlike the temporary
physical restraints at issue in Youngberg, drug side effects may adversely
impact upon a patient's otherwise normal thought processes. 635 As the
Fourth Circuit panel in Charters I noted, even if a patient's mental
630. Id. at 320-22, 102 S. Ct. at 2460-62.
631. Id. at 310, 311 n.8, 102 S. Ct. at 2455, 2456 n.8.
632. Id. at 324, 102 S. Ct. at 2462.
633. Goodman & Gilman, supra note 68, at 172-74; Hollister, supra note 29, at 30-
32; Plotkin, supra note 4, at 474-75.
634. See supra text accompanying notes 73-167.
635. See supra text accompanying notes 216-277.
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disorder renders him incapable of making rational treatment decisions,
he may, nonetheless, be capable of engaging in other activities protected
by the First Amendment. These capabilities, however, may be drastically
diminished by drug side effects. 636 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
"[iun short, the decision in the present case may profoundly impact an
interest at the core of liberty-the protection of the thought processes
that define individuality-an interest which was not at issue in Ro-
meo. "637 Courts relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Youngberg
have also failed to confront the possibility that forced medication will
implicate the fundamental privacy interest in personal decisionmaking.
Many mentally ill individuals retain the capacity to make rational treat-
ment decisions. The respondent in Youngberg, however, was profoundly
retarded and certified, incapable of contributing to his own treatment
decisions. Thus, the Supreme Court in Youngberg did not address the
protected interest in treatment decisionmaking retained by competent
individuals .638
The private interests affected by the forced administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs are not analogous to the liberty interest in freedom
from physical restraint which served as the basis for the Supreme Court's
analysis in Youngberg. The Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R.
is distinguishable on the same grounds. The private interest affected in
a commitment proceeding is the same interest at issue in Youngberg,
freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint. 63 9 A decision to commit,
although a "massive curtailment of liberty,"' does not implicate the
same fundamental interests involved in a decision to compel treatment
with -medication posing potentially serious and harmful side effects.
In addition, as in Youngberg, the Supreme Court in Parham did
not address the rights of a competent patient but rather the interests
of a minor, one considered de jure incompetent. Moreover, the Court
stressed that the minor's liberty interest is "inextricably linked with the
parents' interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the
child, [thus] the private interest at stake is a combination of the child's
636. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 489 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
637. Id. The court's cite is to Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982).
638. As explained earlier, the Supreme Court appears to prefer characterizing a com-
petent patient's right to refuse medical treatment as a liberty interest rather than as an
aspect of the right to privacy. See supra notes 301-304, 331-334 and accompanying text.
However, as the Supreme Court conceded, a state court may base the right to refuse on
the privacy interest in personal decisionmaking found in the state constitution. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
639. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979).
640. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S. Ct. 1048, 1052 (1972).
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and parents' concerns."' The Court held that the child's individual
interest in remaining free from commitment is substantially diminished
by the parents' interest in retaining authority to make decisions on what
is in the child's best interest.62 The Court also emphasized the "tra-
ditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their
child" as offering additional protection for the child."3
Nonconsensual drug therapy poses not only a far greater infringement
of constitutionally protected interests than does physical restraint, but
the interests threatened are of a more varied and important nature.
Therefore, the balancing of individual and governmental interests should
be quite different. The rational basis standard applied in both Youngberg
and Parham, with its resulting deference to professional decisionmaking,
is a grossly inadequate standard for protecting the important -interest
retained by institutionalized mental patients in refusing antipsychotic
drugs.
The grounds on which Youngberg and Parham have been distin-
guished would also appear to support the application of the higher
standard of constitutional protection represented by the least restrictive
alternative doctrine to drug refusal cases.6" At a minimum, it would
seem that when an intrusive treatment is at issue, contemporary medical
standards would require a weighing of the costs and benefits and con-
sideration of less intrusive therapies in order that the ultimate judgment
be professionally acceptable."5 A strict application of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine would require that a reviewing court, after consid-
eration of all the evidence, assure that the correct professional choice-
striking the proper balance between efficacy and intrusiveness-is im-
plemented.646 This may, however, constitute the type of judicial inter-
vention which the Supreme Court criticized in Youngberg when it expressed
641. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600, 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
642. Id. at 604, 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
643. Id., 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
644. See generally Winick, supra note 210, at 20-21. Professor Winick believes that
the Supreme Court's decision in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985),
indicates that the least restrictive alternative doctrine has survived Youngberg, at least in
cases -involving intrusions more serious than the use of physical restraints. Winick, supra
note 210, at 21. In Winston, the state sought compelled surgery to remove a bullet from
a suspect's body for evidentiary purposes. The Court held that due to the highly intrusive
nature of the procedure and its uncertain risks, the state interest was insufficient to
override the respondent's privacy interests given the existence of additional evidence
available to the state. Winston, 470 U.S. at 766, 105 S. Ct. at 1619-20. As explained
infra, the Supreme Court has recently suggested the constitutional applicability of the
least restrictive alternative doctrine to drug refusal cases. See infra note 889 and accom-
panying text.
645. See Winick, supra note 210, at 21; Zlotnick, supra note 210, at 430-31.
646. The district court in Rennie applied the least restrictive alternative principle in
this manner. See supra notes 470-472 and accompanying text.
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concern over placing "an undue burden on the administration of in-
stitutions ... [which] also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of
professional judgment as to the needs of residents."' 47
Considering the significant difference in the degree of intrusiveness
between antipsychotic medication and soft arm restraints, a higher level
of judicial oversight may very well be warranted in drug refusal cases.64
However, even a less stringent utilization of the least restrictive alternative
principle would offer invaluable protection to a patient's fundamental
interests while not unduly hampering the exercise of professional care.
Application of the doctrine in this sense would require that a reviewing
court merely ensure that a cost-benefit analysis from the patient's per-
spective has taken place-that the proper considerations were taken into
account through appropriate procedures. If the government could present
sufficient evidence that the necessary concerns were conscientiously con-
sidered by the appropriate professionals, the court would not involve
itself in a substantive determination of the correct choice 49 This relaxed
standard of review would at least ensure that the professional judgment
at issue was not unduly influenced by the severe administrative, staff,
and economic pressures that are inherent in most public institutions-
concerns which are "simply not significant enough to justify a patient's
exposure to the serious risks accompanying use of [antipsychotic] drugs.''630
B. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation by Deferring to
Professional Judgment and the Value of Additional Procedural
Safeguards
In Parham, the Supreme Court stated that "[wihat process is con-
stitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate
decision that is being made." ' 651 The Court went on to characterize the
questions involved in a child's commitment determination as essentially
medical in nature. 6 2 The Court concluded:
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychi-
atric diagnosis, we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings
of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision
647. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2461 (1982). See
generally Winick, supra note 210, at 20-21.
648. Winick, supra note 210, at 20-21.
649. Id. Professor Winick suggests that an appropriate standard of review would be
the substantial evidence test or the arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion standard
employed for review of administrative agency decisions. Id. at 21. See also Zlotnick,
supra note 210, at 439.
650. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 1983) (Weis, J., concurring).
651. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2507 (1979).
652. Id. at 609, 99 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
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from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical
science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer
after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the non-
specialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric deci-
sion. 61
As illustrated most notably by the Third Circuit's opinion in Rennie
v. Klein and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Charters II, courts have
relied heavily on this reasoning in justifying the application of the
professional judgment standard to drug refusal cases. By characterizing
the questions involved in a forced medication determination as medical
or psychiatric, deference to professional decisionmaking is thereby held
appropriate, obviating the need for additional procedural safeguards.
However, the basic premise underlying this reasoning is false. Unlike
the questions involved in a child's commitment proceeding, the issues
inherent in a forced medication determination are not solely medical in
nature.
For example, the Fourth Circuit characterized the "special risk of
drastic side-effects posed by the antipsychotic medication here in issue"
as a purely medical issue.654 Admitting that it did not undertake an
"exhaustive analysis of the scientific literature before us documenting
these side-effects and their statistical probability," the court merely cited
to scientific disagreement as to the severity, susceptibility to treatment,
duration, and probability of various side effects and to the fact that
neither party asserted that antipsychotic drugs should never be admin-
istered even with patient consent. 6"1 Given these circumstances, the court
relegated the issue to "an element of the ultimate 'best interests' medical
decision" more capable of assessment and review by institutional profes-
sionals than by an adjudicative process. 6 6 However, this risk of serious
harm, which is not at issue in the commitment context, presents a high
degree of intrusiveness into fundamental interests in privacy and personal
security. This grave threat to important individual interests raises a
considerably greater need for legal concern and evaluation. The fact
that there is scientific disagreement over the degree (not the presence)
of risk would appear to support the need for legal safeguards so that
varying medical viewpoints can be adequately assessed.
A growing body of scholarly literature documents a court's ability
to evaluate and weigh social science research. 6 7 Indeed, a court has the
653. Id. (citations omitted).
654. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
655. Id. at 310-11 & n.6.
656. Id. at 311.
657. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology
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duty to thoroughly examine such data, especially when an individual's
fundamental rights are involved 5. 6 8 The Fourth Circuit avoided this ev-
aluative task by simply asserting an inability to reconcile or choose
between the conflicting scientific assessments of the risk of side effects
which were advanced in the case. 6 9 By leaving this evaluative function
to institutional personnel, the court abdicated a critical judicial respon-
sibility necessary for the protection of patients' constitutional rights. 6
Contrary to the inference made by the Supreme Court in the above
quote from Parham, the judge's dispositional decision is not the product
of his own diagnosis. While it is obvious that the judge is "untrained"
to diagnose, such is not his function. Instead, the court's role is to
assure that "there has been a full exploration of all relevant facts,
opposing views and possible alternatives, [and] whether the results of
the exploration relate rationally to the ultimate decision." 1 Through
as Legal Precedent, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 877 (1988); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987);
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Estab-
lishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986).
658. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-48 (Minn. 1988); State ex rel. Jones v.
Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 896 (Wis. 1987).
659. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 311 n.6 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
660. For a critical analysis of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Charters II, including
its reluctance to confront the social science and empirical questions involved, see Michael
L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?: Stripping the Facade
from United States v. Charters, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 957 (1990). Professor Perlin quotes
Judge Bazelon:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists, aeronautical
engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however,
many people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed
dam on fish life, while they reject a similar scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric
treatment on human lives.... [lilt can hardly be that we are more concerned
for the salmon than the schizophrenic.
Id. at 960 (quoting David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 742, 743 (1969)).
As Professor Perlin points out, the Fourth Circuit placed heavy reliance on a 1981
article by Baldessarini and Lipinski which stated that "the use of available antipsychotic
agents continues to be the cornerstone of management for these serious and disabling
mental illnesses." Ross J. Baldessarini & Joseph F. Lipinski, Risks of Antipsychotic Drugs
Overemphasized, 305 N. Eng. J. Med. 588 (1981). However, a more thorough examination
of scientific research would have revealed that Baldessarini had recently qualified the
above statement by pointing out that the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication is
questionable in many cases and that drug therapy is compromised by neurological side
effects. Perlin, supra, at 991-92 (quoting Ross J. Baldessarini et al., Significance of
Neuroleptic Dose and Plasma Levels in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychoses, 45
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 79, 79 (1988)).
661. David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary
Process, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 897, 910 (1975).
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the adversary process, the court is assisted by attorneys representing
each side who are trained in cross-examination, at sorting motivational
nuances, and operating within the context of conflicting facts, opinions,
interests, and professional principles.6 2 The ultimate determination on
whether antipsychotic drugs should be forcibly administered is not based
on the judge's personal diagnosis, but rather on a thorough and objective
evaluation of all the relevant facts, the often conflicting professional
opinions, and the important medical and legal interests at stake. The
fact that the questions may be partially or even entirely medical in
nature "does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It
is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that
justify the requirement of adversary hearings.""' 3 It is for the court to
determine whether the given level of medical certainty about the need
to administer the drugs-whatever that level may be-warrants infringe-
ment of the patient's constitutional rights. That determination is no
more left to medical discretion than the detemination of probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment is left to police discretion.
The importance of the adversary process in this context is under-
scored by a new generation of research into the processes of professional
decisionmaking. Recent studies by cognitive psychologists document a
high degree of inaccuracy in the clinical judgments of mental health
professionals." 4 After a comprehensive review of this research, one
psychologist concluded that "mental health professionals are no more
accurate than lay decisionmakers and that both professionals and lay-
people rely on the same judgment strategies and make the same er-
rors." 63 This commentator stated:
[Ilt is not too polemical to conclude that professional judgment
is, in fact, not much better than arbitrary judgment ...
[Pirofessional judgment is simply judgment made by a profes-
sional, not a judgment that has any special aura of reliability
or validity and is often no better than lay judgment. If, from
the Supreme Court's perspective, the only questions are whether
"professional judgment in fact was exercised," or whether the
clinician "substantial [ly] depart[ed] from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards," then mentally disabled per-
662. See Winsor C. Schmidt & Randy Otto, A Legal and Behavioral Science Analysis
of Statutory Guidelines for Children's Mental Health and Substance Abuse Service: The
Florida Case, 16 J. Psychiatry & L. 9, 49-50 (1988).
663. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1265 (1980) (citation omitted).
664. For a review of this research, see Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to
Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Com-
plexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. Rev. 329 (1992).
665. Id. at 360.
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sons will be vulnerable to erroneous decisions and unlikely to
prevail if they seek to challenge those decisions .... The pref-
erence for "informal, traditional medical investigative tech-
niques" and reliance on an "administrative review using medical
decisionmakers" will bar access to the adversary process, and
hence bar the opportunity to challenge judgments of mental
health professionals through competent cross-examination, the
use of competing experts, and other devices that serve as cor-
rectives to often confident but mistaken judgments by psy-
chiatrists and psychologists."
It should also be noted that if, after thorough evaluation, a court
is unable to make an informed decision on conflicting medical evidence,
the Supreme Court has suggested that such uncertainty dictates against
allowing the medical intervention. In Winston v. Lee,67 the Court denied
the government's request to perform minor surgery on a suspect to
recover a bullet for evidentiary purposes. After addressing the funda-
mental interests involved, the Court pointed to the dispute between
medical experts on the degree of risk presented by the surgery and held
that this "very uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be
'reasonable. 
'66
Courts relying on Youngberg and Parham in extending the full
measure of the professional judgment standard to drug refusal cases
have ignored the traditional application of the informed consent doctrine.
Instead, medical opinion, supported by the objective of restoring be-
havior "to that which is acceptable to society,"66 9 dictates the forced
drugging of competent patients. Under this approach of unqualified
deference to professional judgment, a patient's competence is, at best,
relegated to "simply another factor in the ultimate medical decision to
administer the medication involuntarily." 670 Such a standard diminishes
666. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). The author went on to state, "When, as in Parham,
the decisionmaker's judgment is subject to review only by a colleague and fellow employee
or, as in Harper, where the judgment of the psychiatrist recommending compelled ad-
ministration of medication is reviewed only by other nonlegal professionals, the context
is provided for operation of all the biasing heuristics discussed herein." Id. at 362-63. It
must be emphasized that an inappropriate decision made by a professional may be immune
from challenge under the "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment"
standard articulated by the Supreme Court. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323,
102 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (1982). As Bersoff notes, "Proof of negligence, consonant with a
malpractice standard, will not suffice .... [Tihe Youngberg rule . . . requir[es] something
akin to recklessness or fault, closer to deliberate indifference than simple negligence."
Bersoff, supra note 664, at 333.
667. 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
668. Id. at 766, 105 S. Ct. at 1619.
669. Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987).
670. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 311-12 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
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the value our society has placed on bodily integrity and self-determi-
nation, interests long protected by the common law and encompassed
within the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 671 In addition, this standard reflects a failure to recognize that
forcing treatment on a competent individual will reduce the therapeutic
benefits and can cause substantial injury to self-esteem. 672 Neither Young-
berg nor Parham suggested such an approach.
As in Youngberg, the Supreme Court in Parham did not address
the rights of a competent patient but rather the interests of a legally
incompetent minor. The commitment decision in Parham focused on
whether the child suffered from a mental illness which precluded the
receipt of care and treatment in the community. 67 13 However, these es-
sentially medical determinations do not necessarily mean that once com-
mitted, a mentally ill adult patient is incapable of making a rational
decision regarding proposed treatments. Thus, unlike the situation in
Parham, the threshold question in a forced treatment determination
should be whether the patient is competent. And, as many noted psy-
chiatrists readily admit, "Itihe concept of competency . . . is social and
legal and not merely psychiatric or medical. ' 6 4 One court has accepted
the following explanation:
"Competence is not a clinical, medical, or psychiatric concept.
It does not derive from our understanding of health, sickness,
treatment, or persons as patients. Rather, it relates to the world
of law, to society's interest in deciding whether an individual
should have certain rights (and obligations) relating to person,
property and relationships.1 67
A legal competency inquiry encompasses social and personal values
which are not present in the clinical determination.6 76 Medical profes-
sionals are trained to act in the medical best interests of a patient as
reflected by medical standards on which their professional judgments
are based. 677 This treatment bias was exemplified in the Charters I
671. See supra notes 293-304 and accompanying text.
672. State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Wis. 1987); Appelbaum
& Roth, supra note 402, at 1466.
673. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2505 (1979).
674. Roth et al., supra note 436, at 279.
675. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 253 (Cal. App.
1st Dist. 1987), opinion superseded, 751 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1988), dismissed, 774 P.2d 698
(Cal. 1989) (quoting Robert Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in Refusing Treat-
ment in Mental Health Institutions-Values in Conflict 115, 115 (A. Edward Doudera &
Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982)).
676. Some psychiatrists continue to assert that medical professionals are better qualified
to make competency judgments. See Schwed, supra note 4; Rachlin, supra note 4.
677. See Brooks, supra note 50, at 190-91; Meisel, supra note 454, at 451.
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litigation where the attending psychiatrist "took the position that Char-
ters' medical incompetence was evidenced by his refusal to accept an-
tipsychotic medication since refusing the medication was not, in [the
psychiatrist's] view, the decision most beneficial to Charters." 678
On the other hand, a legal competency evaluation is broader in
focus, taking into account not only medical concerns, but the patient's
personal interests in self-determination and bodily integrity. A treating
physician is not adequately socialized in these legal values to effectively
balance them with medical concerns. The same problem is inherent to
an in-house or independent psychiatric review system. As one commen-
tator noted, "[t]he independent [pisychiatrist shares the socialization
process, the values, the experience, and the professional outlook of the
treating doctor.' '679 The independent psychiatrist also faces the pressure
*of the long-established tradition of "doctors deferring to other doctors ' 680
and the unpleasant prospect of overturning the treatment decisions of
colleagues which may imply criticism of competence or performance. 61
An examination of the independent psychiatric hearing system decreed
by the district court in Rennie,682 before being overturned by the Third
Circuit, supports these concerns. The study indicated that independent
psychiatrists not only shared a bias towards treatment, but viewed their
roles more as consultants to attending physicians than as objective
hearing officers.683
Given the serious risks accompanying the forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs, the constitutionally protected interests in self-au-
tonomy and bodily integrity are implicated to a much greater degree
than in a decision to commit. And "[w]hen medical judgments collide
with a patient's fundamental rights . . . it is the courts, not the doctors,
who possess the necessary expertise. '6 4
678. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). See generally
Meisel, supra note 454, at 451.
679. Brooks, supra note 50, at 199.
680. Gelman, supra note 176, at 251.
681. Brooks, supra note 50, at 199. In addition, well-trained psychiatrists are not likely
to be attracted by the low state compensation budgeted for independent psychiatric
reviewers. Id.
682. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1312 (D.N.J.), stay denied in part, granted
in part, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
683. See Gelman, supra note 176, at 252.
684. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-48 (Minn. 1988). Thus, unlike the reasoning
employed by the Fourth Circuit in Charters II, committing base-line decisionmaking to
medical professionals subject only to an after-the-fact judicial review for arbitrariness is
inadequate protection for the constitutional interests at issue in a drug refusal case. As
one commentator noted, "if the ultimate treatment decision is made by a physician, we
can expect that it will favor health values and underemphasize or even ignore individualistic
values." Meisel, supra note 454, at 478.
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In Charters II, the Fourth Circuit feared that requiring adjudications
of incompetency would "pose an unavoidable risk of completely anom-
alous, perhaps flatly inconsistent, determinations of mental competence
by different judicial tribunals." 685 However, there is not even a clinical
consensus on the definition of incompetency, and the methods used to
make these determinations are unrefined. 686 As the noted psychiatrist
Doctor Loren Roth stated, "[wle don't know who is competent and
who is not competent. ' 68 7 The Fourth Circuit's concerns simply under-
score the need for well-defined criteria which are specific enough to be
interpreted by courts. 688 Delegating the incompetency determination to
medical professionals is not a resolution to such concerns. Although
consistency may be gained, it will favor treatment concerns at the expense
of individual values. As Dr. Roth candidly admitted, "[n]o matter what
the law does, we'll always treat all the people we want. I hate to say
that, but that's my experience. By hook or by crook, most of the
patients will continue to be treated. '68 9 The medical uncertainty and
treatment bias illustrated by Dr. Roth's remarks demonstrate the need
for adversarial competency hearings wherein a law-trained decisionmaker,
guided by appropriate criteria, can exercise the experience and aptitude
necessary to give due concern to legally protected values while objectively
weighing both medical and other evidence. 690
685. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
686. See supra note 402 and accompanying text; Meisel, supra note 454, at 440-41;
Parry, supra note 402, at 153; Roth et al., supra note 436, at 280-82.
687. Conference Report, Refusing Treatment in Mental Health Institutions: Values in
Conflict, 32 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 255, 257 (1981) [hereinafter Conference
Report].
688. See supra notes 437-438 and accompanying text.
689. Conference Report, supra note 687, at 258.
690. The Fourth Circuit also relied on the fact that, although the appellee had not
been determined incompetent to make treatment decisions, he had been adjudicated in-
competent to stand trial. The court stated that "[wlhile in theory there may be a difference
between the two mental states, it must certainly be one of such subtlety and complexity
as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals." United
States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110
S. Ct. 1317 (1990). However, incompetency is no longer considered as global in nature.
Mental illness may render an individual incompetent to make one type of decision while
leaving reasoning ability in other areas intact. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
Incompetency is now viewed as situation-specific, with each type of decision-making
situation being viewed individually and independently. Ruth Macklin, Some Problems in
Gaining Informed Consent from Psychiatric Patients, 31 Emory L.J. 345, 360 (1982). To
be deemed competent to stand trial, a defendant must be able to understand the nature
of the charges against him and to participate in his defense. Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 788-89 (1960) (per curiam). This is wholly different than
the capacity to make treatment decisions. Courts do not equate these two types of
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To avoid a separate hearing on the competency of an involuntarily
committed individual, it has been recommended that the determination
be made during the initial commitment proceeding. 69' This proposal,
however, presents a number of significant problems. If a patient is
adjudicated both suitable for commitment and incompetent to make
treatment decisions, an order allowing compelled medication would grant
the institution free reign in forcing drugs With no independent mechanism
for checking abuses which may arise. Moreover, because a mentally ill
individual's capacity to make reasoned treatment decisions may fluctuate,
the patient may regain competence during the period of commitment. 692
At that point, the patient may make a reasoned decision to forego
further medication due to side effects or for other rational reasons. This
decision could be ignored by institutional personnel who are operating
under the continuing order authorizing forced drug treatment.
While the above problems could be addressed by limiting the duration
of the forced medication order to a reasonable period, other inherent
difficulties persist. As described earlier, a decision to commit and a
determination of incapacity to make treatment decisions are separate
capabilities. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985). See also United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 488
(4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110
S. Ct. 1317 (1990); United States v. Waddell, 687 F. Supp. 208, 209 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
Indeed, competence to stand trial has even been distinguished from competence to waive
counsel. See Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 150, 86 S. Ct. 1320, 1320 (1966). It
should also be noted that determinations of both competence to stand trial and to waive
counsel invoke the. protection of a court and are not left to psychiatrists. See Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S. Ct. 836, 842 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 465, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
691. See Loren H. Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers,
136 Am. J. Psychiatry 1121 (1979). In New Mexico, if the court finds that the criteria
for involuntary commitment are met, it must then determine whether the person is capable
of informed consent. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-11 (D) (1989). Wisconsin legislation allows
a committing court to determine whether the individual is incompetent to refuse treatment
and whether the treatment will be therapeutic and will not unreasonably impair the
individual's ability to participate in subsequent legal proceedings. If the appropriate findings
are made, the court may authorize nonconsensual treatment, but only for the period
between the hearing to determine probable cause for commitment and the final commitment
order. Wis. Stat. § 51.61(l)(g)(2) (West 1991). Further compelled treatment after a final
commitment order must be authorized by an additional court hearing wherein the individual
is found incompetent or the treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm. Wis.
Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)(3) (West 1991).
The American Psychiatric Association's model civil commitment law requires a finding
of incapacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment before an individual
may be involuntarily committed. See Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan A. Stone, A Model
Statute on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 275, 330-38
(1983). Utah's commitment law incorporates this criterion for involuntary civil commitment.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-234(1)(a) (Supp. 1992).
692. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 402, at 1465; Rhoden, supra note 43, at 387.
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and distinct, based on different criteria and affecting different individual
interests.6 93 At the time of the initial commitment hearing, there is not
enough information upon which to base either a finding that the in-
dividual is incapable of making an informed treatment decision or that
antipsychotic medication is an appropriate treatment. Institutional phy-
sicians have not had sufficient opportunity to observe and evaluate the
individual in order to formulate an accurate diagnosis. Little is known
about the types and dosages of drugs which may be warranted or the
individual's susceptibility to the various side effects posed by antipsy-
chotic medication. Without adequate information to communicate, the
person's ability to make an informed decision cannot be measured. Even
if a finding of incompetency could be accurately made, the decisionmaker
has inadequate information from which to determine the appropriateness
of drug treatment.
Another danger is that, in all likelihood, a finding of incapacity
will summarily follow a decision to commit. A hearing officer who
commits a mentally ill individual as dangerous or unable to care for
himself may be reluctant to make a finding which would allow the
patient to refuse treatment which institutional authorities argue is nec-
essary.6 9 A decision to commit will unduly influence the incompetency
determination by blurring the distinction between the separate criteria
on which each decision should be based. Thus, the risk of "rubber
stamping" the patient incapable of making an informed decision is
substantial.
To assure accuracy, the incompetency determination must be made
at the time a person refuses a proposed medication. To avoid frequent
hearings and yet provide the necessary safeguard of eventual review, an
order authorizing the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs should
be limited to a reasonable duration. Four to six weeks has been suggested
as an adequate time period in which most patients will have recovered
their competence while minimizing the risk of debilitating side effects.
For those patients who have not sufficiently improved, the efficacy of
drug therapy should be called into question.6 95
The above discussion has assumed that when an individual is ad-
judicated incompetent, it is most appropriate for the court to act as
the proxy decisionmaker. Another alternative would be to commit de-
cisional authority to a guardian. However, the guardianship system
presents a number of deficiencies. The process is dependent upon an
available supply of qualified substitute decisionmakers. Frequently, fam-
693. See supra notes 428-436 and accompanying text.
694. Brooks, supra note 50, at 196.
695. See Robert D. Miller, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the
Post-Reform Era 159 (1987).
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ily members are used on the assumption that they are most familiar
with the patient's values, preferences, and best interests. 696 The insti-
tutionalized mentally ill, however, often lack close family ties. 697 The
objectivity of family members who are available may be compromised
by prior conflicts with the patient as well as other psychological and
economic factors. 691 Public guardians are in short supply and lack fa-
miliarity with the patient. It has also been suggested that guardians are
too easily influenced by treating professionals and have neither the time
nor ability to examine the relevant concerns involved. 69 In addition, a
guardianship proceeding is a time-consuming process which may unduly
delay appropriate treatment for an incompetent individual.7°° Finally,
once a guardian consents to medication, the system does not contain
adequate review mechanisms for patients who may eventually regain
their competency.70'
Likewise, it would seem inappropriate to delegate substitute deci-
sionmaking authority to mental health professionals. Patients are not
deprived of their constitutionally protected interests by reason of their
incompetency. The decision to risk the hazards posed by drug therapy
remains an individual decision, even though exercised by proxy.70 2 As
described above, mental health professionals, whether in-house or in-
dependent, are socialized in the values of treatment and protection, a
bias which dictates against adequate consideration of other legally pro-
tected individual interests. In addition, because institutional professionals
make the initial decision of whether to pursue an incompetency deter-
696. Rhoden, supra note 43, at 402.
697. Ford, supra note 403, at 336; Thomas G. Gutheil et al., Legal Guardianship in
Drug Refusal: An Illusory Solution, 137 Am. J. Psychiatry 347, 350 (1980).
698. One commentator noted:
[Elven if family members are available and willing, they may be disturbed
themselves, may have a history of conflict with the patient or may have initiated
the involuntary commitment proceedings against the patient. A guardian may
fear that if he does not authorize the treatment hospital personnel desire, the
patient will be released into the guardian's custody and once again become a
family burden.
Rhoden, supra note 43, at 403 (citations omitted). See also Gelman, supra note 176, at
242 n.112 ("relatives who had once taken a neuroleptic were often sympathetic to a
patient's drug refusal, while other relatives generally were not"); Gutheil et al., supra
note 697, at 350; Karucz & Fallon, supra note 62, at 118 (noting that relatives often
insist on continued drug therapy even when physicians recommend discontinuation).
699. Gelman, supra note 176, at 242; Gutheil et al., supra note 697, at 350; Mills,
supra note 137, at 313, 326 n.23 (1980); Rhoden, supra note 43, at 404.
700. Ford, supra note 403, at 336; Gutheil et al., supra note 697, at 350; Rhoden,
supra note 43, at 404.
701. Rhoden, supra note 43, at 404-05.
702. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 316 (Mass.
1983); In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
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mination, placing ultimate decisionmaking authority in their hands may
provide an undue incentive to pursue such means in order to treat a
refusing patient. 70 3 Institutional decisionmaking is also vulnerable to
compromise by pressures to maintain patient control and to ease ad-
ministrative and staff burdens through the use of medication. 7 4
Another issue concerns the standard which guides the court in the
proxy decisionmaking process. The traditional approach requires the
decisionmaker to evaluate both medical and other evidence and reach
an independent decision on what is in the "best interests" of the
incompetent patient. 70 1 The operative guideline is "what a reasonable
person would do if competent. 7 0 6 The more modern "substituted judg-
ment" standard requires the proxy to inquire into the values and pre-
ferences of the patient and attempt to make a decision as the patient
would, were he competent. 70 7
The "best interests" approach has been criticized as depriving in-
competent individuals of rights which are accorded others "by ignoring
their uniqueness and imposing upon them the views of a hypothetical
majority or 'reasonable man."'7 0 Community consensus replaces what
are otherwise uniquely personal decisions. One commentator has stated:
"What this homogenized decisionmaking tool lacks is the individual's
point of view as reflected in notions of advocacy, individualized treatment
plans, personal autonomy and democracy. When used appropriately,
best-interests reflects the values of the collective, not necessarily the
values and preferences of the individual. ' 709
The substituted judgment standard was developed in an attempt to
afford respect to the personal values of the incompetent patient. 710
However, in the many cases where clear evidence is lacking on how the
703. Meisel, supra note 454, at 476. Professor Meisel states:
Since the power to invoke an exception [to the informed consent doctrine] is
the power to alter the balance between individualism and health, it is preferable
that the right to make the ultimate treatment decision ordinarily not be vested
in the physician since to do so would be to further tip the balance away from
that established by the doctrine of informed consent-a balance favoring in-
dividualism.
Id.
704. See supra notes 370-392 and accompanying text.
705. Rhoden, supra note 43, at 399.
706. Parry, supra note 402, at 154.
707. Id.
708. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 497 (4th Cir. 1987), modified, 863 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
709. John Parry, A Unified Theory of Substitute Consent: Incompetent Patients' Right
to Individualized Health Care Decision-making, 11 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep.
378, 381 (1987).
710. See John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 48, 62-68 (1976).
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incompetent patient would decide if competent, strict adherence to this
doctrine converts it into a legal fiction. In these cases, the standard
often camouflages the fact that the proxy is, in reality, making an
independent decision for the incompetent individual.711
The hybrid approach employed in Charters I for guiding proxy
decisionmaking appears to strike an appropriate balance between respect
for an incompetent patient's individualism and concern for his health
and protection. The court should look to the patient's previously ex-
pressed preferences, values, and beliefs in an effort to exercise a sub-
stituted judgment. However, if clear and convincing evidence 12 on this
matter is lacking, as it often is, the decision should be based on the
patient's best interests.7"3
The judicial intervention suggested above will promote consistency,
fairness, and objectivity in both the incompetency determination and
the resulting forced medication decision. A law-trained judge can evaluate
submitted evidence in an unbiased manner, providing adequate concern
for individualism as well as society's interest in protection and health.
Due consideration to these interests will be further assured by the vis-
ibility of this decisionmaking process, visibility which is lacking when
decisions are made behind institutional walls.
C. . The Government's Interests, Including the Function Involved and
the Administrative and Fiscal Burdens Imposed by Additional
Procedures
As previously explained, courts have deemed the objectives under-
lying the government's police power and parens patriae authority as
sufficiently compelling, under certain circumstances, to justify forced
medication. Courts relying on the police power have agreed that an
711. As the court in Charters I noted, in such situations the incompetent patient is
placed "at substantially greater risk of an incorrect decision than he would have been
had the inquiry focused on his best interests." Charters 1, 829 F.2d at 498. See also
Robertson, supra note 710, at 63.
712. The higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, usually reserved for criminal
cases where the associated stigma is high and a person's liberty is often at stake, would
appear inappropriate when the goal is to honor a patient's wishes. The lower "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard appears inadequate due to the important interest in
protecting the patient's health. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981).
713. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 498. See Parry, supra note 709, at 384-85. One com-
mentator has stated:
[S]uch an attempt would continue to regard [the patient], even during his
incapacity, as an individual with free choice and moral dignity, and not as
someone whose preferences no longer mattered. Even if we were mistaken in
ascertaining his preferences, the person [upon regaining competence] could still
agree that he had been fairly treated ...
Robertson, supra note 710, at 63.
[Vol. 53
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
emergency situation, in which the patient presents an imminent or current
threat of physical harm to self or others, justifies forced drugging for
a limited period when no less restrictive alternatives are available. Courts,
however, disagree on whether police power authority is sufficient when
based on a dangerousness standard. Under this standard, as described
earlier, forced medication is justified when based on predictions of future
violence if the patient remains unmedicated.7 14
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court succinctly stated, forced
drugging based on a prediction of future violence amounts to nothing
more than preventive chemical restraint. 715 The dangerousness standard
allows long-term medication for security purposes even when drugs are
not therapeutically beneficial. 71 6 Widespread abuse under such a standard
has been well documented.71 7 Because most public mental health facilities
continue to be plagued by overcrowded and understaffed conditions, the
inherent potential for the misuse of antipsychotic drugs for the purposes
of convenience, management, and control remains high. Furthermore,
even most psychiatrists agree that it is virtually impossible to accurately
predict future violent behavior'.7 1 In addition, less intrusive measures
such as temporary seclusion and other alternative treatments may ef-
fectively address the perceived risk of violence. 71 9 In light of the potential
for abuse, the predictive uncertainty, and the availability of less restrictive
measures to guard against future violence, it would appear that the
dangerousness standard is insufficient to justify the extensive intrusion
presented by antipsychotic drugs.
714. See supra notes 340-397 and accompanying text.
715. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 321 (Mass.
1983). See supra notes 387-392 and accompanying text.
716. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 244-45, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1049 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
717. See supra notes 370-392 and accompanying text. One study found that even when
the dangerousness standard is rejected but no provision is made for review of cases in
which drugs are forcibly administered on emergency grounds, many refusing patients are
inappropriately medicated under the emergency rubric. Lisa A. Callahan, Changing Mental
Health Law: Butting Heads With a Billygoat, 4 Behavioral Sci. & L. 305, 313 (1986).
718. See Bersoff, supra note 664, at 355-57 (reviewing studies which document the
futility in attempting to accurately predict future violent behavior); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 920, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3408 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief
for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae); Alan A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry,
and Morality 139-40 (1984); Alan A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition
25-37 (1975); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 749 (1974).
719. See supra notes 495-508 and accompanying text. See also Julie M. Zito et al.,
The Treatment Review Panel: A Solution to Treatment Refusal?, 12 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 349, 356-57 (1984) [hereinafter Review Panel] (suggesting temporary
seclusion as an effective and therapeutic measure for controlling anxiety based assaultiveness
and for coping and mastering impulses).
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While the government has been allowed to forcibly administer an-
tipsychotic medication for treatment purposes, most courts have required
a finding of incompetency before this parens patriae authority may be
invoked.7 20 As maintained above, an incompetency determination should
be made by a judicial decisionmaker. Moreover, the court, as opposed
to a guardian or mental health professionals, should act as the proxy
decisionmaker for individuals who are adjudicated incompetent.
While courts adopting the professional judgment standard have crit-
icized additional procedural safeguards as unduly interfering with the
government's role as "benign custodian,'' their apprehensions appear
unwarranted. In Rennie v. Klein, the Third Circuit cited the Supreme
Court's concerns in Parham in stating that adversarial-type hearings "are
more likely to be counterproductive, adding to the tensions that may
have contributed to the patient's initial commitment," thereby interfering
with successful long-term treatment.7 2 In Parham, however, the Court
was concerned that a hearing upon an initial parental request for com-
mitment would pit the "parents and child as adversaries," thereby risking
an exacerbation of "whatever tensions already exist between the child
and parents.' '723 This concern does not exist regarding a hearing on
whether a mentally ill adult should be forcibly drugged by institutional
authorities following an involuntary commitment.
Furthermore, research has established that additional procedural pro-
tections have practical medical benefits. They encourage patient input
which is beneficial because physicians must depend upon their patients
for evidence of the subjective effects of medication. 724 The prospect of
facing formalized procedures causes physicians to consult and negotiate
with their patients which, in turn, promotes a more thorough evaluation
of the benefits and risks of medication and any available alternatives.
720. See supra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
721. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). The dissent criticized this characterization of the
government's role, stating:
The prospect that the views of a governmental medical officer may be inclined
to coincide with those of the federal prosecutor on the desirability of the trial's
proceeding and a resulting conviction leading to lengthy incarceration is not
remote. They are, when all is said and done, fellow employees. Nor should we
ignore the likelihood that Butner would rather be freed of the concerns such
as diversion of experts it would rather detail to other tasks than the care of
Charters. It may well be that something other than Charters' well-being drives
the opining medical officials.
Id. at 315 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
722. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119, 102
S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
723. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610, 99 S. Ct. 2508 (1979).
724. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978).
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Thus, the physicians will explore concerns that might otherwise go
unnoticed.12S
This negotiation may result in respect for a patient's refusal or
mutually agreeable improvements to the treatment program. 726 This open
communication enhances the patient's adaptation to the doctor-patient
relationship which increases cooperation, including compliance with the
proposed treatment schedule. Moreover, valuing a patient's viewpoint
enhances his self-esteem, and is thus therapeutic in itself.7 2 7
In addition, research indicates that the adversarial process itself may
be therapeutic. A recent study performed at Manhattan Psychiatric Cen-
ter, a New York public hospital, found that the judicial adversarial
process allows patients "considerably greater representation and partic-
ipation" than the previous administrative review system. 72s The patients
were offered "the opportunity to hear a detailed discussion of their
physician's reasoning and to present their own views. '7 29 The researchers
concluded that "[slome patients may gain a better understanding of the
need for treatment through a process that offers this degree of patient
involvement.' Ta Moreover, a judicial hearing on the necessity of forced
medication, even if decided in the affirmative, instills a sense of fairness
725. See Ciccone et al., supra note 451, at 213-14; Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note
4, at 345; John G. Malcolm, Treatment Choices and Informed Consent in Psychiatry:
Implications of the Osheroff Case for the Profession, 14 J. Psychiatry & L. 9, 39 (1987);
Roger D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient
Population: Six-Month Review, 17 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 107, 114, 118 (1989).
726. See supra note 725. Studies have not yet documented the number of patient
refusals which are being respected due to the prospect of a judicial hearing. Based on
conversations with patient advocates, attorneys, and treating psychiatrists, it appears to
this commentator that the number is substantial. A New York study indicates that rather
than incurring the time and expense of seeking judicial authorization for forced medication,
"staff became understandably and predictably eager to find satisfactory mechanisms to
respond to patients' refusal of medication." Ciccone et al., supra note 451, at 214.
727. See supra note 725. A Wisconsin study found that upon implementation of a
judicial review system, much more staff time was spent discussing the risks and benefits
of treatment with patients and soliciting cooperation. The researchers acknowledged the
resulting clinical benefits including the fact that thirty-three percent of the refusers even-
tually consented to treatment. Miller et al., supra note 725, at 118. See also Nathan T.
Sidley, The Right of Involuntary Patients in Mental Institutions to Refuse Drug Treatment,
12 J. Psychiatry & L. 231, 244 (1984); Franklin J. Hickman et al., Right to Refuse
Psychotropic Medication: An Interdisciplinary Proposal, 6 Mental Disability L. Rep. 122,
130 (1982); Brooks, supra note 50, at 209-10.
728. Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures for
Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 Hosp. & Community
Psychiatry 851, 855 (1988).
729. Id.
730. Id.
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in the patient which often leads to greater cooperation in the treatment
program."'
A judicial adversarial process subjects the proposed treatment plan
to a heightened degree of scrutiny. A study by the Massachusetts De-
partment of Mental Health found that even when forced medication is
ultimately authorized, judicial review often results in improved modi-
fications of the proposed treatment regime.732 Research indicates that
even in-house or independent administrative review procedures often
result in positive changes in the treating physician's proposed drug
therapy program.733 Granting a right to refuse medication also increases
patients' cooperation in other treatment programs.3 4
731. See Callahan, supra note 717, at 313 (informal hearing before medical director
considered a "sham" by patients); Bersoff, supra note 664, at 367-68 ("The failure to
provide an adversarial forum, then, is likely to reduce compliance with the decision,
producing increased temporal, financial, and administrative burdens on the institutions
and professionals who participate in proceedings perceived as unfair, biased, and unjust.").
Id. at 63-64; see also supra note 727 and accompanying text.
732. Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, Report on the Department of Mental
Health's Implementation of the Supreme Judicial Court's Decision in Rogers v. Com-
missioner 30 (1988) [hereinafter DMH Report). A recent study in Minnesota also revealed
court involvement in the modification of proposed treatment plans. The author, a pre-
scribing psychiatrist at the state facility in which the study took place, did not view the
court involvement favorably. Michael G. Farnsworth, The Impact of Judicial Review of
Patients' Refusal to Accept Antipsychotic Medication at the Minnesota Security Hospital,
19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 33, 41 (1991). However, research indicates that New
York courts, operating under the Rivers decision, tend to focus almost exclusively on the
competency of the patient and do not generally make a detailed inquiry into the appro-
priateness of the requested medication. As a result, ninety-six percent of court orders
approving forced medication contain no modifications to the state's requested treatment
program. Julie M. Zito et al., New York Under the Rivers Decision: An Epidemiologic
Study of Drug Treatment Refusal, 148 Am. J. Psychiatry 904, 906 (1991) [hereinafter
Epidemiologic Study]; Zito et al, supra note 422, at 305. The researchers call into question
the propriety of certain treatment programs requested by the state and approved by the
court as submitted. The authors justifiably criticize the courts' limited inquiries as failing
to "meet the Rivers standard of narrowly tailoring drug therapy to individual patients'
clinical needs, with ongoing review of risks and benefits." Epidemiologic Study, supra,
at 908. Upon a finding of patient incompetency, one must question whether, in New
York, patients' attorneys go on to challenge the appropriateness of the state's proposed
treatment programs.
733. William A. Hargreaves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Consent Decree:
Due Process Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated With Psychoactive
Medication, 144 Am. J. Psychiatry 188, 192 (1987); Julie M. Zito et al., Drug Treatment
Refusal, Diagnosis and Length of Hospitalization in Involuntary Psychiatric Patients, 4
Behavioral Sciences & L. 327, 334-36 (1986) [hereinafter Treatment Refusal]; Julie M.
Zito et al., Clinical Characteristics of Hospitalized Psychotic Patients Who Refuse An-
tipsychotic Drug Therapy, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 822, 824 (1985) [hereinafter Clinical
Characteristics].
734. Callahan, supra note 717, at 311.
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In Charters II, the Fourth Circuit feared that if adjudications of
incompetency were required, the resulting delays might cause patients
to deteriorate to such an extent that treatment would rio longer be
efficacious.' This danger, however, can be alleviated by authorizing an
emergency exception as envisioned by the First Circuit in Rogers. If the
patient needs medication immediately to prevent significant and irre-
versible deterioration in his condition, alternative procedures could be
employed and, if determined incompetent, the patient could receive
medication until an adjudication could be arranged. 76 However, as noted
earlier, such a situation is extremely rare. Most individuals with untreated
schizophrenia gradually deteriorate and respond just as well whether
medication is delayed or immediate . 37
The initial recognition of a right to refuse medication generated dire
predictions by psychiatrists that refusals would disrupt hospital wards,
jeopardizing the safety of staff and patients and preventing adequate
treatment. 738 An early study by Gill performed at the Boston State
Hospital during the initial phases of the Rogers litigation appeared to
lend some credence to these fears. Gill reported that the use of seclusion
increased from 244 instances during the year prior to the issuance of
a temporary injunctive order granting a right to refuse to 392 cases
during the second year after the court's decree. 739 Subsequent studies,
however, indicate that this increase may have been largely due to an
overcautious and anxious reaction by institutional staff during an initial
period of adjustment before formalized procedures were in place.'4
In Minnesota, a study performed during the initial twenty-month
implementation period of a multidisciplinary treatment review panel
735. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
736. See supra notes 439-450 and accompanying text.
737. See supra notes 445-446 and accompanying text.
738. Some psychiatrists described the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs as the right
to rot with your rights on. See Gutheil, supra note 4; Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note
4.
739. Michael J. Gill, Side Effects of a Right to Refuse Treatment Lawsuit: The Boston
State Hospital Experience, in Refusing Treatment in Mental Health Institutions-Values
in Conflict 81, 85-86 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds. 1982).
740. As Professor Brooks noted, Doctor Gill, a named defendant in the Rogers
litigation,
with admirable candor, indicates that overly zealous staff may have, on occasion,
consciously or unconsciously, tolerated or even encouraged patient deterioration
by withholding medications and by applying the court standards in a particularly
conservative way in order to assist the defense during litigation by "proving"
that permitting refusals results in disturbance and violence.
Brooks, supra note 50, at 205-06.
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(TRP) revealed a substantial decline in referrals based on risk of physical
harm.74' The researchers stated that "[t]his trend suggests greater ac-
climation of treatment staff members to the TRP referral process and
their acceptance of the non-emergency situation as a viable one for
forced medication administration. ' 74 In a subsequent study performed
at the same facility, the investigators compared the negative behavioral
indicators of a matched group of consenters and refusers. 743 The re-
searchers found that the "refusers did not display more threatening,
assaultive, or destructive behavior, nor did they demonstrate greater
noncompliance with other parts of the treatment program" despite the
fact that most of them had been medication-free for over a mornth. 7 4
The study discovered that seclusion, physical restraint, transfer to locked
wards, and one-to-one supervision were not more frequently used with
the refuser groups.745 A California study by Hargreaves and associates
found that the right to refuse medication did not have any impact on
"length of stay, use of seclusion and restraint, or the frequency of
injury incidents." '74 As illustrated by the Fourth Circuit in Charters II,
the alleged "cumbersomeness, expense and delay" incident to additional
procedural safeguards have weighed heavily in the decision by some
courts to leave forced medication determinations within the discretion
of institutional professionals. 747 However, the above data suggest that
these concerns are exaggerated.
When all refusals are considered as a whole, approximately fourteen
to fifty percent of patients refuse medication at some point during their
institutionalization. 748 Many of these refusals, however, do not persist
long enough to require outside intervention, with a considerable number
being withdrawn within twenty-four hours. Thus, 'studies of formalized
refusal procedures or those requiring refusals to persist for at least
twenty-four hours have found much lower rates. 749 Psychiatrists now
741. Review Panel, supra note 719, at 352-54.
742. Id. at 354.
743. Clinical Characteristics, supra note 733.
744. Id. at 825-26.
745. Id. at 826.
746. Hargreaves et al., supra note 733.
747. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). The Fourth Circuit did not cite any authority supporting
this allegation.
748. For a synopsis of many of these studies, see Paul S. Appelbaum & Steven.K.
Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research Reveals, 4 Behavioral Sci. &
L. 279, 280-81 (1987).
749. See id. at 281. For civil patients, these refusal rates range from less than one
percent to seven percent, although one study at a state hospital in Minnesota revealed A
fifteen percent refusal rate. Zito et al., supra note 422, at 298 (1.3% of involuntary
patients or 0.6% of hospital population required court review of refusal); Epidemiologic
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admit that "[t]he feared epidemics of clinically, significant treatment
refusal, therefore, have not materialized to date.""10 The delay between
a physician's request for override of a patient's refusal and the review
of the refusal varies according to the number of refusing patients, the
type of review process, and the efficiency in implementing that process.",
Study, supra note 732, at 905-06 (petitions for refusal review filed for approximately 1%o
of all civil and forensic admissions; however, nearly one-third of these petitions were
withdrawn before court review); Ciccone et al., sup'ra note 451, at 208-11 (1.2% of private
hospital admittees and 3% of public hospital admittees initiated a formal refusal. However,
only one of the sixteen refusers at the private facility (.08% of admittees) and fourteen
of the forty refusers at the public hospital (10% of admittees) required court review of
the refusal); South Dakota Human Services Center, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1990,
twenty-two (2.7% of adult involuntary patients in state hospital required judicial review
of refusal in 1990; 2.5% in 1989); Steven K. Hoge et al., The Right to Refuse Treatment
Under Rogers v. Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 163, 168 (1987) (2% of state hospital patients in
Massachusetts received court review of refusal); Hargreaves et al., supra note 733, at 190
(although approximately 50% of involuntary patients at California state hospitals objected
to medication at some point during the first eight weeks of hospitalization, only 5% of
those refusals persisted for at least twenty-four hours); Review Panel, supra note 719, at
355 (15% refusal rate among involuntary patients at a Minnesota public hospital); Joseph
D. Bloom et al., An Empirical View of Patients Exercising Their Right to Refuse Treatment,
7 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 315, 320 (1984) (7% refusal rate for involuntary patients at
Oregon state hospital); Hassenfeld & Grumet, supra note 416, at 68 (0.0876 refusals by
admittees of New York state hospital); Robert Keisling, Characteristics and Outcome of
Patients Who Refuse Medication, 34 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 847, 848 (1983)
(2.4% refusal rate at Washington, D.C., public hospital); Henry C. Weinstein, The Right
to Refuse Treatment, 5 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 425, 435 (1977) (0.1% refusal
review rate at New York public hospital).
Refusal rates for forensic patients average slightly higher, ranging from two to fourteen
percent. Farnsworth, supra note 732, at 36 (37 of 255 admittees (14%) to high security
state forensic facility referred for refusal review); Miller et al., supra note 725, at 110-
11 (39 of 272 admittees (14%) to maximum security forensic facility required court review
of refusal); Leta D. Smith, Medication Refusal and the Rehospitalized Mentally Ill Inmate,
40 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 491, 495 (1989) (2.3% refusal rate in New York
forensic facility); Jeffrey T. Young et al., Treatment Refusal Among Forensic Inpatients,
15 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 5, 10 (1987) (13% refusal by admittees to Oregon
forensic hospital); Callahan, supra note 717, at 308 (9.5% refusal rate at Ohio forensic
facility); A. Heller, Due Process as Ordered in Clinical Practice as Protection of Patient
Right to Refuse, unpublished manuscript, reported in Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note
748, at 281 (8% refusal rate among population of Ohio forensic facility).
750. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 748, at 281. See also Hargreaves et al., supra
note 733, at 192.
751. Oregon's review system, involving an independent psychiatrist who interviews the
refusing patient and makes a recommendation to the facility's superintendent for final
decision, averages 12.5 days at one hospital. Bloom et al., supra note 452, at 7. However,
studies of New York's prior system indicated a delay of 5.4 to in excess of 7 weeks.
Cournos et al., supra note 728, at 853 (5.4 week delay); Hassenfeld & Grumet, supra
note 416, at 70 (mean delay of 52.2 days). This process consisted of a paper review by
the head of service and the hospital director before a final decision by an independent
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There is no evidence that these delays result in any type of significant
harm to the patient.7 52 In fact, studies reveal that delays caused by
procedural safeguards do not even result in longer hospital stays. 7 3
psychiatrist acting under the auspices of the regional director within the state Office of
Mental Health. Cournos et al., supra note 728, at 852.
New York's judicial review system after Rivers v. Katz continues to include a modified
initial clinical review involving an interview by the treating physician and clinical director
and averages only 5.8 weeks at one stite hospital. Id. at 853. At least one public hospital
utilizes an independent psychiatrist rather than the hospital's clinical director in the
administrative review preceding the judicial hearing. Ciccone et al., supra note 451, at
205. Other studies of New York's procedural scheme reveal even shorter delays. A study
by Ciccone and associates reveals delays ranging from three to seven weeks, depending
on the court's schedule. Ciccone et al., supra note 451, at 210. Zito and colleagues
discovered that the median time is only thirty-five days and note that the judicial procedure
is more expedient than the previous administrative review system. Zito et al, supra note
422, at 303; see also Epidemiologic Study, supra note 732, at 906 (58% of cases resolved
within thirty days of petition; 25% within thirty to sixty days; 10% within ninety days;
and 6% within 91-547 days).
Minnesota's procedural scheme entails an evaluation of the patient's refusal by a
multidisciplinary treatment review panel. If the panel recommends forced medication, the
patient is entitled to a judicial review. In an emergency situation, drugs may be administered
pending the completion of the process. Farnsworth, supra note 732, at 39-40. A study
by Farnsworth at a state forensic facility revealed that in non-emergency situations, the
average time between a petition for review and the court decision is approximately ten
weeks. In emergency cases, however, the court decision is rendered about 6.5 weeks after
the petition is filed. Id. at 37. A study by Miller and associates found a delay of only
slightly more than thirty days during the initial six months of Wisconsin's judicial review
system. Miller et al., supra note 725, at 111.
Data from Massachusetts during the first twelve months of the judicial review system
decreed in Rogers v. Commissioner indicated an average delay of 4.5 months. Jorge Veliz
& William S. James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice, 144 Am. J. Psychiatry 62, 63
(1987). A more recent report, however, reveals that when physicians deem the circumstances
urgent, a court order can be obtained from within a few hours to fourteen days. DMH
Report, supra note 732, at 31. However, when reviews are scheduled into the regular
probate schedule, delay can range from two to four months. Id. All medication decisions
in both mental health and mental retardation facilities are judicially reviewed, even for
consenting patients. See id. at 29. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not
require that medication determinations be reviewed for consenting patients. However, it
did suggest that "because incompetent persons cannot meaningfully consent to medical
treatment, a substituted judgment by a judge should be undertaken for the incompetent
patient even if the patient accepts the medical treatment." Rogers v. Commissioner of
Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 315 n.14 (Mass. 1983).
Similar delays were experienced in South Dakota during the initial phases of a judicial
review process. Despite only ten referrals during an eight month period, judicial review
through the regular circuit court schedule resulted in a 2.5 month average delay. Chief
of Social Services, South Dakota Human Services Center Memorandum (Sept. 6, 1989).
Fifteen override petitions were actually filed during this period, but five patients voluntarily
withdrew their refusals. Id.
752. See supra notes 445-452 and accompanying text; Brooks, supra note 15, at 370.
753. In a recently published study of consenters and refusers in a New York hospital,
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In one study which did indicate a longer hospitalization period for
refusers, the increase was attributed to the delay between the time of
refusal (rather than physician's request for override) and the ultimate
decision on whether to treat."" Nevertheless, refusers who accepted
medication after a sometimes lengthy review process were better able to
function postdischarge than compliers.7s" The researchers concluded that
"[tihe increased length of stay and the concomitant increase in hospital
cost is probably a small price to pay for allowing these [refusing] patients
to maintain some sense of autonomy, which is useful for coping with
life outside of the hospital." 75 6
Zito and associates found that refusers had shorter hospital stays to a degree approaching
statistical significance. Zito et al., supra note 422, at 301. The authors cite anecdotal
evidence that some refusers may be transferred or discharged "to rid the treatment program
of troublemakers and uncooperative patients." Id. at 305.
Williams and colleagues compared hospitalized insanity acquittees who had refused
drug treatment with non-refusing insanity acquittees in an Oregon forensic facility. The
researchers "were unable to establish that the treatment refusal incident itself had an
effect on the patient's length of stay in the hospital." Mary H. Williams et al., Drug
Treatment Refusal and Length of Hospitalization of Insanity Acquittees, 16 Bull. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry & L. 279, 283 (1988). In this study, treatment refusal was overridden
in all cases and the review process was estimated to average approximately eleven days.
Id.
In comparing refusers of antipsychotic drugs with a matched sample of consenters
at a Minnesota state hospital, researchers found there was no significant difference between
the two groups in the number of patients discharged. Moreover, discharged refusers had
a shorter median length of stay than did the discharged consenters. Clinical Characteristics,
supra note 733, at 824. The sample of refusers chosen were those who had been approved
for non-emergency forced medication by the treatment review panel. Id. at 823.
754. Hassenfeld & Grumet, supra note 416, at 70. See also Bloom et al., supra note
749, at 327 (fourteen day increase in length of stay for refusers). Some physicians make
the unwarranted assumption that a delay occasioned by a review process automatically
results in a concomitant increase in the length of hospitalization. For example, Ciccone
and colleagues studied the impact of the judicial review process implemented in New York
pursuant to the Rivers decision. Ciccone et al., supra note 451. The study revealed an
increase in the time between refusal and resolution. The authors went on to assume that
each day of this increase translated into an additional day of hospitalization with its
accompanying cost. Id. at 210. However, their study revealed no significant difference in
the length of a refuser's hospitalization pre-Rivers and post-Rivers. Id. at 208. See also
Farnsworth, supra note 732, at 40-41 (unsupported assumption that the delay occasioned
by judicial review automatically translates into a concomitant increase in length of hos-
pitalization).
755. Hassenfeld & Grumet, supra note 416, at 72-73.
756. Id. at 73. For other studies indicating that the treatment refusal incident does
not harm the patient, see Sally L. Godard et al., The Right to Refuse Treatment in
Oregon: A Two-Year Statewide Experience, 4 Behavioral Sci. & L. 293, 302-04 (1986);
Bloom et al., supra note 452, at 7.
The upholding of a refusal does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. Data
on the effects of long-term successful refusal is insufficient. A study of forty-four patients
whose refusals were upheld on review at a state hospital in California revealed that
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Despite the lack of resulting harm, procedural protections should
not unduly delay necessary and appropriate treatment. Delays, however,
are not a valid reason for diminishing the protections designed to assure
that intrusive treatment is, in fact, necessary and appropriate. Some
delay is inherent to the implementation of new procedural mechanisms
and is eliminated by further refinements and adoption of standardized
guidelines. 7 7 In addition, measures are available to enhance the efficiency
of judicial review systems. For example, in Massachusetts, a probate
session is scheduled to be held on the grounds of some facilities each
month. 7 8 Another suggestion has been to implement "a system of 'on-
call' probate judges. 7 9 In 1990, the South Dakota Legislature eliminated
long delays by enacting legislation requiring the court hearing to be held
within thirty days from service of the petition for review. 760 Only one
year later, the legislature reduced this period to fifteen days and limited
any extension to one seven-day continuance, to be restrictively granted
only for good cause.
7 6
'
New procedures efficiently and timely implemented entail higher
financial costs. A study of the independent psychiatric review system in
California revealed that during its first year of implementation, each
patient review cost approximately $100. This figure accounted for the
salaries of independent psychiatric reviewers, patient advocates, hospital
and departmental support staff, and various non-personnel expenses. 762
The researchers estimated that it would cost approximately $1-1.5 million
significant deterioration occurred in twenty-five patients, of whom twenty were medicated.
No adverse effects were observed in eight patients. The effect of refusal was unclear in
the remaining patients. Hargreaves et al., supra note 733, at 190. Thus, there was no
observable harm to patients in 42% of the cases and presumably no long-term harm to
the twenty patients later medicated. A six-month study in Wisconsin revealed that of
nineteen patients whose refusals were respected, only one deteriorated to the point where
an involuntary medication order was sought. Miller et al., supra note 725, at Ill.
757. See DMH Report, supra note 732, at 16-17 and n.18.
758. Id. at 32.
759. Veliz & James, supra note 751, at 62.
760. S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-12-11.6 (Supp. 1990). Conversations with staff and
patient advocates at the South Dakota Human Services Center revealed that the court
system adequately adjusted to this legislative mandate.
761. S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-12-3.14 (1992). In 1992, the South Dakota Legislature
enacted legislation introduced by, the National Alliance for the Menally Ill which allows
forced medication pending the court review, if approved by a medical/administrative panel.
S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-12-3.12 (1992). This provision thus allows nonconsensual treat-
ment before the judicial determination on the patient's competency. A South Dakota
circuit court recently issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of this leg-
islation. Lindquist v. Thorpe, No. 92-367 (S.D. 1st Cir. Oct. 29, 1992) (unpublished
opinion). This case, however, was subsequently dismissed when the patient began to
voluntarily accept the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Further litigation is expected.
762. Hargreaves et al., supra note 733, at 192. This figure did not include the hidden
cost of clinician time expended on paperwork. Id.
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annually for reviews at the five major state hospitals in California. 763
Researchers in Minnesota estimated that the cost for each patient
review under the former multidisciplinary treatment review panel system
averaged approximately $162. 76 Farnsworth, in a study of the first year
implementation of Minnesota's current judicial review process, estimates
an annual cost of $150,000 for the Minnesota Security Hospital, although
he provides no basis for this figure. 765
As Professor Brooks points out, accurate estimates of long-term
financial outlays are difficult during the initial implementation of pro-
cedural mechanisms. Costs are likely to diminish as adjustments and
refinements are made. 76 Evidence also indicates that some of these
expenses are offset by savings from decreased medication usage. 767 In
any event, given the important interests protected and the practical
medical benefits arising from additional procedural safeguards, these
expenses appear reasonable in the context of the total funding necessary
to operate a state mental health system. 76
It is also argued that additional procedural protections are a waste
of administrative and financial resources. This argument is based on
reports that most refusals are overridden regardless of the type of review
763. Id. But see Hickman et al., supra note 727, at 129-30 (after six months with a
similar review system, the medical director of an Ohio state hospital reported a low rate
of refusal resulting in no significant administrative burden); Kemna, supra note 66, at
119 ("The practical application of right to refuse due process procedures seems to undercut
psychiatric objections related to excessive or undue cost."); Brooks, supra note 50, at
201 (citing a New Jersey mental health official who acknowledged that the cost of
implementing the independent psychiatric review system ordered by the district court in
Rennie was nominal).
764. This estimate included the cost of time spent by each of the five or more panelists
and the reviewers involved in a two-step appeal process. Review Panel, supra note 719,
at 355. The appeal process involved review of the panel's decision by the facility's medical
director and a subsequent review by a hospital review board. Id. at 352. During the study
period, the panel averaged 3.72 reviews per week. Id. at 355.
765. Farnsworth, supra note 732, at 41. Doctor Farnsworth adds an additional $205,000
to this figure as representing the cost of total hospital days between patients' refusals
and the ultimate dispositions. However, as noted earlier, this cost is based on the mistaken
premise that delays occasioned by procedural safeguards automatically result in an increase
in the length of hospitalization. See supra note 754. Ciccone and associates engage in the
same unwarranted assumption. See id. The Massachusetts Legislature budgeted over $800,000
in 1986 to cover the legal, clinical, and support staff costs incurred by the comprehensive
judicial review system implemented after the Rogers decision, a system which requires
review of both refusing and consenting patient decisions. DMH Report, supra note 732,
at 20.
766. Brooks, supra note 50, at 202.
767. Id. (citing a report from one New Jersey hospital indicating a one year savings
of $100,000 because of decreased use of medication as a result of the Rennie decree).
768. See Brooks, supra note 15, at 373.
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system .769 Unfortunately, studies rarely address the substantive criteria
on which refusal overrides are based. As a result, few conclusions can
be accurately drawn from the available data.770 Nonetheless, critics of
769. A study performed at the Lima State Hospital in Ohio revealed that the medical
director, who presides over an adversarial-type hearing, overrides 75%0 of patient refusals.
In no case was the medical director's decision overturned by the independent reviewing
psychiatrist. Hickman et al., supra note 727, at 129-30. Other studies at the same facility
found a 71% to 86% override rate by the medical director. Heller, supra note 749,
reported in Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 748, at 289 (7106 override rate); Callahan,
supra note 717, at 312 (86% override rate). A study performed at St. Elizabeth Hospital
in Washington, D.C., found that all nine patient refusals reviewed by the medical director
were overridden on grounds of patient incompetency. Keisling, supra note 749, at 847.
Studies from Oregon, where the patient is not entitled to a hearing, indicate a 95% to
10006 override rate by independent psychiatric reviewers. Bloom et al., supra note 749,
at 315 (950o override rate); Young et al., supra note 749, at 7 (100% override rate).
Under a similar system in California, a one-year study at Napa State Hospital reveals a
98.9% override rate by independent psychiatrists. Hargreaves et al., supra note 733, at
188. Likewise, a report on a comparable process previously implemented in New York
revealed a 95% override rate by the reviewing independent psychiatrist. Cournos et al.,
supra note 728, at 853.
A 1982 study of the treatment review panel system previously in effect in Minnesota
discovered the lowest reported rate of refusal overrides. The multidisciplinary panel at
Anoka State Hospital overrode 67% of patient refusals. Review Panel, supra note 719,
at 355. However, a subsequent study at the Minnesota Security Hospital revealed an 87%
override rate by the panel. Farnsworth, supra note 732, at 40. This retrospective study
also reported on Minnesota's current procedural system in which panel recommendations
for forced treatment are referred for court review. It was found that under these cir-
cumstances, in which the review panel does not act as the ultimate decisionmaker, 95%
of patient refusals are overridden and forwarded to the judiciary. Id. at 37.
Information from Massachusetts indicates that judges overturn patient refusals in
90% to 98.6% of reviews. Veliz & James, supra note 751, at 64 (900o override rate);
Hoge et al., supra note 749, at 167 (96% override rate); DMH Report, supra note 732,
at 26 (98.607o override rate). A Minnesota study found that judges override forensic patient
refusals in 93% of the cases referred by the clinical review panel. Farnsworth, supra note
732, at 39. Studies from New York reveal that requests to forcibly medicate are approved
by the judiciary in 85% to 91% of the cases. Ciccone et al., supra note 451, at 211
(85% authorization rate); Zito et al., supra note 422, at 300 (8707o approval rate); Cournos
et al., supra note 728, at 853 (89% authorization rate); Epidemiologic Study, supra note
732, at 906 (9107 approval rate). In South Dakota, the judicial override rate was 85%
in 1989 and 77% in 1990. South Dakota Human Services Center, Annual Report, Fiscal
Year 1990 at 22.
770. Other variables which may affect the override rate are the reason for the patient's
commitment and the quality of representation for the patient during the refusal review.
A Wisconsin study revealed that during the first six months of judicial review, courts
overrode 100% of the forensic cases presented. Miller et al., supra note 725, at 115.
However, most of the refusers were committed as incompetent to stand trial. The authors
speculated that "judges were unwilling to permit defendants who were incompetent to
proceed to avoid trial by choosing to refuse treatment." Id. In addition, the authors
noted that "few defense attorneys seriously challenged our recommendations for involuntary
treatment." Id. Another factor contributing to the high judicial override rate was a lack
of knowledge regarding appropriate criteria and procedures during this initial implemen-
tation period. Id. at 112, 115.
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court involvement argue that the high judicial override rates indicate
that the legal review process does little to protect patient rights.", Studies
indicate, however, that only those patients deemed most in need of
antipsychotic medication are referred for court review. 772 Indeed, in both
New York and Minnesota, patient refusals are first subject to a clinical
review process. Only those refusals which, are overridden during this
initial screening are referred for court review. 77 Thus, high judicial
override rates are not surprising. And yet the data indicates that override
rates are generally higher when the decisionmaker is a physician rather
than a judge.774
It can also be persuasively argued that high override rates do not
justify revocation of procedural protections. Even a ninety percent over-
ride rate means that ten percent of the patients reviewed are protected
from the inappropriate and unnecessary administration of an intrusive
treatment. It should also be emphasized that the utility of the adversarial
review process cannot be judged by the number of refusals which are
upheld by the court. Instead, the advantages referred to earlier, including
the fostering of consultation and negotiation with the patient, allowing
the patient to participate in his own treatment plan, and taking such
input seriously, are the true measures of the value of judicial involve-
ment. As Professor Brooks stated, the legal system serves to remind
"mental health professionals, particularly psychiatrists, what many of
them had long ignored and should have known, that their patients have
a moral as well as a legal right to participate in their own treatment
programs and to express their reactions to medications. ' 77
X. WASHINGTON V. HARPER: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
ADDRESSES THE RIGHT TO REFUSE IN THE PRISON SETTING
A. The Proceedings Below
In Harper v. State,776 the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
applicability of the professional judgment standard to drug refusal cases. 777
Harper involved a convicted felon, Walter Harper, incarcerated in the
Special Offenders Center (SOC). This correctional institution was es-
771. Veliz & James, supra note 751, at 66.
772. See supra notes 726-727; Veliz & James, supra note 751, at 63; Zito et al., supra
note 422, at 302.
773. See supra note 751.
774. See supra note 769.
775. Brooks, supra note 15, at 374.
776. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358 (Wash. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
777. Washington v. Harper, 489 U.S. 1064, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
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tablished to diagnose and treat prisoners suffering from "serious be-
havioral or mental disorders.' '178
After being diagnosed as mentally ill, Harper voluntarily submitted
to treatment with antipsychotic medication. He was administered a wide
variety of drugs, including Trialafon, Haldol, Prolixin, Taractan, Lox-
itane, Mellaril, and Navene. 779 Harper began experiencing symptoms of
dystonia and akathisia whicli led to his refusal of the medication after
approximately ten months of treatment. 7s0 Harper had a history of
assaultive behavior which was attributed to his mental disorder. His
treating physician believed that antipsychotic drugs reduced such conduct
and sought authorization for involuntary medication."'
The offenders center had a stated policy (Policy 600.30) which
allowed forced treatment with antipsychotic drugs upon a finding that
a prisoner suffers from a mental illness and, as a result, is gravely
disabled or presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself, others, or
their property. 7 2 Procedurally, the policy provided for an informal, in-
house hearing before a committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psy-
chologist, and the associate superintendent of the center. At the time
of the hearing, committee members could not be involved in the inmate's
diagnosis or treatment, although such past involvement was not pro-
hibited. 783
The prisoner was entitled to at least twenty-four hours notice of
the hearing and an explanation of why the drugs were being proposed.
The inmate also had the right to attend the hearing, present evidence,
and cross-examine staff witnesses.78 4 There was no right to legal counsel,
although the assistance of a lay advisor was made available. 785 Prior to
an involuntary medication hearing, the committee met with institutional
staff, ex parte, to determine whether the policy's requirements had been
complied with. At this pre-hearing meeting, staff were allowed to explain
their positions to committee members. 786
778. Harper, 759 P.2d at 360.
779. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1990).
780. Brief of Respondent at 20-21, Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028; Harper,
759 P.2d at 360-61 & n.4.
781. Brief of Respondent at 2-3, Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028.
782. Harper, 494 U.S. at 215, 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 216, 110 S. Ct. at 1033. The rights to present testimony and cross-examine
could be restricted "for reasons that 'include, but are not limited to such things as
irrelevance, lack of necessity, redundancy, possible reprisals, or other reasons relating to
institutional interests or security, order, and rehabilitation."' Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Record, Book 9, Policy 600.30, p.3).
785. Id. at 216, 110 S. Ct. at 1033-34.
786. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 362-63 (Wash. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 210, 110
S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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The policy required approval by the psychiatrist and one other
committee member to authorize non-emergency forced medication. 7 7 The
committee's order, effective for seven days, was appealable to the center's
superintendent. 78 After seven days, a similarly composed committee
could authorize indefinite involuntary medication based on a paper review
of the inmate's file and the minutes of the hearing. 7 9 Members of the
initial hearing committee and treating staff were permitted to serve on
this long-term panel.790 Once indefinite drug treatment was authorized,
the only safeguard was a bi-weekly review and report by the treating
psychiatrist.7 9 1
During his hearing, Harper was represented by a nurse practitioner
from another institution. 792 The committee found Harper to be a danger
to others as a result of a mental disorder and approved involuntary
medication. The SOC superintendent upheld the committee's order on
appeal. 793 Harper was administered antipsychotic drugs on an involuntary
basis until he was transferred to a state penitentiary nearly four years
later. 794 Prior to his transfer, Harper filed suit in state court charging
that the forced medication violated his constitutional rights to equal
protection, free expression, and due process. 79 Although the trial court
found that Harper retained a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic
drugs, it held that the mandates of Policy 600.30 satisfied due process
requirements. 796 Harper appealed directly to the Washington Supreme
Court. 797 The Washington Supreme Court had previously held in the
case of In re Schuoler7 9a that an involuntarily committed mental patient
had a fundamental privacy interest in being free to decide whether to
undergo electroshock therapy (ECT).799 In Harper v. State, the same
court held that because "antipsychotic drug treatment is no less intrusive
than ECT," prisoners retain a fundamental privacy interest, arising from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in refusing drug
787. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215-16, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1033 (1990).
788. Id. at 216, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
789. Id. at 251, 110 S. Ct. at 1052.
790. Id. In this case, Harper's treating psychiatrist was not a member of this long-
term committee. Id. at 216, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
791. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
792. Id. at 217, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
793. Id., I10 S. Ct. at 1034.
794. Id., I10 S. Ct. at 1034.
795. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1034. Harper also brought tort claims under state law.
796. Id. at 217-18, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
797. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (Wash. 1986), rev'd, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.
Ct. 1028 (1990).
798. In re Schouler, 723 P.2d 1103 (Wash. 1986).
799. Id. at 1108.
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
therapy.0 9 The court based the right to refuse on due process grounds,
and did not address Harper's equal protection and First Amendment
claims. 801
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determi-
nation that the policy satisfied due process. The state first pointed to
the Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones 2 and argued that due
process merely requires an independent institutional decisionmaker rather
than a judge in a forced medication review. 03 The state further relied
on Youngberg in maintaining that a "professional decisionmaker" ad-
equately protects the due process rights of mentally disabled persons. s0 4
The Washington Supreme Court, however, distinguished both Young-
berg and Vitek. The court noted that Youngberg did not involve the
issues relevant to a forced medication determination.805 The court stated
that "[h]ere, we are concerned with the administration of mind altering
drugs that have adverse, potentially permanent, side effects. We believe
that the highly intrusive nature of antipsychotic drug treatment warrants
greater protections than those necessary to protect the interest at issue
in Vitek." 0 6 The court concluded that "a judicial hearing is required
before the State may administer antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner against
his will."m'
The Washington Supreme Court relied on Schuoler in defining the
criteria for judicial authorization of forced medication. The reviewing
court must first determine whether the inmate's refusal is competently
made. If not, the court would then make a substituted judgment for
the individual.m A competent refusal or one arising from the substituted
judgment can only be overridden by a compelling state interest. 0 9 If a
compelling state objective is found, the court must then determine whether
800. Harper, 759 P.2d at 362. The court labeled this right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs a "liberty" interest. In so doing, the court cited its previous decisions in Schuoler
and In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363 (Wash. 1984). Id. at 361. These cases
make it clear that the court was relying on the privacy interest in making fundamental
personal decisions and remaining free from unwarranted government intrusions. See Schu-
oler, 723 P.2d at 1108; In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Wash. 1984).
801. Harper, 759 P.2d at 361 n.2. The court did not address the state law tort claims.
Id. at 361.
802. 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
803. Harper, 759 P.2d at 363.
804. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2462
(1982)).
805. Id.
806. Id.
807. Id. The court further supported its holding by noting that the Supreme Court
in Vitek stated that "[i]t is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis'
that justify the requirement of adversary hearings." Id.
808. Id. at 365.
809. Id. at 364.
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treatment with antipsychotic drugs is both necessary and effective, con-
sidering the prognosis with and without the drugs as well as other less
intrusive measures.810
B. The Supreme Court's Review
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Washington
v. Harper1 ' and agreed with the Washington high court in holding that
a prisoner retains a constitutionally protected interest "in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ' A six to three majority,
however, overruled Harper by finding that Policy 600.30 satisfied both
substantive and procedural due process requirements.
1. The Substantive Issue
While conceding that a prisoner's interest in refusing medication is
"significant," 1 3 the Court stated that the "extent of a prisoner's right
... to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must
be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement.11a 4 The majority
then turned to a recently developed line of prison cases emphasizing
the "[s]tate's interests in prison safety and security." ' 5 This jurispru-
dence, beginning with the Court's decision in Turner v. Safley,1 6 has
established that "the proper standard for determining the validity of a
prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights
is to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."'81 17 The Court emphasized that "Itihis is true even
when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is funda-
mental, and the State under other circumstances would have been re-
quired to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review." 8 8 The Court
810. Id. at 364-65.
811. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
812. Id. at 221-22, 110 S. Ct. at 1036. The Court described this right as a liberty
interest and cited both Youngberg and Parham for support. Id. at 222, 110 S. Ct. at
1036-37. In so doing, it appears the Court analogized to the liberty interest in freedom
from bodily restraint rather than the privacy interest in personal decisionmaking and
freedom from unwarranted government intrusions relied on by the Washington Supreme
Court. However, in a subsequent case, Justice Rehnquist stated that the right to refuse
medical treatment is more properly categorized as a liberty rather than a privacy interest.
See supra notes 301-304, 331-334 and accompanying text.
813. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
814. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
815. Id. at 223, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
816. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
817. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S. Ct. at 1037 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
818. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
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determined that the Washington Supreme Court erred in requiring a
compelling rather than a rational state interest to override the respon-
dent's right to refuse medication. 1 9
The Court stressed the legitimacy of the governmental interest, stating
that "[t]here are few cases in which the State's interest in combating
the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is' greater than
in a prison environment, which, 'by definition,' is made up of persons
with a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct. '"820 Citing evidence indicating the effectiveness of antipsychotic
drugs in "treating and controlling a mental illness likely to cause violent
behavior," the Court found that Policy 600.30 is a "rational means of
furthering the State's legitimate objectives."1 2'
The Court rejected Harper's contention that he must be found
incompetent before the State may forcibly treat him with antipsychotic
drugs. Focusing again on the "context of the inmate's confinement, 8 2
the Court reasoned that the respondent's argument "takes no account
of the legitimate governmental interest in treating him where medically
appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses." 23
The Supreme Court also rejected the applicability of the least re-
strictive alternative doctrine. Under Turner's "reasonableness" standard
of review as applied in Harper, prison officials need not consider less
intrusive means in controlling dangerousness, as long as the treatment
method chosen is reasonable.8 24 Only if an "inmate claimant can point
to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's right at de
minimus cost to valid penological interests" may the court "consider
that as evidence that the [treatment] does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard.' '823 The Court concluded its substantive analysis
by stating:
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environment,
the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against
his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.8 26
The Court's analysis of the substantive issue is confusing in a number
of respects. Policy 600.30, which the Court purportedly upholds, falls
819. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
820. Id. at 225, 110 S. Ct. at 1038 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526,
104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
821. Id. at 226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
822. Id. at 222, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
823. Id. at 226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
824. Id. at 225-26, 110 S. Ct. at 1038-39.
825. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 110 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987).
826. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
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short of the standards articulated by the Court. While the policy au-
thorizes forced drugging based on a risk of harm to property, the Court's
holding is limited to danger to self or others. In addition, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in dissent, Policy 600.30 does not require that
antipsychotic drugs be medically appropriate for the inmate. On its face,
the policy allows the forced drugging of a prisoner "based purely on
the impact that his disorder has on the security of the prison environ-
ment." '27 The majority merely assumed that an institutional psychiatrist
would not prescribe drugs for reasons other than the inmate's medical
needs.828 However, the Court then blends the prisoner's interest in med-
ically appropriate treatment with institutional concerns by remarking that
"the treatment in question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner's
medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional con-
finement. ' 29 This statement suggests a balancing by institutional profes-
sionals which may result in forced drugging, even when not medically
appropriate, if institutional needs are deemed to outweigh an inmate's
medical interests.8 30
Authorization of long-term drugging based on the policy's "likeli-
hood of serious harm" standard flows directly from the majority's failure
to adequately distinguish between a prisoner's medical needs and insti-
tutional concerns. As defined by the policy, this police power standard
allows the forced administration of drugs based on mere speculation
that an inmate poses a risk of future harm.8 3' There is no requirement
that the risk of harm be imminent. The abuse that such a "danger-
ousness" standard invites has been described earlier. 832 The Court allows
antipsychotic drugs to be used as a form of chemical restraint in order
to accommodate an ongoing penological interest in security and con-
venient management. As the dissent stated, "It is difficult to imagine
what, if any, limits would restrain such a general concern of prison
administrators who believe that prison environments are, 'by definition,'
.. made up of persons with 'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial
criminal, and often violent, conduct."'8 ' 33 The dissent concluded that
"[t]he result is a muddled rationale that allows the 'exaggerated response'
827. Id. at 243, 110 S. Ct. at 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
828. Id. at 222 n.8, 110 S. Ct. at 1037 n.8.
829. Id. at 222, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
830. However, the Court later stated that the governmental interest was to treat Harper
"where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses." Id. at
226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039. This statement suggests that the medication must be determined
medically appropriate before it can be administered to reduce danger.
831. Id. at 215 n.3, 110 S. Ct. at 1033 n.3.
832. See supra text accompanying notes 370-392.
833. Id. at 247, 110 S. Ct. at 1050 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526,
104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of forced psychotropic medication on the basis of purely institutional
concerns. So serving institutional convenience eviscerates the inmate's
substantive liberty interest in the integrity of his body and mind. ' 34
The Court's refusal to require a finding of incompetence as a
precondition to forced drugging is not surprising in the context of the
state's police power authority. Several lower courts which have authorized
forced medication on police power grounds have not deemed it necessary
to address the patient's ability to make treatment decisions. Whether
competent or not, if the individual presents a threat of violence reaching
the requisite degree, forced treatment has been allowed 3.8
By upholding Policy 600.30, the Court purportedly affirms the re-
gulation's "gravely disabled" standard for compelling drug treatment.
This affirmance creates additional confusion when considered in the
context of the Court's specific holding, which restricts forced medication
to prisoners who are dangerous. As defined, the gravely disabled criterion
includes an individual who "manifests severe deterioration in routine
functioning ...and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or
her health or safety. 8 36 The Court did not have occasion to thoroughly
address this standard as the respondent did not fall within its parameters.
Indeed, the Court justified its holding by referring to the drugs' efficiency
in controlling violent conduct 3" and pointing to the respondent's "long
history of serious, assaultive behavior." '838 In addition, the Court em-
phasized the state's police power interest in preventing violence in a
setting populated by individuals with "a demonstrated proclivity for
antisocial criminal, and often, violent conduct." 839
The gravely disabled standard implicates the state's parens patriae
rather than its police power authority to force treatment. However, the
Court failed to distinguish between a gravely disabling condition and a
condition presenting a "likelihood of serious harm." Instead, the ma-
jority appears to combine the two under the label of "dangerousness"
and implements the same "reasonableness" standard of review for both.
Perhaps the Court deemed an inmate experiencing deterioration in func-
tioning as particularly vulnerable to abusive and violent behavior in a
prison setting. However, labeling a mere deterioration in functioning as
834. Id. at 249-50, 110 S. Ct. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
835. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 655-56 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 974 (Colo. 1985); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y.
1986).
836. Harper, 494 U.S. at 215 n.3, 110 S. Ct. at 1033 n.3.
837. Id. at 226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
838. Id. at 227 n.11, 110 S. Ct. at 1040 n.11.
839. Id. at 228, 110 S. Ct. at 1038.
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dangerousness, thereby invoking the police power standard of review,
eviscerates the restrictions traditionally associated with the state's parens
patriae authority to compel medical treatment.
As explained earlier, when invoked to justify the forced treatment
of the mentally ill, the parens patriae power is based on the compelling
need to help individuals who, because of their mental impairments, are
incapable of evaluating their own need for psychiatric treatment. Thus,
the Court's perfunctory rejection of the need for a finding of incom-
petence before medication can be forced is disturbing in light of the
policy's gravely disabled standard. Whether the Court intended to deprive
a competent prisoner of the right to decide whether to submit to intrusive
treatment when no danger of violence is threatened is less than clear
from its opinion. However, as explained below, in a subsequent clari-
fication of Harper, the Court has indicated that the decision is limited
to situations involving a threat of physical violenceYm
The Court refused to consider the less intrusive measures proffered
by the respondent as acceptable alternatives to forced drugging. The
majority held that measures such as seclusion and physical restraints do
not satisfy the Turner standard because they impose more than a de
minimus cost on limited prison resources.8 4' The Court also indicated
concern that physical restraints leave "the staff at risk of injury while
putting the restraints on or tending to the inmate who is in them."UI
However, as the dissent stated, "Harper's own record reveals that ad-
ministrative segregation and standard disciplinary sanctions were fre-
quently imposed on him over and above the forced medication and thus
would add no new costs."' ' 1 In addition, applying physical restraints or
administering less intrusive drugs such as sedatives pose no greater risk
to staff than nonconsensual intramuscular injections of antipsychotics.8
2. The Procedural Issue
The Court in Harper began a procedural analysis of Policy 600.30
by repeating the guiding considerations previously enunciated in Ma-
thews. 5 In addressing the first factor, the private interest at stake, the
Court described several side effects of antipsychotic drugs. The majority
once again acknowledged that the "[r]espondent's interest in avoiding
840. See infra notes 914-916 and accompanying text. In Harper, the Court supported
its holding on the incompetence issue by reasoning that the respondent's argument did
not take account of the government's interest in "reducing the danger he poses." Harper,
494 U.S. at 226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
841. Id. at 226, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
842. Id. at 227, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
843. Id. at 248, 110 S. Ct. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
844. See id., 110 S. Ct. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
845. Id. at 229, 110 S. Ct. at 1041.
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the unwarranted administration of antipsychotic drugs is not insubstan-
tial." " Notwithstanding the described risks of the drugs, the Court,
citing its previous decisions in Parham and Youngberg, upheld the
policy's procedures as adequate under the Due Process Clause. The
majority supported its holding by characterizing the necessary inquiries-
whether the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and whether, as a
result of that disorder, he is dangerous-as "medical" in nature.8 47 Like
the Fourth Circuit in Charters II, the Supreme Court classified the risks
associated with antipsychotic drugs as "for the most part medical ones."1 8
So characterized, the Court concluded that "an inmate's interests are
adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision
to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. '8 49
Like the Fourth Circuit in Charters II, the Court quoted from Parham
in maintaining that the "fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis"
cannot always be avoided by "shifting the decision from a trained
specialist ... to an untrained judge ... after a judicial-type hearing.
Even after a hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a
medical-psychiatric decision." 5 0 The Court also voiced a concern that
"requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce prison resources, both
money and the staff's time, from the care and treatment of mentally
ill inmates." ''
Finding that -there was "no indication that any institutional biases
affected or altered the decision to medicate respondent against his will,"
the majority was satisfied that the policy's procedures assured "inde-
pendence of the decisionmaker. ' 85 2 The Court further justified its ap-
proval of an internal review system by citing studies which indicate that
even outside decisionmakers most often concur with the treating phy-
sician's recommendation to medicate involuntarily. 53 Finally, the Court
reasoned that because medical personnel are conducting the review, the
rules of evidence and a standard of proof are neither helpful nor
required.8 54 The Court refused to mandate provision of legal counsel,
stating that the "provision of an independent lay advisor who under-
stands the psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection." '55
The criticisms of additional procedural safeguards made by the
Supreme Court in Harper are the same as those made by other courts
846. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1041.
847. Id. at 232, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
848. Id. at 233, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
849. Id. at 232, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
850. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
851. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
852. Id. at 233, 110 S. Ct. at 1043.
853. Id. at 234 n.13, 110 S. Ct. at 1043 n.13.
854. Id. at 235, 110 S. Ct. at 1044.
855. Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1044.
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which have deferred to professional decisionmaking in drug refusal cases.5 6
The dissent accused the majority of according insufficient weight to the
private interests at issue by downplaying the side effects of antipsychotic
drugs. As the dissent noted, the Court relied on outdated data supplied
by the American Psychiatric Association which indicated an unrealisti-
cally low prevalence rate of tardive dyskinesia.8 5 7
Following the Fourth Circuit's lead in Charters II, the Supreme
Court classified the determinations necessary in a forced medication
decision, including the potential for side effects, as medical in nature.85
Thus, the Court concluded that the determinations are best left to medical
professionals rather than a judge.5 9 As explained earlier, however, the
risk of serious harm associated with antipsychotic drugs and the scientific
disagreement over the degree of that risk in any particular case requires
judicial involvement so that varying medical opinions may be thoroughly
and objectively assessed. s6°
The Court cited Parham in criticizing judicial hearings as diverting
money and staff time from the care and treatment of mentally ill
prisoners . 61 The majority, however, failed to consider the growing body
of research, previously described, which documents the therapeutic ben-
efits inuring to adult patients as a result of the judicial process.8 62 Nor
did the Court take into account the very low percentage of refusals
which actually require a hearing.8 63 In addition, for the reasons set forth
earlier, the high rate of refusal overrides to which the Court referred
is not a benchmark of the value of an independent review process.8 "
The majority was satisfied with the independence of the decision-
maker in spite of a record which indicated bias and conflicting interests
inherent to the policy's procedural structure. The committee's pre-hearing
meeting with institutional staff, held ex parte, is but one example of
this bias. Objectivity was further compromised by the fact that panel
members were under the pressure of reviewing the work of colleagues
who, in turn, regularly evaluate panel members' decisions. As the dissent
stated, "Such an in-house system pits the interest of an inmate who
856. See supra text accompanying notes 533-597.
857. Id. at 239 n.5, 110 S. Ct. at 1046 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra
notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
858. Harper, 494 U.S. at 231, 110 S. Ct. at 1039.
859. Id. However, as the dissent noted, "two of the committee members are not
trained or licensed to prescribe psychotropic drugs, and one has no medical expertise at
all." Id. at 254, 110 S. Ct. at 1053 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
860. See supra notes 654-666 and accompanying text.
861. Harper, 494 U.S. at 232, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
862. See supra notes 724-734 and accompanying text.
863. See supra notes 749-750 and accompanying text.
864. See supra notes 771-775 and accompanying text.
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objects to forced medication against the judgment not only of his doctor,
but often his doctor's colleagues.' '865
In addition, committee members, as staff of the facility, were nec-
essarily influenced by institutional concerns unrelated to the inmate's
medical interest. The record revealed instances of abuse due to insti-
tutional pressures. For example, at one point a physician added an
antipsychotic drug to Harper's treatment program merely to "sedate
him at night" thereby relieving the evening staff of a supervisory burden."
The prescribing physician later served on the committee which authorized
long-term involuntary medication for Harper.167
The Court's denial of the right to counsel effectively limits a mentally
ill prisoner's ability to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses on
the complex issues involved in a forced medication decision.'" Fur-
thermore, as the dissent noted, the loyalty of a state-employed lay advisor
is problematic. 69 The majority also failed to explain why a standard of
proof is "neither required nor helpful when medical personnel are making
the judgment" as opposed to when the decisionmaker is a judge or
jury. 70 The dissent termed the proceeding a "mock trial'8 7' and con-
cluded that "it is difficult to imagine how a committee convened under
Policy 600.30 could conceivably discover, much less be persuaded to
override, an erroneous or arbitrary decision to medicate or to maintain
a specific dosage or type of drug. '8 72
XI. BEYOND HARPER: EFFECTS ON THE RIGHT TO REFUSE OUTSIDE
THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
The Harper decision is noteworthy. For the first time, the Supreme
Court expressly recognized that the right to refuse medical treatment is
a constitutionally protected interest. 73 The extensive qualifications placed
865. Harper, 494 U.S. at 251, 110 S. Ct. at 1052 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
866. Id. at 254, 110 S. Ct. at 1054 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
867. Id. at 254, 110 S. Ct. at 1053 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
868. This compromised right to present evidence and to cross-examine could be further
restricted or denied based on "reasons relating to institutional interests of security, order,
and rehabilitation." See supra note 781.
869. To make matters worse, the inmate was not introduced to the lay advisor until
the commencement of the hearing. Harper, 494 U.S. at 256 n.30, 110 S. Ct. at 1055
n.30.
870. See id. at 235, 110 S. Ct. at 1044.
871. Id. at 237, 110 S. Ct. at 1045.
872. Id. at 257, 110 S. Ct. at 1055. The decision to administer long-term medication
is not preceded by a hearing, but rather by a mere paper review. Id. at 251, 110 S. Ct.
at 1052.
873. Id. at 221-22, 110 S. Ct. at 1036. See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (citing Harper for the "principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment").
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on this right in Harper are the result of a rationale developed by the
Supreme Court in cases addressing the rights of convicted prisoners.
The Court did not discuss whether some or all of these limitations apply
to involuntarily confined civil patients. In a line of cases dating back
to the mid-1960s, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly distin-
guished between the substantive and procedural rights of individuals
imprisoned through the criminal justice system and those involuntarily
hospitalized through the civil system.174 This criminal-civil distinction
suggests that the restrictions on a convicted prisoner's right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs are not automatically applicable to civil patients.
The Court's reasoning in Harper revolved around three factors: 1)
the respondent was convicted of criminal behavior; 2) because of a
mental illness, he was deemed to present a danger of violent behavior
to other inmates and staff; and 3) he was confined in a prison envi-
ronment. The Court's "reasonableness" standard for reviewing state
penological objectives was developed out of concern for preventing vi-
olence in the prison setting. The Court stated that the extent of a
convicted prisoner's right to refuse "must be defined in the context of
the inmate's confinement. 8 1 75 As the Court emphasized, "There are few
cases in which the State's interest in combating the danger posed by a
person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment,
which, 'by definition,' is made up of persons with 'a demonstrated
proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct."' 87 6 The
Court, in Harper, suggested that "under other circumstances [the State]
would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of re-
view.' 87
Not long after the Harper decision, the Supreme Court had occasion
to review slightly different circumstances. In the 1992 case of Riggins
v. Nevada,178 the Court addressed the right of a pretrial detainee to
refuse antipsychotic drugs deemed necessary by the State to insure trial
competency. The petitioner Riggins, who was asserting an insanity de-
fense, claimed that the forced administration of antipsychotic medication
violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Riggins argued that the drugs "denied him the ability to assist in his
874. Baxtrom v Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S. Ct. 760 (1966); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804
(1979); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983). See generally John Parry, The Supreme Court
Fashions New Boundaries for Involuntary Care and Treatment, 14 Mental & Physical
Disability L. Rep. 198 (1990).
875. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
876. Id. at 225, 110 S. Ct. at 1038 (citation omitted).
877. Id. at 223, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
878. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
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own defense and prejudicially affected his attitude, appearance, and
demeanor at trial. ' 879
The majority referred to Harper in stating that a prison inmate has
a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs. 8 0 However, "[taking account of
the unique circumstances of penal confinement ...due process allows
a mentally ill inmate to be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs
where there is a determination that 'the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.' 88' Thus,
the Court stated that "[uinder Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on
a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness. ' 8 2 The
Court went on to hold that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at
least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial." ' 3
After acknowledging the lack of substantive standards for judging
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs in the trial or pretrial
settings, the majority established parameters for such determinations.8 4
The State would have satisfied due process upon a finding that the
"medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive
alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety
of others.''885 In addition, the State might have justified medically ap-
propriate, forced medication by establishing that its fundamental interest
in obtaining an adjudication of guilt or innocence could not be accom-
plished by any less intrusive means.8 8 6 The Court did not find it necessary
to finally prescribe such substantive standards, as the lower court allowed
the administration of antipsychotic drugs "without making any deter-
mination of the need for this course or any findings about reasonable
alternatives .... Nor did the order indicate a finding that safety con-
siderations or other compelling concerns outweighed Riggins' interest in
freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.' '887 The Court, therefore,
reversed and remanded the case for further findings.
Although the majority refused to mandate substantive criteria in
Riggins, it did suggest a more rigorous standard of review for the
involuntary medication of pretrial detainees than that articulated in
Harper for convicted inmates. Rather than deferring to a rational state
879. Id. at 1813.
880. Id. at 1814.
881. Id. at 1815.
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id.
886. Id.
887. Id. at 1815-16.
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interest as in Harper, the Court indicated that "safety considerations
or other compelling concerns" must be asserted in order to override a
pretrial detainee's liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs."' 8 The
Court also suggested a less intrusive analysis of the type rejected in
Harper.8 9 As Justice Thomas acknowledged in dissent, "[ejither the
Court is seeking to change the Harper standards or it is adopting different
standards for detainees.'"'s9
The Supreme Court's opinions in Harper and Riggins establish an
interesting categorization of drug refusal cases. At one end are cases
involving individuals who have been determined by a court to have
engaged in criminal behavior and are incarcerated in a prison environ-
ment. Under Harper, these inmates' refusals would be subject to a
"reasonableness" standard of review. A showing that without medication
the prisoner presents a risk of danger to himself or others due to a
mental illness would justify medically appiopriate, involuntary treatment.
Less intrusive alternatives need not be considered as long as the proposed
state action is reasonable. 9 1
A middle category of cases involve pretrial detainees, individuals
held in a prison setting but not yet convicted. The. Supreme Court's
opinion in Riggins indicates that drug refusals by these individuals are
subject to a much stricter standard of review. To override the refusal,
the state must show that medically appropriate drugs are essential to
prevent danger or to accomplish some other "compelling" objective. In
addition, a finding that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs is
the least intrusive measure to accomplish the state objective appears to
be required.8 92
At the other end of the spectrum are cases involving individuals
who have been involuntarily committed to civil psychiatric facilities.
These individuals would appear to be entitled to the most exacting
standard of review. The justifications for the "reasonableness" standard
adopted in Harper are lacking in these cases. Persons committed through
the civil process are not confined because they have been convicted of
criminal behavior. Thus, these individuals should be entitled to at least
as much protection as that accorded pretrial detainees. Moreover, in-
voluntarily committed individuals are not confined in a prison environ-
ment. Security concerns in a public hospital, while important, cannot
be equated with those present in a prison. The Supreme Court empha-
sized this point in Jones v. United States.193 In addressing the com-
888. Id. at 1816.
889. Id.
890. Id. at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
891. See supra notes 813-825 and accompanying text.
892. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
893. 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
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mitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, the
Court stated that "[tihe fact that a person has been found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness." 94 The Court suggested that this "concrete evidence"
of criminal behavior is what sets such defendants apart as generally
being more dangerous than individuals committed through the civil sys-
tem. 95 Both Jones and Harper indicate that the Supreme Court considers
the prison environment especially vulnerable to security and management
problems because its population has an established capacity for criminal
behavior.
The refusal issue was presented to Maryland's highest court only
three months after the Harper decision. In Williams v. Wilzak,8 9 a case
decided before the Supreme Court's opinion in Riggins, the Maryland
Court of Appeals was presented with a constitutional challenge to a
statute which authorized a clinical review panel to override an institu-
tionalized patient's objection to medication . 97
The appellant, Williams, had been charged with attempted rape and
battery. After being found competent to stand trial, Williams was ad-
judicated not criminally responsible for his criminal conduct due to a
mental disorder.898 As a result of this verdict, Williams was committed
to a state psychiatric institution until he was no longer deemed to present
a danger to self, others, or property.8 99
While institutionalized, Williams refused antipsychotic medication
based on his fear of side effects and the drugs' ability to disrupt his
thought processes. Williams claimed that the medication would interfere
with his ability to engage in Muslim religious prayer and to assist his
attorney in subsequent release hearings. 90° On two separate occasions,
894. Id. at 364, 103 S. Ct. at 3049.
895. Id. This holding cannot be interpreted to justify the forced medication of any
mentally ill prisoner on the basis of dangerousness simply due to past criminal behavior
in the community. As the Harper opinion makes clear, compelled drugging must be based
on a showing that an inmate, as a result of mental illness, presents a danger to himself
or others within the prison setting. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227, 110 S.
Ct. 1028, 1039 (1990).
896. 573 A.2d 809 (Md. 1990).
897. The statute allowed an institutionalized patient to refuse medication except in
emergency situations where the patient presents a danger to himself or others or in non-
emergency situations when the medication is approved by a clinical review panel. The
panel is composed of the clinical director if a physician, or a non-treating physician
designated by the director; a non-treating psychiatrist; and a non-physician mental health
service provider. Id. at 810.
898. Id. at 810-11.
899. Id. at 811.
900. Id.
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the clinical review panel authorized forced drugging based on a finding
that without medication, Williams would become more hostile. 9°1
Williams filed suit and, on appeal to the Maryland high court,
argued that a competent individual has a constitutional right to refuse
drug treatment in non-emergency situations. 902 Williams further claimed
that due process requires a court determination of incompetency before
drugs can be forcibly administered. 93
The Maryland court emphasized the civil-criminal distinction in ex-
amining the substantive component of the statute.9 While noting that
the case did not involve a convicted felon confined in a penal institution
as in Harper, the appellant's confinement "was mandated by law as a
consequence of his having been found not criminally responsible for his
criminal acts." 95 Because Williams' confinement was a result of proven
criminal behavior, the court applied Harper in upholding the substantive
portion of the Maryland legislation.9 The court found that the statute
appropriately "limits the authority of the panel to order that such drugs
be involuntarily given to Williams for any purpose other than for his
mental disorder and only to treat the illness which renders him a danger
to himself or others.)' '
In examining the procedural component of the statute, however, the
court found that it fell short of the procedures upheld in Harper. The
court therefore held the statute invalid under procedural due process
requirements."' As a result, the case was governed by the common law
of Maryland which, ironically, prohibits forcing medication on an adult
who has not been adjudicated incompetent, absent an emergency.9
Williams indicates that the civil-criminal distinction may be less clear
when individuals are committed to a civil psychiatric facility due to a
risk of violent behavior. However, the Maryland court, by focusing
solely on the appellant's proven criminal conduct, ignored the Supreme
Court's directive in Harper that the extent of the right to refuse "must
901. Id. at 81-12. The panel described Williams as "moderately hostile and suspi-
cious." The panel also found that Williams was unable to make a rational treatment
decision despite expert testimony to the contrary.
902. Williams claimed that the state statute violated his "state and federal constitutional
rights to privacy, due process, freedom of speech, thought, and religion." He later added
an equal protection claim. Id. at 812.
903. Id. at 812-13. Williams pointed out that under Maryland law, commitment does
not give rise to a presumption of incompetence.
904. Id. at 820.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Id.
908. Id. at 820-21.
909. Id. at 821.
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be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement." 910 As explained
above, the "reasonableness" standard of review applied in Harper was
developed out of concern for security in the prison setting. Applying
this minimal review to a case involving a civil inpatient setting removes
the standard from its conceptual underpinnings. Unlike the situation in
Harper, an individua. committed into a non-forensic civil psychiatric
facility is not placed into an environment which 'by definition' is made
up of persons with 'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal,
and often violent, conduct."' 911 Thus, although security and orderly
management are important concerns in public hospitals, the level of
such concerns cannot be equated to that present in penological settings.
Therefore, when an intrusive treatment is proposed, the patient's medical
interests should not, as was the case in Harper, be blended with insti-
tutional concerns in security and ease of management. At a minimum,
a standard of review should distinguish between emergency and non-
emergency situations which can be addressed by less intrusive measures.
Further, the least restrictive alternative principle should apply where
citizens have not been convicted of a crime and are placed in a ther-
apeutic rather than a penal environment. 92 Indeed, application of the
principle appears required in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Riggins. There, the Court indicated the necessity of a least intrusive
analysis when reviewing the refusal of a pretrial detainee, even though
confined in a prison setting. 9 3
The effects of the Harper decision on the scope of the state's parens
patriae authority is less than clear given the Court's upholding of the
prison policy at issue. As explained above, an unsettling possibility is
that the Court's opinion may provide a basis for equating a hospitalized
patient's deterioration in functioning with dangerousness. In such a case,
the justification for imposing treatment would shift from the parens
patriae rationale to the police power authority. Under this reasoning, a
finding of incompetency-the traditional precondition to the exercise of
the state's parens patriae authority-would no longer be necessary. 91 4
However, this concern has been diminished by Justice Kennedy, the
drafter of the Harper decision. In his concurring opinion in Riggins,
910. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 244, 110 S, Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990).
911. Id. at 225, 110 S. Ct. at 1038. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Jones,
there is no legally sufficient finding that an individual who is civilly committed has engaged
in criminal behavior. See supra notes 893-895 and accompanying text. Furthermore, most
states do not limit civil commaitment to those who present a risk of violent conduct. Many
mentally ill individuals are committed because of an inability to meet their basic needs
in the community. See supra notes 430-431 and accompanying text.
912. See Parry, supra note 874, at 202.
913. See supra notes 885-887 and accompanying text.
914. See supra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
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Justice Kennedy clarified Harper by indicating that the decision was
intended to address only situations in which a threat of physical violence
is present. 911 Thus, a mere deterioration in functioning, in itself, would
not qualify under the dangerousness standard articulated in Harper. This
interpretation would appear appropriate. While the treatment of serious
physical and mental disorders is a legitimate state objective as well as
a duty in both the criminal and civil context, the Tenth Circuit has
stated:
The premise underlying this duty is that the state may not
deliberately fail to provide medical treatment when it is desired
by the detainee. . . . This . .. requirement cannot be turned on
its head to mean that if a competent individual chooses not to
undertake the risks or pains of a potentially dangerous treatment,
the [state] may force him to accept it. 916
Ironically, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the applicability of
the informed consent doctrine in the mental disability area. In a 1990
case, Zinermon v. Burch,917 the Court ruled that state officials can be
held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to obtain
the informed consent of a mentally ill individual before hospitalizing
him on a voluntary basis. 918 The right to exercise informed consent to
intrusive medical treatment, a right deeply imbedded in the common
law and encompassed within the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, should not be taken from a nonviolent, com-
petent individual, whether institutionalized in a penological or civil set-
ting. 91
9
Procedurally, the Supreme Court in Harper upheld an informal in-
house review of treatment refusals as satisfying due process requirements.
Whether such procedures would be sufficient outside the prison context
is unclear. The Court's inappropriate characterization of the necessary
inquiries as "medical" in nature may indicate its willingness to defer
to institutional decisionmaking.
915. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1818 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy stated that Harper was a case "in which the purpose of the involuntary medication
was to insure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or
others." Id.
916. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985) (emphasis in original).
917. 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
918. Id. at 137, 110 S. Ct. at 990.
919. Although the Supreme Court in Jones stated that a finding of criminal conduct
beyond a reasonable doubt indicates dangerousness, a more specific inquiry is necessary
before the state may invoke its police power authority. It must also be determined that
the inmate, due to a mental disorder, presents a risk of violence in the prison setting.
See supra note 895 and accompanying text.
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The Court, however, took into account only three inquiries: 1)
whether the prisoner suffers from a mental disorder; 2) whether, as a
result of that disorder, the inmate is dangerous; and 3) the risks as-
sociated with antipsychotic drugs.920 It must be emphasized that the
Court did not address competency inquiries which are necessary when
the state invokes its parens patriae authority to force treatment. Com-
petency, as previously addressed, is a legal and not a medical concept.
These determinations should continue to be made by a judicial deci-
sionmaker. The Harper decision provides no basis to argue otherwise.
XII. CONCLUSION
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court did not intend to
establish one standard of review to be applied in all cases involving the
rights of institutionalized disabled individuals. The Court applied its
traditional analytical framework for determining whether government
action unconstitutionally infringes upon protected individual interests.
The Court balanced the private interest at stake-defined as a liberty
interest in freedom from physical restraints-against the state's reasons
for infringement. 92' Considering the nature of the protected interest
involved under the circumstances and the character of the state action,
the Court concluded that the restrictions should be upheld upon the
minimal showing of a reasonable relation to legitimate objectives. 922 The
Court then fashioned the professional judgment standard as a method
of determining whether the state's showing satisfies the "reasonableness"
standard.
By automatically applying Youngberg's professional judgment stan-
dard to drug refusal cases, courts such as the Fourth Circuit in Charters
II and the Eighth Circuit in Dautremont invert the traditional framework
for constitutional analysis. These courts misuse a standard of review to
define the constitutional interests at issue as opposed to assuring that
such rights are appropriately implemented. 923 Under the rubric of "pro-
fessional judgment," the protected interests implicated by the forced
920. Harper, 494 U.S. at 232, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
921. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-20, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 (1982).
922. Id. at 320-22, 102 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
923. See generally Parry, supra note 709, at 384. A standard of review simply "denotes
the degree of deference that a reviewing court gives to the actions or decisions under
review." Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L.
Rev. 469, 469 (1987-88). Justice Brennan stated: "A standard of review frames the terms
in which justification may be offered, and thus delineates the boundaries within which
argument may take place. The use of differing levels of scrutiny proclaims that on some
occasions official power must justify itself in a way that otherwise it need not." O'Lone
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356-58, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2408-09 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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administration of potentially hazardous drugs are automatically equated
to the interests at issue in Youngberg. As a result of this blind extension
of Youngberg, any retained interests of an involuntarily institutionalized
individual "must yield to the legitimate governmental interests that are
incidental to the basis for legal institutionalization ... and are only
afforded protection against arbitrary and capricious government ac-
tion. '924 This appears to remain true regardless of the nature of the
interests at stake and the extent of the intrusion presented.
Conspicuously absent from the Supreme Court's opinion in Harper
is any mention of the professional judgment standard. Indeed, in its
recent Cruzan decision, the Court expressly acknowledged that Young-
berg "did not deal with decisions to administer or withhold medical
treatment. ' 921 However, the Court's application of Turner's "reasona-
bleness" standard of review differs little from the professional judgment
standard as applied by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. Under the Turner
standard, a prison regulation which infringes upon an inmate's consti-
tutional rights, regardless of the nature of those rights and the type of
infringement presented, is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.' '926
This article maintains that the Harper rationale is limited to situations
involving a convicted individual confined in a penal setting and deter-
mined to be a danger to himself or others due to a mental illness.
However, even the minimal, if not meaningless, protections afforded
such prisoners go beyond those provided to a pretrial detainee in Charters
II and an involuntarily committed civil patient in Dautremont.917 The
Harper opinion indicates that the Court will consider only certain gov-
ernmental interests as being sufficiently legitimate to justify forced med-
ication under the "reasonableness" standard. The Court's specific holding
makes it clear that absent a finding of a mental disorder resulting in
a danger of physical violence, the state cannot force antipsychotic drugs
on a competent individual in the prison environment. 921 Involuntary
treatment must also be directly related to controlling dangerous behavior
and cannot be used solely to treat aspects of a mental disorder unrelated
924. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1016, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990) (citations omitted). Accord Dautremont v. Broadlawns
Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987).
925. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
926. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990).
927. The substantive restrictions placed on a pretrial detainee's right to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs by the Fourth Circuit in Charters II would appear to be in serious question
after the Supreme Court suggested a heightened standard of review for these individuals
in Riggins.
928. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
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to the dangerous behavior. 929 Moreover, the Court's holding requires
that any such treatment be medically beneficial. 930
The Harper decision also overrules the procedural components of
cases such as Charters II and Dautremont which adopt an approach of
unqualified deference to professional judgment. The Supreme Court
required that there be "procedural safeguards to ensure the prisoner's
interests are taken into account. ' '931 The Court upheld an informal, in-
house review with certain accompanying procedures. 932 As minimal as
these procedures are, they are something more than an unqualified
deference to the judgment of a treating professional. Unfortunately, due
to the conflicting interests and bias inherent to such in-house review
systems, any additional protection perceived is, in reality, quite illusory. 93
The extensive qualifications placed on the right to refuse in Harper
are the result of a standard of review developed specifically for indi-
viduals with a demonstrated proclivity for criminal conduct confined in
the inherently violent atmosphere of the prison environment. In other
circumstances, the Court indicated that the state "would have been
required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. ' 934 When sub-
sequently presented with different circumstances in Riggins-involving a
pretrial detainee-the Court went on to suggest a more rigorous standard
of review. This article maintains that any such standard must recognize
that involuntarily hospitalized individuals with mental disabilities are not
per se dangerous or incompetent. These individuals have not been con-
victed of criminal conduct and are confined in therapeutic rather than
penal settings. As such, these citizens should be accorded the same rights
to self-determination and bodily integrity that all enjoy as members of
a civilized society.
929. The Court stated that "[wlhere an inmate's mental disability is the root cause
of the threat he poses to the inmate population, the State's interest in decreasing the
danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with medical treat-
ment for his illness." Id., 110 S. Ct. at 1039. See generally Parry, supra note 874, at
202.
930. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110 S. Ct. at 1040.
931. Id. at 233, 110 S. Ct. at 1043.
932. See supra notes 845-872 and accompanying text. The Maryland Court of Appeals
has indicated that these procedures are the minimum necessary to satisfy procedural due
process requirements. See supra notes 908-909 and accompanying text.
933. It must be emphasized that the Court did not address the procedures necessary
in a competency determination. See supra note 920 and accompanying text.
934. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
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